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ABSTRACT
This Article sets forth a new model of parental rights designed to
free children and families from the ideals of parent–child unity and
family privacy that underlie the law’s expansive protection for parental
rights. The law currently presumes that parents’ interests coincide with
those of their children, creating an illusion of parent–child union that
suppresses the very real ways in which children’s interests and
identities, even at a young age, may depart from those of their parents.
Expansive protection for parental rights also confines children to the
private family, ignoring children’s broad range of interests beyond the
family and thwarting calls for more robust state support of children
subordinated by race and class.
The new model of parental rights presented here brings children out
from under parental control and into public view. The model conceives
of parental rights in relational terms, offering greater state support for
the parent–child relationship, addressing the race and class biases
underlying expansive parental rights, and highlighting children’s
independent interests and agency. This new approach calls for the
highest scrutiny of governmental action that threatens to separate
parents and children, but a less strict level of scrutiny for governmental
action that intrudes upon parental authority in ways that support
children’s independent interests and agency. The model also
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strengthens the parent–child relationship by urging a radical increase
in affirmative support for all children, but especially for low-income
children and children of color who suffer the most under a legal regime
that privatizes the costs of children’s upbringing.
This reenvisioning of parental rights has the potential to transform
a broad range of laws affecting the lives of children and parents. The
Article analyzes several issues of critical importance to children’s
welfare: homeschooling; transgender youth medical decisionmaking;
foster care; children’s peer relationships; and the forced separation of
parents and children through immigration detention, child welfare
removal, and parental incarceration. By calling for greater state
support of both children and families, the “new parental rights”
challenges the privatization of dependency; fosters diversity of family
life; and respects the independent capacities, values, beliefs, and
identities of all children.
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INTRODUCTION
This Article sets forth a new model of parental rights designed to
free children and families from the ideals of parent–child unity and
family privacy that underlie the law’s current protection of expansive
parental rights. Parents today enjoy robust constitutional, statutory,
and common law rights to raise children in the manner they see fit, with
the state generally stepping in only to educate children or to protect
children from serious harm.1 This expansive protection for parental
rights reflects the longstanding view that children’s interests generally
coincide with those of their parents, in the same way wives’ interests
were once assumed to coincide with those of their husbands.2
In this Article, we challenge the law’s assumption of parent–child
unity, highlighting the many ways in which children’s interests may
diverge from those of their parents and calling on courts and
legislatures to recalibrate the scope of parental rights to better support
and nurture the full range of children’s diverse capacities and interests.
Although concerns about expansive parental rights and their
detrimental effects on children’s interests have been voiced over the
years,3 courts and commentators largely remain staunchly committed

1. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65–66 (2000) (plurality opinion); Parham v.
J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213 (1972); Martha Minow,
Rights for the Next Generation: A Feminist Approach to Children’s Rights, 9 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J.
1, 7 (1986).
2. See infra notes 26–29 and accompanying text.
3. For other critiques of expansive parental rights, see Elizabeth Bartholet,
Homeschooling: Parent Rights Absolutism vs. Child Rights to Education and Protection, 62 ARIZ.
L. REV. 1, 3 (2020); Katharine T. Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood, 98 YALE L.J. 293, 294–95
(1988); Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The Need for Legal
Alternatives When the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 VA. L. REV. 879, 887–90
(1984) [hereinafter Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood]; Anne C. Dailey & Laura A. Rosenbury,
The New Law of the Child, 127 YALE L.J. 1448, 1470–72 (2018); James G. Dwyer, Parents’
Religion and Children’s Welfare: Debunking the Doctrine of Parents’ Rights, 82 CALIF. L. REV.
1371, 1413 (1994); Martha Albertson Fineman & George Shepherd, Homeschooling: Choosing
Parental Rights over Children’s Interests, 46 U. BALT. L. REV. 57, 59 (2016); Samantha Godwin,
Against Parental Rights, 47 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 23–34 (2015); Melissa Murray, The
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to the protection of near-absolute parental rights of childrearing.4 And
that commitment has only solidified in recent years.5
Law has long romanticized the family as a place of unified interests
and shared values. This romanticized vision of the family portrays
children as innocent, dependent, and passive beings in need of adult
care, supervision, and guidance. While clearly true to some extent, this
portrait of the dependent child obscures the ways in which children
actively engage as agents in the world and downplays the ways in which
the parent–child relationship may be one of troubling domination and
control. The end of marital coverture took a first step toward
challenging law’s overly romantic view of the family by eliminating
husbands’ right of control over their wives. This Article takes the
second step by revealing law’s overly romantic vision of parent–child
unity. We aim to bring children’s agency and other interests to light,
thereby exposing the damaging effects of the law’s expansive
conception of parental rights, particularly for children who are
different from their parents or grow up in families that do not conform
to the “private” nuclear family norm.
The law’s current protection of expansive parental rights has three
especially pernicious effects. First, it merges children’s interests into
those of their parents, thereby denying the reality of children’s
independent selves. We recognize that children need parental guidance
and caregiving; children’s primary attachment to their parents is the

Networked Family: Reframing the Legal Understanding of Caregiving and Caregivers, 94 VA. L.
REV. 385, 389 (2008); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, From Property to Personhood: A ChildCentered Perspective on Parents’ Rights, 5 GEO. J. ON FIGHTING POVERTY 313, 319 (1998)
[hereinafter Woodhouse, From Property to Personhood]; Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Hatching
the Egg: A Child-Centered Perspective on Parents’ Rights, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1747, 1809–12,
1828–29 (1993) [hereinafter Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg]; Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, “Who
Owns the Child?”: Meyer and Pierce and the Child as Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995,
1041–50 (1992) [hereinafter Woodhouse, Who Owns the Child].
4. See Martin Guggenheim, The (Not So) New Law of the Child, 127 YALE L.J.F. 942, 943–
44 (2018); Emily Buss, “Parental” Rights, 88 VA. L. REV. 635, 636 (2002); Elizabeth S. Scott &
Robert E. Scott, Parents as Fiduciaries, 81 VA. L. REV. 2401, 2417–18 (1995); Troxel, 530 U.S. at
66 (plurality opinion).
5. For example, the American Law Institute’s current attempt to restate the field of
children and law doubles down on broad protection for parental rights. See RESTATEMENT OF
THE LAW, CHILDREN AND THE LAW ch. 1, intro. note (AM. L. INST., Tentative Draft No. 1, 2018)
[hereinafter A.L.I. Tentative Draft 1] (endorsing “strong parental rights” over education,
discipline, medical treatment, and religious upbringing); see also Clare Huntington & Elizabeth
S. Scott, Conceptualizing Legal Childhood in the Twenty-First Century, 118 MICH. L. REV. 1371,
1413–18 (2020) (arguing that the promotion of child wellbeing is a rationale for strong parental
rights).
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single most important factor in children’s wellbeing and development.6
Children’s attachment to their parents justifies strong support for the
parent–child relationship, particularly in the face of state removal or
other efforts to separate children and parents. But unencumbered
parental rights that suppress children’s independent interests and
agency may leave children isolated from broader communities and
suffering from unreasonable parental control. For example, even wellintentioned parents may reject their child’s chosen gender identity and
deny needed medical care; they may unilaterally terminate children’s
relationships with important caregivers or nonfamily mentors; they
may deny children access to ideas or information, including access to
the internet; or they may refuse to allow children to participate in
activities outside the home, including preventing them from attending
public or private schools. The broad scope of parental rights hides
parent–child differences and divisions behind a false front of family
unity.
Second, expansive parental rights cloister children within a
parent-dominated private sphere, especially harming racially and
economically marginalized children. Although many assume that
parental rights protect children from intervention by the state, this is
true only with respect to well-resourced parents. Expansive parental
rights relegate children to private family support unless the state
determines that parents are failing to meet children’s needs, in which
case the state moves to intervene.7 As the literature on racial
disproportionality shows, the ideal of the private family especially
burdens Black children, who removed from their parents at much
higher rates than white children.8 Unhoused youth, youth with
disabilities, and transgender youth are also harmed when law leaves
children’s caregiving to the private realm of parental power. The allor-nothing conception of parental rights ties children’s life
opportunities to their parents’ resources, thereby reinforcing family
inequality and absolving the state of more robust duties to support
parents and children before problems arise.

6. Anne Alstott, Anne C. Dailey & Douglas NeJaime, Prioritizing Psychological
Parenthood, 106 MINN L. REV. (forthcoming Sep. 12, 2021) (manuscript at 8–10) (on file with the
authors).
7. The state does have parens patriae powers to override parental authority in certain
circumstances, such as child labor. See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
However, these powers are very limited. Even in the area of education, parents have the right to
homeschool their children in all states. See infra Part III.A.1.
8. See infra note 345–47 and accompanying text.
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Third, law’s relegation of children to the private sphere of parental
control cuts children off from broader communities of support and
connection. Advocates for expansive parental rights emphasize the
dangers of state authority but fail to acknowledge the importance of
community involvement in furthering children’s welfare, affirming
children’s values and identity, and socializing children into the broader
society.9 These communities may include neighborhoods, sports teams,
youth clubs, religious congregations, extended family, political groups,
and professionals such as pediatricians, psychologists, counselors,
lawyers, and social workers. These communities exist not fully within
the family nor within the state but instead in a social realm that one of
us has described as lying “between home and school.”10 The traditional
model of expansive parental rights either subsumes these communities
under the broad category of “the state,” and then rejects this
undifferentiated category as a threat to personal freedom, or treats
these communities as under full parental control, which is simply not
the case.11 In these spaces children encounter diverse people and are
exposed to a range of values and beliefs, often using these spaces to
form their own identities and influence the identities of other
children.12 The model of expansive parental rights ignores the vital
importance of these diverse communities to children’s present welfare
and upbringing.
This Article aims to reduce these harms by proposing a
fundamental reworking of parental rights and the conception of
children that underlies this area. We offer a model of parental rights
that better recognizes the relational dimension to parental rights by
respecting children’s independent identities and the diversity of
families and communities in which children actually live. To date, the
United States Supreme Court has not established a clear standard of
review for laws implicating parental authority over children.13

9. Laura A. Rosenbury, Between Home and School, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 833, 843–50 (2007);
see also Martha Minow, Interpreting Rights: An Essay for Robert Cover, 96 YALE L.J. 1860, 1871–
77 (1987) (emphasizing how children’s rights are dependent upon an established community
order).
10. Rosenbury, supra note 9 passim.
11. See id. at 856–75.
12. See infra Part III.B.2.
13. See Margaret Ryznar, A Curious Parental Right, 71 SMU L. REV. 127, 128 (2018) (“[T]he
Court has not articulated a consistent level of scrutiny for judicial review of restrictions on the
parental right.”); David D. Meyer, The Paradox of Family Privacy, 53 VAND. L. REV. 527, 529
(2000) (describing the “uncertainty and confusion” surrounding the family privacy doctrines).
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Importantly, although our model will not wholly displace the
longstanding presumption that parents act to further their children’s
interests, we recognize that some intrusions on parental authority are
necessary to ensure that children’s interests are understood and
respected. Governmental actions that threaten the existence of the
parent–child relationship must be carefully reviewed, but not all
intrusions on parental authority are deserving of the highest scrutiny.
We thus adopt a two-tiered standard of review in order to better
account for children’s independent interests, particularly as children
grow and their agency and interests expand beyond the family. Because
maintaining the parent–child bond is so crucial to children’s welfare,
our model adopts the strictest level of judicial review for state action
that threatens the physical separation of parents and children. But for
laws or state conduct that seek to promote children’s welfare with less
intrusive effects on parental authority, a lower standard of review is
appropriate, one that asks whether the government action substantially
furthers children’s independent interests and agency.14 Importantly, we
do not adopt a broad presumption that parents always act to further
their children’s interests. As Justice Stevens emphasized in Troxel v.
Granville,15 “even a fit parent is capable of treating a child like a mere
possession.”16
In implementing this two-tiered standard, our model posits an
important role for persons other than the state in helping to identify
and further children’s independent interests. Pediatricians, teachers,
coaches, youth counselors, psychologists, developmental scientists, and
a host of persons and diverse communities with a stake in children’s
present and future welfare should be involved in the important process
of articulating children’s independent interests and in ensuring that
these interests are fostered by parents, the broader community, and
public actors. In earlier work, we drew on developmental psychology,
social science, and legal scholarship to begin to articulate children’s
broader interests, including children’s interests in relationships with
parents as well as with children and other adults; exposure to new
ideas; expressions of identity; personal integrity and privacy; and

14. While two commentators have expressly proposed an intermediate standard of review,
see Ryznar, supra note 13, at 154 (proposing an intermediate standard of review for “health issues
and visitation issues”); Meyer, supra note 13, at 571, these proposals fail to focus on children’s
independent interests as an inherent limiting principle for parental rights.
15. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
16. Id. at 86 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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participation in civic life.17 Even in infancy, children have interests that
may conflict with their parents’ wishes, such as interests in bodily safety
and privacy from public view, and the law should take account of those
interests and the people best situated to protect them.
Our new model of parental rights therefore expands state power
to some extent but not in the wholesale manner some critics fear.18
Under our model, courts will not be adjudicating minor disputes
between parents and children. Parents will still enjoy rights to control
their children’s upbringing except when state involvement is warranted
to further children’s important interests in areas such as personal
identity, relationships, or activities outside the home. Because
children’s interests and agency change over time, our model would
extend broader parental rights to the parents of infants and narrow
those rights as children pass through middle childhood and later
adolescence when they are developing their own values and
preferences.
In summary, the new parental rights aims to reconceive parental
rights in relational terms, provide broad structural supports for the
parent–child relationship, address the race and class biases underlying
expansive parental rights, and further children’s independent interests
and agency, including their ties to broader communities. Although we
style our model as “new,” we build upon the work of earlier scholars
who advocated for greater legal recognition of children’s interests and
agency,19 but we incorporate and expand upon these earlier efforts in
proposing a comprehensive shift away from parental rights of control
toward greater public support for children and recognition of children’s
independent interests. The alternative to expansive parental rights is
not unencumbered state control of children, but rather a legal system
that recognizes the importance of parental care and guidance while
setting limits on parental power in recognition of children’s distinct
identities.

17. Dailey & Rosenbury, supra note 3, at 1451.
18. See, e.g., Huntington & Scott, supra note 5, at 1415 (“If parents’ authority is withdrawn
or seriously restricted, the state necessarily will have a larger role regulating families than under
current law.”); Guggenheim, supra note 4, at 947 (rejecting critiques of parental rights on the
ground that they “shift ultimate decision-making authority from parents to judges”).
19. See, e.g., Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg, supra note 3, at 1812–27; Minow, supra note 1,
at 6–8; cf. Murray, supra note 3, at 396–99 (“Parental rights and authority . . . do more than
obscure the fact that parents function as parts of caregiving networks. They obscure the
nonparental caregivers within these networks as well.”). We began this work in Dailey &
Rosenbury, supra note 3, at 1478–1506.
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At the outset, we note that advocates of expansive parental rights
often argue that robust parental rights are necessary to protect racially
and economically marginalized families from intrusive state
intervention.20 We share these vitally important equality concerns,
which is why we posit strict judicial review of state action that threatens
to physically separate parents and children. But advocates for
expansive parental rights disregard the fact that protection for the
private family sometimes comes at a high cost for those its advocates
claim to protect.21 Many families need intervention in the form of
greater state support; low-income families do not currently receive the
benefits of parental rights because they do not have the resources to
meet family needs. Children in these families are the most susceptible
to state removal arising from poverty or racial bias, a harm caused in
large part by the current all-or-nothing conception of parental rights.22
Tragically, the existing regime of parental rights ends up harming many
children by requiring the state to wrest control away from parents
before intervening to further children’s interests, thereby privileging
private ordering against a backdrop of stark racial, social, and
economic inequality.
This privileging of the private family persists even as scholars have
soundly discredited the idea of a private family set apart from the
state.23 Given that families are defined and regulated by the state in

20. See, e.g., Huntington & Scott, supra note 5, at 1416 (“Parental rights provide an essential
shield against excessive state intrusion driven by bias against ‘children of color and low-income
families.’”).
21. Cf. Martha Minow & Mary Lyndon Shanley, Relational Rights and Responsibilities:
Revisioning the Family in Liberal Political Theory and Law, 11 HYPATIA 4, 18 (1996)
(emphasizing that “the common law notion that the family is a unitary entity” shields gender
inequality within the family).
22. For more discussion of child welfare removal, see infra Part III.C.2.
23. For the groundbreaking critique of the idea of the “private family,” see generally
Frances E. Olsen, The Myth of State Intervention in the Family, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 835
(1985). See also Minow, supra note 1, at 7–8 n.15 (“From another vantage point . . . the state is
always ‘intervening’ in the sense that its noninvolvement in family matters expresses its approval,
or at least its lack of disapproval, of what goes on in the private realm.”). For additional reflections
on the notion of family privacy, see Naomi R. Cahn, Models of Family Privacy, 67 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 1225, 1240–45 (1999); Martha Albertson Fineman, Intimacy Outside of the Natural
Family: The Limits of Privacy, 23 CONN. L. REV. 955, 961–69 (1991); Dorothy E. Roberts, Child
Protection as Surveillance of African American Families, 36 J. SOC. WELFARE & FAM. L. 426, 429–
35 (2014); Jane Rutherford, Beyond Individual Privacy: A New Theory of Family Rights, 39 U.
FLA. L. REV. 627, 640–51 (1987). The notion of a private sphere of family life is belied by
compulsory schooling, labor laws, marriage laws, parentage laws, child support, and child abuse
laws, to name a few. The state also directly enforces parental authority by forcibly returning
runaway children to the home, adjudicating noncompliant children as delinquent, respecting
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myriad ways, the issue is not whether the state intervenes in the family
but rather the kind of intervention that should occur.24 Our
reconceptualization of parental rights shifts law away from an
approach that frequently yields disruptive all-or-nothing state
interventions toward one that promotes children’s interests, including
their vital interests in an intact family. Our approach sets strict limits
on the physical separation of parents and children as a way to prevent
the state from coercing and sometimes terrorizing families of color with
the threat of child removal. But our approach also imposes affirmative
obligations on the state to intervene in children’s lives in supportive
ways. The goal is to radically redistribute social resources toward
supporting families and to prevent the surveillance and disruptions
experienced by low-income communities and families of color.25
Shifting the law’s focus from protecting parental prerogatives to
furthering children’s interests serves to strengthen the parent–child
relationship at the same time that it recognizes children’s independent
identities and children’s ties to people and communities outside the
family.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I explains and critiques
the existing regime of expansive parental rights. Starting from the
traditional common law doctrine of coverture, we distinguish between
the two distinct categories of marital coverture and child coverture and
analyze how child coverture persists even as marital coverture has
largely disappeared. This Part describes the continuing harms of
expansive parental rights, which include the false reliance on family
privacy, perpetuating systemic racial and class biases, and obscuring
children’s interests and agency.
parental rights to discipline children, and generally deploying its coercive powers to support
parental rights against dissenting children.
24. Several scholars have attempted to reimagine how the state interacts with families,
moving away from the traditional “family privacy” paradigm to ones providing more and different
supports to families and children. See ANNE L. ALSTOTT, NO EXIT: WHAT PARENTS OWE THEIR
CHILDREN AND WHAT SOCIETY OWES PARENTS 49–72 (2004); MAXINE EICHNER, THE
SUPPORTIVE STATE: FAMILIES, GOVERNMENT, AND AMERICA’S POLITICAL IDEALS 117–40
(2010); MARTHA A. FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY OF DEPENDENCY 17–49,
188–95 (2004); Clare Huntington, Mutual Dependency in Child Welfare, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1485, 1510–24 (2007); Kay P. Kindred, God Bless the Child: Poor Children, Parens Patriae, and a
State Obligation To Provide Assistance, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 519, 535–40 (1996); Dorothy E. Roberts,
Child Welfare’s Paradox, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 881, 892–900 (2007). See generally Khiara
Bridges, Poor Women and the Protective State, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 1619 (2012) (arguing for a shift
away from coercive state management of individual parental behaviors and towards macro
regulations to support healthy child development).
25. See infra Part III.C.2.
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Part II sets out our new model of parental rights. This model
recognizes parental rights as relational and limited by children’s
independent interests and agency; it clarifies that parental rights should
trigger the strictest judicial review when the physical separation of
parent and child is threatened but an intermediate standard of review
for lesser intrusions aimed at furthering children’s independent
interests and agency; it addresses the race and class biases perpetuated
by a system of broad parental rights that privatizes children’s support;
and it emphasizes children’s affirmative rights to state support.
Part III examines the implications of this new model of parental
rights in several doctrinal areas of critical importance to children. This
Part discusses legal regulations in the areas of homeschooling,
transgender youth medical decisionmaking, foster care, children’s
friendships, and the forced separation of parents and children through
immigration detention, child welfare removal, and parental
incarceration.
I. THE CURRENT REGIME OF EXPANSIVE PARENTAL RIGHTS
Expansive parental rights have their roots in the common law
system of coverture. Deriving from English common law, the doctrine
of coverture structured married family life in the United States well
into the 1800s.26 Coverture appointed one member of each legally
recognized family—the husband—as the family’s sole legal
representative.27 The husband spoke for the family in the public sphere,
and the law respected only his decisions in the private sphere.28 As
Blackstone emphasized,
By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law: that is, the
very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during the
marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that of the

26. See Tim Stretton & Krista J. Kesselring, Introduction to MARRIED WOMEN AND THE
LAW: COVERTURE IN ENGLAND AND THE COMMON LAW WORLD 3, 5 (Tim Stretton & Krista J.
Kesselring eds., 2013) (“[A] typical wife in New England in 1750 had much in common with a
typical wife in England in 1250.”).
27. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 660 (2015) (“Under the centuries-old doctrine of
coverture, a married man and woman were treated by the State as a single, male-dominated legal
entity.”); NANCY F. COTT, PUBLIC VOWS: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION 11–12
(2000).
28. See Stretton & Kesselring, supra note 26, at 6 (“Again and again in Anglo-American
history, extensions of citizenship or the expansion of its associated rights, entitlements, and
obligations specifically excluded married women because they fell under the authority of their
husbands.”).
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husband: under whose wing, protection, and cover, she performs
every thing; and is therefore called in our law-french a feme-covert . . .
; is said to be covert-baron, or under the protection and influence of
her husband, her baron, or lord; and her condition during her
marriage is called her coverture.29

Relatedly, in a discussion of the father’s control over children,
Blackstone wrote,
The legal power of a father (for a mother, as such, is entitled to no
power, but only to reverence and respect) the power of a father, I say,
over the persons of his children ceases at the age of twenty one: for
they are then enfranchised by arriving at years of discretion, or that
point which the law has established (as some must necessarily be
established) when the empire of the father, or other guardian, gives
place to the empire of reason.30

Under the regime of coverture, the entire family was reduced to one
person—the husband—in the eyes of the state.31 Yet because coverture
attached only to legally recognized marriages, not all husbands became
their families’ legal representatives. Most notably, enslaved couples
could not legally marry, and masters could override slaves’ informal
marriage vows.32

29.
30.
31.

1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *442.
Id. at *453.
COTT, supra note 27, at 12; TAPPING REEVE, THE LAW OF BARON AND FEMME, OF
PARENT AND CHILD, GUARDIAN AND WARD, MASTER AND SERVANT, AND OF THE POWERS OF
THE COURT OF CHANCERY 431 (3d ed. 1862).
32. COTT, supra note 27, at 32–34; MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW
AND THE FAMILY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 130–32 (G. Edward White ed., 1985);
HENDRIK HARTOG, MAN AND WIFE IN AMERICA: A HISTORY 93 (2000); TERA W. HUNTER,
BOUND IN WEDLOCK: SLAVE AND FREE BLACK MARRIAGE IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 32
(2017); see also JACQUELINE JONES, LABOR OF LOVE, LABOR OF SORROW: BLACK WOMEN,
WORK, AND THE FAMILY, FROM SLAVERY TO THE PRESENT 32–33 (1985) (describing the
barriers to marriage for enslaved people). Yet the doctrine of coverture still deeply affected the
lives of enslaved families. Indeed, it was in part because of the obligations of coverture that
enslaved persons could not legally marry; enslaved men were viewed as incapable of taking on
these family obligations because a “master’s legal right of command” trumped the intentions and
actions of the people that law considered to be his property. COTT, supra note 27, at 33; see also
Margaret A. Burnham, An Impossible Marriage: Slave Law and Family Law, 5 LAW & INEQ. 187,
204–05 (1987) (discussing status of family members under slavery); Katherine M. Franke,
Becoming a Citizen: Reconstruction Era Regulation of African American Marriages, 11 YALE J.L.
& HUMANS. 251, 252 (1999) (“[Enslaved people] were incapacitated from entering into civil
contracts, of which marriage was one, and were regarded as lacking the moral fiber necessary to
respect and honor the sanctity of the marital vows.”).
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Legal historians have extensively explored and critiqued the
evolution of coverture and its effects,33 but the vast majority of that
scholarship examines coverture’s effects on wives, as opposed to
children born within marriage.34 Indeed, legal historians generally have
not grappled with how coverture affected children within legally
recognized families.35 Historians have identified and critiqued the
common law’s failure to impose obligations on fathers who bore
children outside of marriage, which was certainly a collateral effect of
the doctrine of coverture.36 Without marriage, unwed mothers and
their children experienced neither the benefits nor burdens of
coverture.37 Scholars have not, however, delineated how the doctrine
of coverture consolidated family power in the husband upon marriage,
removing all other family members from the public sphere and limiting
their influence in the private sphere.38
To emphasize and critique coverture’s broader effects, this Article
distinguishes between marital coverture and child coverture, coining

33. The effects were diverse, as lived reality often differed from the law of coverture, yet
“[i]n marking ownership coverture delineated inequality and confirmed the ultimate power of the
husband.” Stretton & Kesselring, supra note 26, at 9; cf. Wright, supra note 26, at 240–42
(discussing legal and extralegal resistance to coverture); STEPHANIE E. JONES-ROGERS, THEY
WERE HER PROPERTY: WHITE WOMEN AS SLAVE OWNERS IN THE AMERICAN SOUTH 27–30,
57–80 (2019) (describing exceptions to and evasions of coverture for white wives who owned
slaves).
34. See, e.g., HARTOG, supra note 32, at 93–166; Norma Basch, Invisible Women: The Legal
Fiction of Marital Unity in Nineteenth-Century America, 5 FEMINIST STUD. 346, 347–48 (1979).
35. For an important exception, see Martha Minow, “Forming Underneath Everything That
Grows:” Toward a History of Family Law, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 819, 827–28.
36. See, e.g., Martha F. Davis, Male Coverture: Law and the Illegitimate Family, 56 RUTGERS
L. REV. 73, 79–83 (2003). Similarly, the regime of slavery imposed no duties on fathers of enslaved
children, whether those fathers were enslaved or were white slaveowners or other freed men. Id.
at 82.
37. See id. at 80 (emphasizing that in the context of “inheritance, wrongful death, domicile,
adoption, and citizenship, . . . law often continue[s] to assign the primary, and in some instances
exclusive, responsibility for out-of-wedlock children to mothers”).
38. Martha Albertson Fineman and George Shepherd come closest to making this point. In
their application of vulnerability theory to homeschooling, they write that they aim to “bring[]
the child out from under the coverture of the family and prompt[] discussions about what should
be the nature and extent of state responsibility for the vulnerable subject in childhood.” Fineman
& Shepherd, supra note 3, at 60. Ruth Colker, Dara Purvis, and Marc Spindelman also each
emphasize fathers’ power under coverture, but they do not expand their analysis. See Ruth
Colker, The Freedom To Choose To Marry, 30 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 383, 409 (2015); Dara E.
Purvis, The Constitutionalization of Fatherhood, 69 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 541, 565 (2019); Marc
Spindelman, Obergefell’s Dreams, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 1039, 1070 (2016). Finally, Melissa Murray
emphasizes the similarities between spousal and parent–child relationships, but she does not
associate the parent–child relationship with coverture. Murray, supra note 3, at 397 n.33.
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these more specific terms in order to analyze coverture’s far-reaching
nature and its persistence to this day in the form of expansive parental
rights.39 There does not appear to be evidence that courts and
lawmakers made this distinction historically, but that omission
reinforces the extent to which children born within marriage were
“covered” by husband-fathers and continue to be covered by parents
to this day. Moreover, separate analyses of marital coverture and child
coverture permit examinations of coverture’s effects on children that
are not bound by the justifications behind marital coverture and its
demise.40 Children continue to suffer many of the same disabilities that
wives suffered under coverture, but as explained below the
justifications for children’s ongoing disabilities have long been
different and continue to evolve.
A. The Presumption of Parent–Child Unity
Prior to the seventeenth century, children were not subject to
coverture or even to the custody of their fathers. As Professor Holly
Brewer has written,
In sixteenth-century England, children over age seven were of “ripe
age” to marry (under seven they could contract only “espousals,” or
betrothals). Four-year olds could make wills to give away their goods
and chattels. Children of any age could bind themselves into
apprenticeships. Eight-year-olds could be hanged for arson or any
other felony. Teenagers were routinely elected to Parliament.

39. A very small number of scholars have used the term “marital coverture,” but not as a
contrast to “child coverture.” For example, Martha Davis uses “marital coverture” to distinguish
the traditional doctrine of coverture from the “male coverture” she critiques. Davis, supra note
36, at 76–79. We have found two legal scholars who use the term “children’s legal coverture,” but
they do not elucidate their use of the terms or otherwise explore the contours of child coverture
today. Annette Ruth Appell, The Pre-Political Child of Child-Centered Jurisprudence, 46 HOUS.
L. REV. 703, 736–37 (2009) [hereinafter Appell, The Pre-Political Child of Child-Centered
Jurisprudence]; Medha D. Makhlouf, Theorizing the Immigrant Child: The Case of Married
Minors, 82 BROOK. L. REV. 1603, 1624 (2017); see also Annette Ruth Appell, Accommodating
Childhood, 19 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 715, 722–23 (2013) (“The legal child is disenfranchised
under the coverture of her parents or guardians . . . .”); Annette R. Appell, The Child Question,
2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1137, 1155 (“Children are, effectively, under coverture of their parents . . .
.”).
40. Susan Appleton writes that “[t]he parent–child relationship, just like the marital
relationship once did, subsumes the identity and autonomy of one member of the family in the
authority of another.” Susan Frelich Appleton, Restating Childhood, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 525, 543
(2014). We agree with Appleton that “we cannot seamlessly apply to children what we have
learned about married women,” id., which is why we believe it is useful to delineate the separate
category of child coverture.
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Children who owned sufficient property could vote. And custody as
we know it did not exist. These norms applied not only in England
but in Virginia as it was founded during the seventeenth century.41

Children’s legal capacity soon gave way to patriarchal control.
Beginning in the mid-seventeenth century, English courts began to
recognize the concept of parental custody.42 Eventually, “[t]he
assumption of the law had shifted to deny the identity of a child
altogether, up to age twenty-one: society should see the child only as
part of a family, with a father at its head.”43
Children born within a marriage in the United States thereby
became subject to their fathers’ control in much the same way that
wives were subject to their husbands’ control.44 A father could dictate
almost every aspect of his children’s lives: he could force children to
work, marry off daughters to persons of his choosing, and physically
punish children for failure to follow his dictates, in some states up to
the point of death.45 Fathers maintained this control even when
marriages dissolved; women could not seek custody of their children
upon divorce.46 During marriage or afterwards, fathers could appoint
41. HOLLY BREWER, BY BIRTH OR CONSENT: CHILDREN, LAW, AND THE ANGLOAMERICAN REVOLUTION IN AUTHORITY 230 (2005). Writing about children in the United States
during “the seventeenth and early eighteenth centur[ies],” Professor Mary Ann Mason
emphasizes that “[c]hildren were critical to the colonial labor force; after the age of ten children
were often employed like adult workers, and many, if not most, did not remain in the custody of
either parent until adulthood.” Mary Ann Mason, Masters and Servants: The American Colonial
Model of Child Custody and Control, 2 INT’L J. CHILD.’S RTS. 317, 317 (1994).
42. BREWER, supra note 41, at 232. Custody as a legal concept was generally reserved for
guardians to heirs, as opposed to parents, prior to this time. Id. at 232–37. Beginning in 1660, law
made “all children potential wards, and gave fathers significant power over their children.” Id. at
250. Equity courts in England did not recognize parental custody until 1690. See id. at 282
(detailing that Justice Story found no precedent in English equity courts for parental custody
before 1690).
43. Id. at 266.
44. See Mason, supra note 41, at 319 (“Fathers, without dispute, had almost unlimited
authority of custody and control over their natural, legitimate children, leaving almost no room
for maternal authority, at least during the fathers’ lifetime.”); cf. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S.
644, 660 (2015) (“Under the centuries-old doctrine of coverture, a married man and woman were
treated by the State as a single, male-dominated legal entity.”).
45. BARBARA BENNETT WOODHOUSE, HIDDEN IN PLAIN SIGHT: THE TRAGEDY OF
CHILDREN’S RIGHTS FROM BEN FRANKLIN TO LIONEL TATE 41, 62–63 (2008); Jill Elaine
Hasday, Parenthood Divided: A Legal History of the Bifurcated Law of Parental Relations, 90
GEO. L.J. 299, 310 (2002).
46. GROSSBERG, supra note 32, at 234–37. Coverture also meant that mothers had no
financial obligations to their children from a dissolved marriage, even after mothers remarried.
See Kim Kippen, Poor Law, Coverture, and Relations in King’s Bench, 1601–1834, in MARRIED
WOMEN AND THE LAW: COVERTURE IN ENGLAND AND THE COMMON LAW WORLD, supra note
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guardians for their children without any input from the children’s
mothers.47 Moreover, unlike children born into slavery, who assumed
the legal status of their enslaved mothers, children born to noncitizen
wives married to citizens assumed the status of the citizen father.48
In supporting male power, both marital and child coverture
assumed that husbands represented the interests of their wives and
children, yet law did nothing to mandate that husbands actually
represented their wives’ and children’s interests. Instead, the regime of
coverture respected a husband’s authority so long as he provided
minimal necessities for family members.49 Wives and children could
appeal to their husbands and fathers, but they could not appeal to the
state.50
1. The Persistence of Child Coverture. Wives are no longer living
under a regime of coverture, but the persistence of expansive parental
rights means that children are.51 With the enactment of the Married
Women’s Property Acts and Earning Statutes in the mid-nineteenth

26, at 64, 67–77 (examining the financial liability of mothers and married women from the
seventeenth to eighteenth centuries).
47. See Danaya C. Wright, De Manneville v. De Manneville: Rethinking the Birth of Custody
Law Under Patriarchy, 17 LAW & HIST. REV. 247, 270 & n.74 (1999) (discussing the passage of
the Abolition of Military Tenures Act and the implication that it elevated the father’s will over
the common law preference for mothers and kin).
48. See Todd, supra note 26, at 163, 168–81 (examining the development of law concerning
children born abroad, to noncitizen parents, or to enslaved parents). Likewise, children born to a
citizen wife married to a noncitizen did not assume their mother’s citizenship. See id. at 180–81.
49. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 29, at *430; see also Earle v. Earle, 43 N.W. 118, 119 (Neb.
1889) (“It is a well-established rule of law that it is the duty of the husband to provide his family
with support and means of living . . . and for this purpose the wife has generally the right to use
his credit for the purchase of necessaries.”); McGuire v. McGuire, 59 N.W.2d 336, 342 (Neb. 1953)
(“The living standards of a family are a matter of concern to the household, and not for the courts
to determine, even though the husband’s attitude toward his wife, according to his wealth and
circumstances, leaves little to be said in his behalf.”).
50. MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY
AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 8–9, 187 (1995). Fineman later explained:
[I]t is the family, not the state or the market, that assumes responsibility for both the
inevitable dependent – the child or other biologically or developmentally dependent
person – and the derivative dependent – the caretaker. The institution of the family
operates structurally and ideologically to free markets from considering or
accommodating dependency.
FINEMAN, supra note 24, at 228.
51. Cf. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Child Abuse, the Constitution, and the Legacy of
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 78 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 479, 483 (2001) (“Women may have
escaped the separate spheres of Bradwell v. Illinois, but children remain trapped in the time warp
of Pierce.”).
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century, marital coverture was ultimately formally abolished.52
Although marital coverture lingered as a cultural force,53 its effects
lessened as individual states granted women (including married
women) the right to vote and the Nineteenth Amendment granted
women in all states the right to vote in 1920.54 Judges and lawmakers
also began departing from the longstanding practice of granting
husbands custody of children when marriages dissolved.55 Families

52. See JILL ELAINE HASDAY, FAMILY LAW REIMAGINED 108–09 (2014). The abolition of
marital coverture happened gradually, with no definitive end date. See id. at 99–101 (discussing
the debate over when coverture was eradicated); HARTOG, supra note 32, at 110–11 (describing
state laws delegating more rights to women in the mid-1800s); Richard H. Chused, Married
Women’s Property Law: 1800-1850, 71 GEO. L.J. 1359, 1385–89 (1983) (detailing the erosion of
coverture laws in England); Reva B. Siegel, The Modernization of Marital Status Law:
Adjudicating Wives’ Rights to Earnings, 1860-1930, 82 GEO. L.J. 2127, 2132–40 (1994) (“It was by
statutory codification of equitable principles that common law reform began in the first half of
the nineteenth century, with the enactment of married women’s property acts that allowed wives
to hold property in their own names.”); Allison Anna Tait, The Beginning of the End of Coverture:
A Reappraisal of the Married Woman’s Separate Estate, 26 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 165, 212–14
(2014) (discussing the evolution of women’s property rights).
53. See Ariela R. Dubler, In the Shadow of Marriage: Single Women and the Legal
Construction of the Family and the State, 112 YALE L.J. 1641, 1655 (2003) (“Even with coverture’s
gradual demise . . . married women’s legal and political identities continued to be defined and
limited by their marital status.”); Leti Volpp, Divesting Citizenship: On Asian American History
and the Loss of Citizenship Through Marriage, 53 UCLA L. REV. 405, 428 (2005) (“While
beginning in the 1840s, ‘married women’s property acts’ allowing married women to control their
own property were passed in virtually every state, the ideology of coverture and the importance
of property ownership as signifying citizenship lingered well past that date.”).
54. HASDAY, supra note 52, at 99–101; see also, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 56 U.S. 644, 659–
60 (2015) (describing how the landscape of marriage has evolved, including the abandonment of
coverture).
55. Mary Becker, Maternal Feelings: Myth, Taboo, and Child Custody, 1 S. CAL. REV. L. &
WOMEN’S STUD. 133, 167–68 (1992). Some wives are still subject to the vestiges of coverture,
particularly in interspousal litigation. See Sally F. Goldfarb, Violence Against Women and the
Persistence of Privacy, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 23 (2000) (discussing the influence of coverture and
family privacy on “interspousual tort immunity, parental tort immunity, and the marital rape
exemption”). See generally HASDAY, supra note 52, at 108–18 (discussing legal prohibitions on
interspousal litigation). Scholars have otherwise astutely analyzed coverture’s ongoing effects on
marriage and divorce law. See, e.g., HASDAY, supra note 52, at 118–20 (discussing the domestic
relations exception to federal diversity jurisdiction, which assumes that spouses cannot have
separate legal residences and therefore cannot have diversity of citizenship, and the marital rape
exemption, which historically assumed that husbands could not rape their wives); Colker, supra
note 38, at 411–15 (discussing vestiges of coverture, such as women taking their husband’s last
name); Siegel, supra note 52, at 2196–2210 (describing courts’ refusal to enforce interspousal
contracts concerning labor and the wife’s “duty” of marital service); Joan Williams, Is Coverture
Dead? Beyond a New Theory of Alimony, 82 GEO. L.J. 2227, 2236–39 (1994) (arguing that the
family ecology is gendered). The principles of coverture also continue to influence law’s treatment
of services performed by nonmarital partners. Albertina Antognini, Nonmarital Coverture, 99
B.U. L. REV. 2139 passim (2019).
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went from having one legal representative to having two legal
representatives—both recognized spouses or both legal parents.56
This evolution has greatly increased adult equality within families,
but control continues to be the guiding principle of parental rights. It
is no longer acceptable for husbands to imprison their wives, to beat
them in the name of discipline, to isolate them from their friends and
family, or to confiscate their money and squander it.57 Yet most of these
things are still permissible in the case of children.58 Fathers no longer
have exclusive control over their children, as their control must be
shared by mothers or other legal parents, but the regime of parental
control remains intact even when parental viewpoints may not be in
the best interests of a child.59 The idea of children being the exclusive
property of their fathers has faded, but law still subjects children to the
control of both their parents.60
Child coverture continues to confer on parents broad control over
children’s emotional, intellectual, moral, spiritual, and everyday lives.
Moreover, many common law parental prerogatives have now become

56. Many commentators rightly observe that the law still privileges marital families over
nonmarital families, a privilege that particularly harms low-income nonmarital families. See, e.g.,
Serena Mayeri, Intersectionality and the Constitution of Family Status, 32 CONST. COMMENT. 377,
377–78 (2017). Moreover, the Supreme Court’s recent extension of legal marriage to same-sex
couples relied on rhetoric that evoked many aspects of historical coverture. Allison Tait argues
that
[Obergefell] invokes not only good governance but also gender hierarchy; not only
social stability but also social prescription; not only enduring commitment but also
inescapable burden. Consequently, instead of extinguishing dated concepts about the
nature of marriage and replacing them with a more modern form of marriage, grounded
in true gender equality and relationship equity, Obergefell signals a new life for
coverture values.
Allison Anna Tait, The Return of Coverture, 114 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 99, 108–09
(2016).
57. COTT, supra note 27, at 52–55.
58. See infra notes 67–68 and accompanying text.
59. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Mentry, 190 CAL. RPTR. 843, 846–47 (Ct. App. 1983) (noting
that the law encourages exposure to both parents’ differing religious viewpoints even when
stability or repose may be logically in the best interest of the child).
60. See Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood, supra note 3, at 882 (emphasizing law’s continuing
focus on parental authority and its failure to support children’s other relationships); Martha
Fineman, Dominant Discourse, Professional Language, and Legal Change in Child Custody
Decisionmaking, 101 HARV. L. REV. 727, 737 (1988) (“The modern, reformist discourse viewed
children not so much as individual property to be divided between parents, but as a form of social
investment in which custody produced concomitant social duties on the part of each parent . . .
.”); Woodhouse, Who Owns the Child, supra note 3, at 1113–15 (discussing the focus on parental
control in jurisprudence concerning parental rights).
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constitutionalized.61 Parents control where children go to school,
dictating public school, private school, or home school.62 Parents may
prohibit their children from interacting with other adults or children,
or force them to do so.63 Parents may force their children to attend
church,64 or force or prevent them from engaging in other activities.65
Parents may require children to work within the home for free.66 If
children work for wages outside of the home, parents may claim those
wages for their own use.67 Parents even control many of the damages
awarded in personal injury suits seeking redress for their children’s
own injuries.68
In these ways, children continue to suffer many of the same
disabilities that wives suffered under coverture, including having
limited to no control over their associates, labor, or bodies. Children
instead are represented (or covered) by their parents. The family is

61. HASDAY, supra note 52, at 157 (“[C]ourts have frequently taken common law parental
prerogatives to be so commonsensical and so foundational to American law and society that they
have embedded many of these prerogatives in constitutional law.”).
62. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213–14 (1972) (noting that while the state has the
responsibility to educate its citizens, that right yields “to the right of parents to provide an
equivalent education in a privately operated system”); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534
(1925) (“[P]arents and guardians, as a part of their liberty, might direct the education of children
by selecting reputable teachers and places.”).
63. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000) (plurality opinion) (holding that parents
have the right to make decisions about “the care, custody, and control of their children”).
64. In Vermont, for instance, parents have the statutory right to control a child’s religion.
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 664(1)(A) (2021). This right is so critical that the Vermont Supreme
Court has stricken portions of a family court order prohibiting both parents “from requiring
children ‘to attend religious services against their will.’” Jakab v. Jakab, 664 A.2d 261, 266 (Vt.
1995).
65. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968) (finding that parents have a right to
control children’s access to information); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400–03 (1923)
(suggesting that parents have control over their children’s education, including language
instruction); Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 654 (1995) (noting that, at common law,
parents or guardians control the physical freedom of unemancipated minors).
66. United States v. Toviave, 761 F.3d 623, 625 (6th Cir. 2014) (“An American parent has
always had the right to make his child perform household chores.”).
67. Constance v. Gosnell, 62 F. Supp. 253, 254 (W.D.S.C. 1945) (“Under the common law
the father is entitled to the earnings of his minor, unemancipated children during their minority.
This right accrues to the father by way of compensation for the support, nurture, care, protection,
maintenance and education actually afforded and furnished his children during their minority.”).
68. Callies v. Reliance Laundry Co., 206 N.W. 198, 200 (Wis. 1925).
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considered a unified entity with respect to children.69 Under child
coverture, parent and child are one—and the one is the parent.
2. Ongoing Support for Child Coverture. The persistence of child
coverture is rarely acknowledged. Political theorist Elizabeth Cohen
has made the connection between children’s current reality and the
regime of marital coverture, emphasizing that “[m]uch like women
were under coverture, children are confined to the private sphere,
removed from public life – ostensibly for the good of themselves and
the polity in general.”70 Professor Jill Hasday also emphasizes: “When
parental prerogatives and children’s interests actually conflict, family
law continues to adhere closely to common law patterns in repeatedly
prioritizing parental prerogatives.”71 Yet most legal scholars have not
explicitly made the link to coverture when examining the field of
children and law.72 In fact, legal scholars, judges, and lawmakers often
assume that coverture was completely eliminated once wives emerged
from its disabilities. The Supreme Court of Missouri, for example,
wrote in 1949 that “[i]t is as repellent to our present-day thinking to
regard a child as the chattel or servant of his parent as it is to regard a
wife as the chattel of her husband.”73 This assumption ignores the many
ways that children remain subject to the prerogatives of their parents.
Even as coverture is no longer regarded as the reigning paradigm,
parental control over children continues unabated in the form of
expansive parental rights.
The American Law Institute (“ALI”) recently embarked on a new
and ambitious Restatement of Children and the Law, which—because
the ALI has tasked itself with restating, rather than reforming,

69. See Martha Albertson Fineman, What Place for Family Privacy?, 67 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1207, 1215 (1999) (“The legal construct of the family is based upon the presumption that
‘parents [make up for their children’s lack of] maturity, experience and capacity . . . .’”).
70. Elizabeth F. Cohen, Neither Seen nor Heard: Children’s Citizenship in Contemporary
Democracies, 9 CITIZENSHIP STUD. 221, 222 (2005); see also Ruth Lister, Why Citizenship: Where,
When and How Children?, 8 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 693, 714 (2007) (discussing Cohen’s
analogy between coverture and children).
71. HASDAY, supra note 52, at 142. Hasday also emphasizes that some parental prerogatives
have expanded, most notably in the context of parental tort immunity. See id. at 154.
72. For two instances of the use of “children’s legal coverture” without any further
explanation, see Appell, The Pre-Political Child of Child-Centered Jurisprudence, supra note 39,
at 736–37 and Makhlouf, supra note 39, at 1624.
73. Mennemeyer v. Hart, 221 S.W.2d 960, 962 (Mo. 1949).
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common law in the United States74—retains the principles of expansive
parental rights rooted in child coverture.75 Yet the ALI does not
acknowledge the history of coverture even as it reinforces its
principles.76 In taking a strong stand in favor of protecting expansive
parental rights, the Restatement ensures that parents exercise nearly
unfettered decision-making authority over children’s lives except in
cases of serious harm.77 The Restatement presumes this authority is in
children’s best interests and thus protects parents’ choices in all but the
most dire circumstances.
For example, the Restatement gives parents the power to deny
their child access to third parties unless doing so would pose a
“substantial risk of serious harm to the child’s health or well-being.”78
In other words, parents may unilaterally cut off children’s relationships
with siblings, grandparents, former stepparents, and former foster
parents as long as there is no clear and convincing evidence of harm,79
a standard unlikely to be met in most cases.80 Moreover, even if a third
party meets that standard, the third party must also establish “by clear
and convincing evidence that continued contact with the third party
will not substantially interfere with the parent–child relationship and
such contact is in the child’s best interest.”81
The Restatement also protects parents’ right to engage in corporal
punishment in the context of civil child protection proceedings so long
as the punishment did not cause, or create “a substantial risk of
causing, physical harm beyond minor pain or transient marks.”82 The
Restatement provides even more protection to parents in the context
of criminal proceedings, permitting corporal punishment so long as it

74. The Am. L. Inst., Capturing the Voice of the American Law Institute: A Handbook for
ALI Reporters and Those Who Review Their Work (rev.
ed.
2015),
https://www.ali.org/media/filer_public/08/f2/08f2f7c7-29c7-4de1-8c02-d66f5b05a6bb/ali-stylemanual.pdf [https://perma.cc/92BX-ALG4].
75. See A.L.I. Tentative Draft 1, supra note 5.
76. See id. (failing to acknowledge the history of coverture but implicitly reinforcing
coverture’s principles by emphasizing that “[p]arents have long enjoyed strong protection of the
right to raise their children as they see fit without undue interference from the state”).
77. See id.
78. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, CHILDREN AND THE LAW § 1.80(a)(2) (AM. L. INST.,
Tentative Draft No. 2, 2019) [hereinafter A.L.I. Tentative Draft 2].
79. Id.
80. See id. at cmt. g (“This Section’s harm standard imposes a high burden on a third party
seeking contact with a child.”).
81. Id. § 1.80(b)(2).
82. Id. § 2.23(b).
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did not cause, or create “a substantial risk of causing, serious physical
harm or gross degradation.”83 In addition, the Restatement extends
such protection to teachers and other school authorities in private
schools. In public schools, if state law expressly authorizes corporal
punishment, the Restatement privileges such punishment “if the school
authority reasonably believes that the force is necessary to maintain
order and safety in the school.”84
Justifications for this control over children’s lives track those that
were once offered for marital coverture. Proponents of expansive
parental rights, including the ALI Reporters, justify broad parental
control on the grounds that children are dependent creatures and that
parents, or in some cases teachers or other state actors, can and will
represent children’s interests.85 As with marital coverture, neither of
these justifications suffices. While children are dependent in a way
wives were not, that dependency does not necessarily translate into
unfettered parental control at the expense of furthering children’s
interests. And the myth of parent–child unity is simply that: a myth.
Neither dependency nor theories of parental representation justify
expansive parental rights given that parents are sometimes unable or
unwilling to further children’s independent interests regarding
significant life issues. Even more importantly, expansive parental rights
harm many children and families, as discussed below.
B. The Harms of Expansive Parental Rights
This Section lays out the primary shortcomings of the nearabsolute protection for parental rights in existing law. Expansive
parental rights privilege the interests of parents over those of children,
reinforce a myth of state nonintervention in the family in ways that
further harm children’s interests, and adversely impact racially and
economically marginalized families. By conceiving of the family as a
unified private entity, existing law represses children’s independent
interests and identities and fails to offer nonpunitive forms of state
support for children and their families.

83. Id. § 2.23(a).
84. Id. § 7.10.
85. See A.L.I. Tentative Draft 1, supra note 5, at 3 (“Parents typically know their children
better than any third party, and thus usually are better positioned to make decisions on their
children’s behalf than outsiders and strangers.”).
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1. Obscuring Children’s Interests and Agency. Expansive parental
rights hide children’s independent interests and agency beneath the
veil of parent–child unity. For example, the law currently obscures how
children may develop a gender identity at odds with their parents’
values; children may deserve greater privacy than what their parents
give them (particularly when parents display their children’s private
lives on social media); children’s bodily integrity may be violated by
common forms of corporal punishment; and children may have their
access to the world restricted by isolated homeschooling. In all these
cases, law fails to see children as people with serious interests and
identities separate and apart from those of their parents.
Parents’ freedom to control their children’s lives sits uneasily
within a liberal system of law that protects every person’s right to
determine their own life course. It is difficult, if not impossible, to
justify parental authority solely on the basis of a parent’s liberty
interest without falling back on the long-discredited notion of children
as property.86 For this reason, advocates of expansive parental rights
now justify parental rights on the ground that these rights further
children’s interests. These proponents argue that parental rights serve
children’s interests because parents are likely to know what their
children need and to ensure those needs are met.87 Parental decisions
are thus generally shielded from scrutiny and require no justification
because they are presumptively in children’s best interests.88 Advocates
of expansive parental rights acknowledge that parents may not always
know what is in their children’s interests or act to further those
interests, but they nevertheless take the position that expansive rights
are justified because parents—however imperfect they may be—are
better situated than anyone else to make choices regarding their
children’s welfare.89

86. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, “Out of Children’s Needs, Children’s Rights”: The Child’s
Voice in Defining the Family, 8 BYU J. PUB. L. 321, 325–26 (1994).
87. Buss, supra note 4, at 647; Huntington & Scott, supra note 5, at 1377.
88. Some scholars argue that this shielding feature itself serves children’s interests because
it ensures parents retain the sense of authority necessary to successfully raise children. June
Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Which Ties Bind? Redefining the Parent-Child Relationship in an Age
of Genetic Certainty, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1011, 1011 (2003).
89. Huntington & Scott, supra note 5, at 1416. Advocates argue, for example, that parents
are better situated than judges to determine whether a child should have access to third parties,
such as siblings, grandparents, or former stepparents. See, e.g., id. at 1423–24; Buss, supra note 4,
at 647.
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Presuming that parents always represent children’s interests
reflects an overly romanticized vision of the parent–child relationship:
that because parents love their children, and indeed sometimes
jealously love their children, parents’ interests and their children’s
interests perfectly align. This rose-colored view of parental
decisionmaking ignores the reality of intrafamily diversity. We do not
dispute that most parents love their children and believe that they are
putting their children’s interests first. And most parents indeed know
what is best for their children and take steps to meet those needs. But
the argument that parents are always best situated to make decisions
regarding children wrongly equates parental wishes with children’s
interests. Although some parents will act to further their children’s
interests, not all parents can or do, for varying reasons at varying times.
Parental behavior in child custody disputes and rates of serious child
maltreatment readily confirm that not all parents are able or willing to
put their children’s interests first.90 Universal compulsory education
laws and child labor laws exist in large part because some parents
would otherwise be unable or unwilling to ensure that their children
receive an adequate education or resist the allure of increased family
earnings.91
The law’s presumption of parent–child unity thereby wrongly
elevates parental love above all else, often ignoring parental conflicts
of interests, biases, and blind spots. Parents do provide essential love
and care, along with the profound sense of security and safety that only
loving caregivers are able to provide. But despite that love, or perhaps
because of that love, parents do not always see their children as
separate people.92 Most importantly, parents are sometimes unable to
acknowledge how their children’s interests may depart from their own,
even when parents believe they are acting to further their children’s
interests. In some circumstances, children may be treated as extensions
of parental egos or used to satisfy parental needs and desires.

90. See Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Reconstructing Fault: The Case for Spousal Torts, 79 U. CIN.
L. REV. 207, 238–39 (2010) (discussing and citing studies of how exposure to high levels of conflict
and stress negatively impacts children); CHILD.’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.,
CHILD MALTREATMENT 2019, at 57 (2021), https://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
cb/cm2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/8JFB-H745] (finding that parents of child victims were the
perpetrators in 79.7 percent of substantiated cases of child maltreatment nationwide).
91. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 227–28 (1972).
92. As Paula Fass puts it, “Parents love their children, but they also love themselves.”
PAULA S. FASS, THE END OF AMERICAN CHILDHOOD: A HISTORY OF PARENTING FROM LIFE
ON THE FRONTIER TO THE MANAGED CHILD 268 (2016).
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This Article focuses on the many situations where perfectly fit, and
sometimes exemplary, parents might fail to recognize and further their
children’s interests. For example, parents might allow anger at a former
spouse to cloud their judgment concerning the importance of a child
maintaining a relationship with former stepsiblings. A parent with
conservative religious views might prevent a child from accessing
medical care for gender identity issues or from attending school.
Otherwise well-intentioned parents might hit or isolate their child in
the name of discipline. A parent might post videos on social media that
reveal private aspects of a child’s life that remain online forever.
Moreover, “children are subject to a degree of parental authority that
often leaves them little opportunity to conceive interests that diverge
from the nomos of those who raise them.”93 The current legal regime
not only runs the risk of stifling children’s interests; it may also prevent
those interests from developing in the first place.
Some proponents of expansive parental rights acknowledge these
potential conflicts and draw the analogy to fiduciary relationships in an
attempt to address these conflicts.94 Yet, as even proponents of the
fiduciary model recognize, fiduciary principles do not serve as a
sufficient check on parental wishes. The parent–child relationship is
much more comprehensive than most other types of fiduciary
relationships, such as trustee and beneficiary, and has intrinsic value in
ways those other relationships do not.95 More importantly, parents are
often self-interested in ways that would otherwise disqualify them from
serving as fiduciaries. Indeed, parents generally profit from their status
as parents.96 It is simply impossible to disentangle parental wishes and
children’s interests. As one commentator writes, “the line between the

93. Cohen, supra note 70, at 221–22 (using nomos in the sense of custom or norms). As the
dissent in Yoder noted:
If the parents in this case are allowed a religious exemption, the inevitable effect is to
impose the parents’ notions of religious duty upon their children. Where the child is
mature enough to express potentially conflicting desires, it would be an invasion of the
child’s rights to permit such an imposition without canvassing his views.
406 U.S. at 242 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
94. Scott & Scott, supra note 4 passim; Lionel Smith, Parenthood is a Fiduciary Relationship,
70 U. TORONTO L.J. 395 passim (2020).
95. Scott & Scott, supra note 4, at 2402–03 (“[The parent–child relationship] is broader in
scope than are many other fiduciary relationships. Beyond this, the parental relationship, once
established, has intrinsic value for the child that extends beyond successful performance of
caretaking tasks.”).
96. Katherine M. Franke, Theorizing Yes: An Essay on Feminism, Law, and Desire, 101
COLUM. L. REV. 181, 190–91 (2001); Carol Sanger, M is for the Many Things, 1 S. CAL. REV. L. &
WOMEN’S STUD. 15, 48 (1992).
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ownership and fiduciary model[s] is ambiguous . . . . There is little to
prevent parents from acting as owners rather than as fiduciaries, and
the difference may be very difficult to discern in more abstract matters
of personal belief.”97 With vaguely defined concepts such as the “best
interests of the child” or “child wellbeing,”98 fiduciary analogies place
no restraints on parents’ discretion to act in their own interests.99
Moreover, even the fiduciary analogy does not escape
assumptions about children’s dependency and parental control, which
rest on and reinforce the view that children are more passive and
dependent on their parents than they actually are. Of course, children
are born physically dependent on adults, but law currently makes this
biological fact the defining feature of children’s existence from infancy
through adolescence. Expansive parental rights, even when tempered
by the fiduciary analogy, position children as unformed beings or
adults-in-waiting until they reach the legal status of adulthood.100
Expansive parental rights thus construct children as more
dependent and passive than they actually are, thereby obscuring the
extent to which children possess agency within dependency. By agency,
we do not mean autonomy. Older children have such autonomy
interests, and the law should recognize and further them. But more
importantly, children have agency interests, that is, the capacity from

97. Cohen, supra note 70, at 226.
98. Various scholars have analyzed the vagueness of the best interests of the child standard.
See, e.g., Annette R. Appell & Bruce A. Boyer, Parental Rights vs. Best Interests of the Child: A
False Dichotomy in the Context of Adoption, 2 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 63, 66 (1995); Susan
Frelich Appleton, Doing Better for Child Migrants, 17 WASH. U. GLOB. STUD. L. REV. 615, 616
(2018); Jon Elster, Solomonic Judgments: Against the Best Interest of the Child, 54 U. CHI. L. REV.
1, 11–17 (1987); Robert H. Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face
of Indeterminacy, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 226, 256 (1975). For the seminal critique, see
generally JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, ANNA FREUD & ALBERT J. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST
INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (1973). But see Carl E. Schneider, Discretion, Rules, and Law: Child
Custody and the UMDA’s Best-Interest Standard, 89 MICH. L. REV. 2215, 2291 (1991) (arguing
that the best interest standard “provides as reasonable a framework for balancing the advantages
of rules and discretion as we are likely to find”).
99. Moreover, unlike fiduciaries appointed by a court, parents as fiduciaries are not
supervised by independent persons to ensure that the parents’ decisionmaking conforms to
children’s interests. Scott & Scott, supra note 4, at 2441–42. Other scholars have argued that
parental rights instead may be justified as a mechanism for allowing parents to hold children’s
future interests in trust. See, e.g., Joel Feinberg, The Child’s Right to an Open Future, in WHOSE
CHILD? CHILDREN’S RIGHTS, PARENTAL AUTHORITY, AND STATE POWER 124, 125–26 (William
Aiken & Hugh LaFollette eds., 1980) (arguing that parental rights can be justified as a mechanism
for allowing parents to hold children’s future interests in trust). That argument similarly relies on
broad parental power to determine children’s interests.
100. Dailey & Rosenbury, supra note 3, at 1499.
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the earliest age to express their will, engage with others, and be active
in the world. Even infants have agentic powers as they learn to control
bodily movements, express their needs, respond to caregivers, and act
independently. Walking, speaking, and exploring are all ways in which
young children express their agency while at the same time being
dependent upon adults for supporting and nurturing those agentic
activities.
The simple developmental view of children obscures the extent to
which children come to possess this agency within dependency. As
children grow, their agentic powers grow with them; they become
increasingly independent and self-directed. Expansive parental rights
thereby inevitably limit and distort what lawmakers and others
conceive of as children’s interests. If children’s agency is downplayed
or denied, we are unlikely to see their interests in participating in the
public sphere or in expressing their identity. We are unlikely to see the
importance of their exposure to ideas outside the home or their need
for privacy. It is true that “children may have undeveloped, or
developing, minds and capabilities. But this would seem to argue in
favor of offering them more, not fewer opportunities to explore worlds
outside of that which exists in their home.”101
Once children’s agency is viewed within dependency, it becomes
clear that children are not mere ciphers for parental beliefs and values
or puppets of parental wishes. Although children may deeply identify
with parents, they also—starting at an early age—struggle to separate
themselves from their parental caregivers. Indeed, child development
can be seen as one long process of separation propelled by children’s
innate agentic powers. Without a developed understanding of
children’s interests rooted in developmental science and child
psychology, existing law subsumes children’s independent interests and
represses the extent to which children actively shape themselves and
their worlds.
2. Perpetuating Systemic Race and Class Biases. Expansive
parental rights are often justified on the ground that they are necessary
to protect low-income families, particularly poor Black families,
against the intrusions of a racially discriminatory state.102 Scholars

101. Cohen, supra note 70, at 234.
102. See, e.g., Huntington & Scott, supra note 5, at 1414 (“[M]odern doctrine reflects an
understanding—sometimes explicit, but more often implicit—that deference to parental
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describe how the removal of children has been devestating for Black
families and communities.103 Many of these removals are supported by
vague conceptions of parental “neglect” which can turn on subjective
and racially biased perceptions about parental fitness.104 In light of
concerns about racial disproportionality in thte system, it is
understandable that many turn to expansive parental rights as a
bulwark against child protection interventions by the state.105
We share these very serious concerns about the vulnerability of
low-income families of color to discriminatory state interventions. Yet
relying upon the current doctrine of parental rights to solve the
problem of discrimination in the child welfare system in fact multiplies
the harms these families face. Expansive parental rights adversely
affect low-income families in part by absolving the state of
responsibility to further children’s interests.106 The law currently treats
caregiving as entirely privatized, reinforcing the traditional view that
children must turn to parents, not the state, for the basic necessities of
life.107 The current regime of expansive parental rights thus fails to help
parents in the difficult task of childrearing. From the moment of birth,
children’s experiences and opportunities are determined by their
parents’ private resources.
The law thus leaves many parents without the resources they need
to raise their children. When economic hardships arrive, so often does
the state in ways that punish parents and harm children. The state
decisionmaking typically furthers child wellbeing, serves society’s interests, and provides an
important shield against state intervention for low-income families and families of color.”).
103. See Dorothy E. Roberts, Child Welfare and Civil Rights, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 171, 172
(2003). But see ELIZABETH BARTHOLET, NOBODY’S CHILDREN: ABUSE, NEGLECT, FOSTER
DRIFT, AND THE ADOPTION ALTERNATIVE 63 (1999) (arguing that racial disparities in removal
rates reflect elevated rates of parental maltreatment due to higher rates of poverty and other risk
factors among families of color).
104. Kari E. Hong, Parens Patri[archy]: Adoption, Eugenics, and Same-Sex Couples, 40 CAL.
W. L. REV. 1, 31–32 (2003).
105. See Roberts, supra note 103, at 178 (“The racial bias in state interventions in the family
clarifies the reasons for safeguarding family autonomy. Parents’ freedom to raise their children is
important not only to individuals but also to the welfare or even survival of ethnic, cultural, and
religious groups.”).
106. Somewhat analogously, LaToya Baldwin Clark compellingly analyzes how systems that
depend on parental advocacy to vindicate children’s interests often “exacerbate[] and
legitimize[]” racial inequities because the fact of parental involvement legitimizes the outcomes
of a system that low-income and minority parents cannot meaningfully shape. LaToya Baldwin
Clark, The Problem with Participation, 9 MOD. AM. 20, 21 (2013).
107. See EICHNER, supra note 24, at 84 (setting out how law “ascribes to parents the
responsibility for childrearing, and accords the state residual responsibility only when and if
parents fail”).
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functionally presumes that all parents have adequate access to the
resources needed to raise their children and does not help rectify the
effects of systemic inequality.108 The state then ascribes any parental
failings to parents’ own moral or economic choices, rather than
background distributional inequalities, and intervenes in an all-ornothing way by removing children from the home.109 In the current
regime, therefore, the state does not leave everyone alone. Expansive
parental rights reinforce a public–private binary that subjects some
children to even greater mechanisms of state control.
Expansive parental rights therefore hurt many families even as
they purport to protect them. As Professor Dorothy Roberts has
argued, racially subordinated families often want a different kind of
state intervention as opposed to no intervention.110 Law currently
places no duty on the state to support parents before problems arise by
providing early childcare, financial support, access to health care, and
other necessities of life. To the contrary, expansive parental rights
create an either-or system where punitive state interventions, including
removal and termination of parental rights, become the state’s primary
response to parental difficulties. The problem is not intervention by the
state but rather the lack of preventive intervention in the form of
financial supports designed to strengthen families.
Protection against a system that disproportionately removes
children of color from their families should be tailored to the specific
harm of family separation. Any state action that raises the risk of family
separation by child welfare workers must be subject to the highest
scrutiny and allowed only where the child is at risk of serious and
imminent emotional or physical harm. Strict scrutiny should apply not
only to decisions to remove a child but also to steps in the child
protection process preceding termination. Expansive parental rights go
well beyond such protections, instead erecting barriers against state
involvement designed to support families. The broad shield of family
privacy absolves the state of its responsibility to help families by
providing support for the parent–child relationship.

108. See Anne L. Alstott, Is the Family at Odds with Equality? The Legal Implications of
Equality for Children, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (2008) (“[F]amily inequalities shape children’s
life chances.”).
109. See infra Part III.C.2.
110. Dorothy E. Roberts, The Value of Black Mothers’ Work, 26 CONN. L. REV. 871, 885
(1994).
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The law’s idealized view of the private family also implicitly
reinforces a model of the two-parent nuclear family, disregarding the
vast array of family forms in which children are now raised. Expansive
parental rights presumes that children are in the custody of one or two
parents who have the resources to exercise full decision-making
authority against the state and third parties, including other family
members.111 Under this ideal of private caregiving, all others—the state
or third parties—are thought to be unnecessary, masking the reality
that families need state support and that families today include a much
broader range of people than one or two legal parents.112 In some
families, children might be raised by other family members, such as
grandparents, or by close family friends whom children consider aunts
or uncles. A range of extended family members and other important
figures outside the private family may be intimately involved in a
child’s upbringing. These unofficial caregivers currently have little or
no legal standing unless they go through formal channels to become
legal guardians or legal parents.113 As in other areas, the burden here
falls especially heavily on children of color who are disproportionately
likely to live in single-parent families with fewer financial resources.114
Expansive parental rights thus implicitly rest on a naturalized
vision of the private two-parent family, one rooted primarily in legal
status flowing from biology. Advocates of expansive parental rights
have responded to concerns about harm to children in nontraditional
111. See Anne L. Alstott, Neoliberalism in U.S. Family Law: Negative Liberty and LaissezFaire Markets in the Minimal State, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 25, 26 (2014) (“Even in the
parent–child relationship, neoliberalism dominates, as state law leaves children’s fates to depend
on their parents’ market earnings.”).
112. See Murray, supra note 3, at 386–87, 397–98 (“Just as feminist legal scholars argued that
coverture . . . prevented the state from identifying and remedying dysfunction within marriages,
parental rights create a zone of privacy that prevents the state from seeing into the black box of
family life to understand how caregiving responsibilities actually are performed.” (footnote
omitted)).
113. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66–67 (2000) (plurality opinion) (holding a
nonparental visitation statute infringed on the fundamental right of parents to make decisions
concerning their children); see also Murray, supra note 3, at 398–405 (“The law effectively has
constructed a parent/stranger dichotomy in which one is either a parent, vested with the rights
and responsibilities of caregiving, or one is a legal stranger without legal entitlements or
obligations.”).
114. Children in Single-Parent Families by Race in the United States, Annie E. Casey Found.
Kids Count Data Ctr., https://datacenter.kidscount.org/data/tables/107-children-in-single-parentfamilies-by-race#detailed/ 1/any/false/1729,37,871,870,573,869,36,868,867,133/10,11,9,12,1,185,13/
432,431 [https://perma.cc/P8NK-8JEB] (providing data that shows 64 percent of Black families
and 42 percent of Hispanic or Latino families are headed by one parent as compared to 24 percent
of white families).
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families by broadening the category of persons who should count as
legal parents because they are functioning as parents or otherwise
should be seen as de facto parents.115 If the worry is that many
caregivers do not conform to the legal definition of parent, then the
solution in this view is to expand the definition of who counts as a legal
parent. This is a welcome and long-overdue development. When
people have acted as parents for an extended period of time and have
developed deep, emotional parent-like bonds with children, it will
generally be in the children’s interests for these de facto parent
relationships to receive legal recognition so that children may maintain
important attachment relationships.116
Yet expanding the category of legal parenthood—while
desirable—does not address the full range of children’s relationships
or support low-income families in less punitive ways. In some families,
for example, grandparents and other family members may serve as
primary caregivers for children but do not wish to be designated the
child’s legal parents and certainly do not wish to terminate the parental
rights of existing legal parents.117 In other families, as discussed in Part
III below, children may be cared for by third parties when parents are
incarcerated, but it is not necessarily in children’s interests to have the
rights of their incarcerated parents terminated and their new caregivers
proclaimed legal parents, particularly when caregivers do not wish to
be designated legal parents.118 For families struggling with poverty or
incarceration, expanding the category of legal parents risks pitting legal
parents against subsequent caregivers or, worse, may keep
incarcerated parents from seeking help from family members out of

115. Douglas NeJaime, The Nature of Parenthood, 126 YALE L.J. 2260, 2331–47 (2017).
Stepparents and unmarried partners of biological parents are examples of people who often
succeed in fulfilling the requirements of de facto parenthood. See In re Parentage of J.B.R., 336
P.3d 648, 653 (Wash. Ct. App. 2014) (holding that de facto parentage could be extended to
stepfather even though child had two biological legal parents); In re Custody of A.F.J., 260 P.3d
889, 890–91, 899 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011) (holding that biological mother’s lesbian partner was the
child’s de facto parent); In re B.G., 523 P.2d 244, 253 (Cal. 1974) (“[A] person who assumes the
role of parent, raising the child in his own home, may in time acquire an interest in the
‘companionship, care, custody and management’ of that child. The interest of the ‘de facto parent’
is a substantial one . . . .”).
116. See Buss, supra note 4, at 641–42; UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 609 (UNIF. L. COMM’N
2017).
117. Cf. Sacha M. Coupet, “Ain’t I a Parent?”: The Exclusion of Kinship Caregivers from the
Debate over Expansions of Parenthood, 34 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 595, 609–10 (2010)
(“[T]here is a tension between the potential costs of seeking legal recognition of a kinship
caregiver’s parenthood and the benefits gained by such a recognition.”).
118. See infra Part III.C.3.
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fear that they might be surrendering their parental status altogether.
Expanding the category of legal parenthood therefore does not address
the diversity and needs of many families.
3. Using Family Privacy to the Detriment of Children and Families.
As we have seen, expansive parental rights are often justified on the
ground that they serve as a bulwark against excessive state intervention
in the private family.119 The state may exercise its parens patriae
authority to wrest control over children from parents,120 but the state is
justified in doing so only in limited circumstances when parents are
failing and, therefore, forfeiting their rights.121 This conception of
parental rights “perpetuates the myth that the state does not intervene
in most families.”122 Efforts by the state to intervene in the lives of
children are understood as encroachments on parental rights, and any
assertion of parental authority is understood as preempting state
interference.123
This vision of a private family immune to state intervention is
deeply misleading for several reasons, including the minimal
protection it provides against a child welfare system that massively
intrudes in the lives of families subordinated by race and class.124 Even
more broadly, the state already intervenes in all families by defining
who counts as a parent and then continuing the historical practice of
allocating almost exclusive control over children to parents.125 The
law’s allocation of control to parents is a choice, not a natural state of
affairs. Because the state grants control to parents in most instances,
parents are thought to be free of state control until they engage in gross

119. MARTIN GUGGENHEIM, WHAT’S WRONG WITH CHILDREN’S RIGHTS 32 (2005);
Huntington & Scott, supra note 5, at 1374.
120. Parens patriae (literally “parent of the country”) authority refers to the power that a
state wields when it acts to support or protect children. Developments in the Law: The Constitution
and the Family, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1156, 1199 (1980).
121. See, e.g., EICHNER, supra note 24, at 59 (describing the dominant view of the liberal
state’s responsibility for supporting children as “residual,” meaning that it is “triggered only after
families fail in some serious way”).
122. Dailey & Rosenbury, supra note 3, at 1457.
123. See Huntington, supra note 24, at 1498–99 (analyzing family autonomy as “the idea and
ideal that a stark line divides the family from the state”); Shani King, The Family Law Canon in
a (Post?) Racial Era, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 575, 588–91 (2011) (describing the widely held belief, in
family law doctrine and scholarship, that “all families, including black families, are able to
organize themselves as they see fit without the interference of the state”).
124. See infra Part III.C.2.
125. For a recent examination of who counts as a parent in constitutional law, see generally
Douglas NeJaime, The Constitution of Parenthood, 72 STAN. L. REV. 261 (2020).
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misconduct. Expansive parental rights therefore rest on the false
notion of a natural divide and opposition between parents and the
state.126
The law’s embrace of the ideal of family privacy distorts the reality
of the family–state relationship,127 with three major adverse
consequences for children and families. First, because children are
assumed to be under the authority of their parents, children are
relegated to the private sphere and hence legal obscurity.128 “Much like
women were under coverture, children are confined to the private
sphere, removed from public life – ostensibly for the good of
themselves and the polity in general.”129 The advantages to children are
merely ostensible because privatization permits parents to exercise
almost unbounded discretion over children’s lives. Most children do
attend school, which gives them important access to the public domain
even as they otherwise remain located in the private realm of the home.
But, as discussed below, parents still retain authority to remove
children from school altogether and educate them at home.130 Indeed,
children exist largely outside of the law unless their parents engage in
misconduct, perceived or real, that comes to the attention of child
welfare authorities. Even when that occurs, the state merely assumes
parens patriae authority, attempting to replicate private parental
authority. As a result, “[l]ittle room remains for anyone, parents,
children or the state, to create a space for children that lies between the
world of the parents and the world of the state.”131
Second, current notions of family privacy construct the allocation
of authority between parents and the state as an on-off switch,
precluding shared family–state responsibility for furthering children’s
interests. State involvement in the family is often seen as punishment
instead of support, particularly for families of color, as described
above.132 Attempts to better address children’s interests within families

126. Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform,
96 HARV. L. REV. 1497 passim (1983).
127. See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, The Dark Side of Family Privacy, 67 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1247, 1257–58 (1999).
128. Fineman & Shepherd, supra note 3, at 62.
129. Cohen, supra note 70, at 222.
130. See infra Part III.A.1.
131. Cohen, supra note 70, at 234; see also Rosenbury, supra note 9, at 834–35 (discussing
childrearing performed by actors who are neither parents nor teachers).
132. DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS: THE COLOR OF CHILD WELFARE passim
(2002); see also Josh Gupta-Kagan, Toward a Public Health Legal Structure for Child Welfare, 92
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are therefore understandably met with alarm, because it is assumed
that the only alternative to parental rights is punitive state intervention
into the family.133 Scholars and policymakers continue to embrace
expansive parental rights because they fear any alternative will result
in a significant transfer of power from parents to the state. This eitheror mentality leads to alarming rates of state separations of children
from their parents instead of state support for families.134 It also limits
opportunities for public support of children living with their parents
and prevents the development of state initiatives designed to increase
the involvement of teachers, pediatricians, religious counselors, and
other adults and children in children’s lives, as discussed below in Part
III. Existing notions of family privacy unnecessarily pit parents against
the state, precluding any possibility that states could better partner
with parents to support children.
Third, family privacy creates obstacles to affirmative community
involvement in children’s lives and upbringing. Children interact with
a wide range of actors outside of the home, including those affiliated
with private schools, religious congregations, sports teams, youth clubs,
extended family, political causes, and other social communities.135
These actors often support parents and almost always influence
children’s identities and world views, yet existing notions of family
privacy continue to cling to a binary of parents and state actors, such
as public school teachers and child welfare workers.136 Family privacy
therefore simplifies the lives of both children and parents and
overlooks the ways families are supported and influenced by nonstate
actors.
For all of these reasons, notions of family privacy predicated on a
parent–state binary serve to fortify the “privatization of
dependency,”137 undermining efforts to recognize children’s
affirmative rights to state support. The U.S. Supreme Court has
NEB. L. REV. 897, 903 (2014) (“Parental fault is jurisdictional; without it, there are no legal
grounds for the court system to intervene or for a child protection agency to force a family to
work with it.”).
133. See, e.g., Huntington & Scott, supra note 5, at 1416 (“Parental rights provide an essential
shield against excessive state intrusion driven by bias.”).
134. See infra Part III.C.2.
135. Rosenbury, supra note 9, at 834–36, 843–44, 870–71, 885–89.
136. Murray, supra note 3, at 386–87; Rosenbury, supra note 9, at 834.
137. For more on the “privatization of dependency,” see FINEMAN, supra note 24 passim;
Deborah Dinner, The Divorce Bargain: The Fathers’ Rights Movement and Family Inequalities,
102 VA. L. REV. 79, 83–84 (2016); Emily J. Stolzenberg, The New Family Freedom, 59 B.C. L.
REV. 1983, 1992–97 (2018).
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repeatedly held that the Constitution protects only negative liberties,
that is, individuals’ rights to be free from governmental interference.138
In DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services,139 a
case involving the claims of a young child to safety from his father’s
violent abuse, the Court held that the Constitution “generally confer[s]
no affirmative right to governmental aid, even where such aid may be
necessary to secure life, liberty, or property interests of which the
government itself may not deprive the individual.”140 In other words,
the state has no positive duty to protect children from harm at the
hands of their parents, let alone a duty to support parents seeking to
foster their children’s interests. Visions of the family as a sphere of
individual liberty free from government intervention keep the state out
in all ways.
Current notions of family privacy thereby reinforce an all-ornothing model that pits parents against the state rather than a model
that views the family as both private in certain respects and open to
public support in others. This all-or-nothing model justifies the
longstanding denial of affirmative rights for children by assigning
parents the duty to provide for children’s needs, in turn absolving the
state of its obligations toward families. When parents are well-off, the
lack of affirmative rights to basic necessities may have little effect
because parents are able to purchase the goods and services their
children need. In contrast, economically marginalized children, who
are disproportionately children of color, may suffer. Expansive
parental rights and the lack of affirmative rights for children privatize
caregiving within the family, leaving children vulnerable to the social
and economic inequalities afflicting their adult caregivers.

138. Parents’ expansive parental rights fall within the classic definition of a negative liberty:
preserving parents’ freedom to raise their children free from governmental control. For critiques
of the Court’s focus on negative rights and aversion to affirmative rights, see Susan Bandes, The
Negative Constitution: A Critique, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2271, 2272 (1990); Anne C. Dailey,
Developing Citizens, 91 IOWA L. REV. 431, 482 (2006); Robin West, Rights, Capabilities, and the
Good Society, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1901, 1906 (2001). The Court has recognized only a few
affirmative constitutional rights, such as the right to habeas corpus, trial by jury, and possibly
marriage in Obergefell, but the Court for the most part views the federal Constitution as a charter
of negative liberties. See, e.g., Gregg Strauss, The Positive Right To Marry, 102 VA. L. REV. 1691,
1691 (2016).
139. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
140. Id. at 191, 196. But see Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984) (indicating that children
do have one fundamental affirmative constitutional right: the right to be in the custody of an adult
caregiver, so “if parental control falters, the State must play its part as parens patriae”).
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Expansive parental rights reinforce a myth of state
nonintervention in the family in ways that harm children’s interests,
adversely impact low-income and Black children, and privilege the
interests of parents over those of children. By conceiving of the family
as a unified, private unit, the law ignores or represses children’s agency
within dependency, intrafamily diversity, and nonpunitive forms of
state support. The following Part presents a new model of parental
rights that looks beyond the façade of family unity to uncover and
better support the interests, outlooks, and identities of all family
members.
II. A NEW MODEL OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
This Part sets forth a new model of parental rights that
foregrounds children’s relationships with parents and the broader
communities in which families live. The model offers a relational
conception of parental rights; seeks to strengthen the state’s role in
supporting the parent–child relationship, particularly for families
subordinated by race and class; and brings children out from under the
cover of parent–child unity in order to reveal children’s agency within
dependency, their diverse interests, and their ties to broader
communities. In so doing, our model reframes parental rights as a
mechanism for furthering children’s vital interests in the parent–child
relationship as well as their interests in the world beyond the family.
We argue that children’s relationships, needs, and interests are
important government ends that justify setting limits on parental
authority in addition to providing affirmative state support to families.
This model builds on aspects of existing law and aspirations voiced for
decades by scholars and judges,141 but the model goes further by
comprehensively recalibrating parental rights in light of children’s
needs for robust parental and state support as well as their important
capacities and needs as people in their own right. Of course, existing

141. For example, Barbara Woodhouse has argued for a conception of parental rights
“flowing from parents’ responsibilities” and the needs of children rather than claims of ownership.
Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, A Public Role in the Private Family: The Parental Rights and
Responsibilities Act and the Politics of Child Protection and Education, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 393, 394–
95 (1996); see also Dailey & Rosenbury, supra note 3, at 1515–27 (explaining “the new tripartite
framework [in which] adult responsibilities . . . foster a collaborative relationship between parents
and the state”).

DAILEY & ROSENBURY_PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

THE NEW PARENTAL RIGHTS

9/17/2021 12:07 PM

111

law already limits parental authority to some extent. Public school
boards may impose curriculum requirements over parental
objections,142 states may allow for sex or mental health counseling
without parental approval,143 states require children to attend school
and to abstain from most forms of paid labor, and states monitor for
maltreatment in the home.144 Yet, however broad, these existing limits
on parental authority are the exception rather than the norm in the
current regime of expansive parental rights. Our model, in contrast,
foregrounds children by asking how the law might best strengthen the
parent–child relationship in a diverse range of families, provide greater
state support for children and their families, and better account for the
ways children’s interests may diverge from parental interests and
wishes.
Our model thus clarifies that any governmental action that
threatens to separate parents and children must be subject to the
strictest judicial scrutiny given children’s overriding interest in
maintaining the parent–child relationship. But under our approach,
state action that otherwise burdens parental rights should be subject to
an intermediate standard of review requiring the government action to
substantially further an important state interest in children’s welfare.
This two-tiered model of judicial review affirms the fundamental
importance of the parent–child relationship to both children and
parents and the need to ensure that this relationship is protected from
undue disruption by the state. Importantly, our model seeks to foster
state and other programs that strengthen parental caregiving and
obviate the need for close supervision or children’s removal from the
home. Our model therefore does not aim to eliminate parental rights;
instead, a relational view of parental rights safeguards the parent–child
relationship while also seeking to further children’s broader interests.
Although deference to parents is often the best way to help children,
particularly young children, flourish, our model emphasizes that

142. See Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 869 (1982) (affirming a school board’s general
authority over the curriculum but holding that the board’s authority does not extend “into the
school library and the regime of voluntary inquiry that there holds sway”).
143. See A.L.I. Tentative Draft 2, supra note 78, §§ 16.01, 16.02.
144. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166–67 (1944) (stating that “the state has a
wide range of power for limiting parental freedom and authority in things affecting the child’s
welfare” and enumerating exceptions to parental authority regarding education, child labor, and
health).
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deference to parents must be closely tailored to children’s diverse
interests at any given moment in time.145
A. The Basic Model: Relational Rights and State Support
The new model of parental rights shifts law’s focus to the needs of
parents and children in relation to one another and the ways that the
state may support those needs. The model therefore conceives of
parental rights in relational terms rather than as rights of control
focused primarily on parental prerogatives. Children clearly need
parental guidance and caregiving, as children’s primary attachment to
their parents is the single most important factor in children’s wellbeing
and development.146 Indeed, attachment theory rooted in
developmental science emphasizes that children have relational needs
for close, nurturing care from parental figures who provide consistent
and stable caregiving.147 Children need the kind of intimate care and
guidance that only parents and other important caregivers can provide.
Yet guidance and care need not equate to unfettered parental
authority or control. Children are both deeply attached to their
caregivers and are independent persons with interests separate and
apart from their parents.
By focusing on aspects of the parent–child relationship beyond
hierarchical control, the new model of parental rights recasts the
fundamental right to direct the upbringing of one’s children. The
earliest cases recognizing this right—Meyer v. Nebraska148 and Pierce
v. Society of Sisters149—focused on state attempts to dictate aspects of
children’s education.150 Because those cases focused on whether
parents or states would make these decisions, the analysis was
presented as one of either state or parental control. In doing so,
children’s interests were collapsed into the interests of either parents
or the state. The right to direct the upbringing of one’s children was
framed, and continues to be framed, like other autonomy rights, pitting

145. In this sense, we would qualify Woodhouse’s assertion that “[a]ffording legal protection
to the rights of privacy and autonomy, which parents need to carry out their responsibilities,
serves both the interests of children and the interests of a larger community.” Woodhouse, supra
note 141, at 394–95.
146. GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 98, at 22.
147. Alstott, Dailey & NeJaime, supra note 6, at 2–3.
148. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
149. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
150. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 400–03; Pierce, 268 U.S. at 530.
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individual parents against the state.151 From this perspective,
individuals enjoy certain fundamental freedoms such as freedoms of
speech, religion, and assembly; among them is the freedom to decide
whether to have a child, and once the child is born, how to raise and
care for the child. This autonomy-based vision of parental rights
protects the autonomy of parents to raise their children but does
nothing to acknowledge children as persons in their own right.
Likewise, because individual parents are pitted against the state, state
involvement is constructed as hostile to parental rights instead of
facilitative of those rights.
In contrast, the new model of parental rights brings children’s
interests to the forefront of the analysis and positions the state as a
potential partner in childrearing as opposed to an adversary. This dual
aspect of the model affirms the fundamental right to direct the
upbringing of one’s children yet recognizes that parental rights are
different than other fundamental rights because they are relational
rights rather than individual rights. The model offers an alternative
relational perspective on parental rights that emphasizes the ways in
which the parent–child relationship is one of emotional reciprocity and
exchange between individual yet deeply connected parties, in contrast
to a hierarchical relationship in which children are passive recipients of
parental caregiving.152 Children receive physical and emotional
caregiving from their parents, but they too provide emotional
gratification and, as they age, intellectual exploration. As Professors
Martha Minow and Mary Lyndon Shanley have identified, this is the
paradox of family life: “family members are individuals, but they are
individuals who are in part defined by their relationships with
others.”153
Our relational conception of parental rights respects the parent–
child relationship while at the same time limiting parental rights in

151. GUGGENHEIM, supra note 119, at 32 (“The right to bear and raise children is at the core
of an individual’s autonomy because it permits him or her the opportunity to choose the kind of
life that makes the most sense.”); Elizabeth S. Scott, Parental Autonomy and Children’s Welfare,
11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1071, 1072 (2003) (“Under a fiduciary model, legal regulation that
diminishes parental autonomy in child rearing—by giving third parties custody and visitation
rights without full parental status, for example—threatens the law’s goal of promoting children’s
welfare through parental dedication.”).
152. See JENNIFER NEDELSKY, LAW’S RELATIONS: A RELATIONAL THEORY OF SELF,
AUTONOMY, AND LAW 9 (2011).
153. Minow & Shanley, supra note 21, at 5. We draw upon Minow and Shanley’s theory of
relational rights in the family. For a brief overview of that theory, see id. at 5–6.
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order to foster children’s other interests in three important ways. First,
in a relational frame, parental rights do more than simply carve out a
sphere of caregiving activity free from state control; parental rights are
also about negotiating the relationship between parents and children
and the ways that the state might support that relationship. A relational
perspective sets some limits on parental control by bestowing equal
respect on children’s independent interests in people and experiences
beyond the parent–child relationship. From this perspective, children
are active participants in their own lives rather than passive objects of
parental control. As Part III describes, a relational approach means
narrowing parental rights to allow for recognition of children’s
interests outside the home.
Second, a relational view of parental rights situates parents in
relationship to other important people in children’s lives. Under law’s
current embrace of expansive parental rights, parents have full control
over children’s relationships with so-called third parties, which
includes anyone other than legal parents, no matter how important the
relationship to the child.154 Parental rights under our model reflect the
fact that children live within a web of relationships, both within and
outside the family, including relationships with important caregivers,
mentors, and peers.155 A relational perspective allows room for
children to develop ties to people and communities beyond the family.
In discussing children’s relationships to foster parents and friends,
parental rights must be narrowed in some circumstances to allow for
the flourishing of children’s broader relationships to people and
communities.
Finally, relational rights are not solitary rights of control but
instead are shared rights held by both parents and children that
encompass claims to affirmative state support. Relational rights reject
the model of the individual autonomous actor seeking freedom from
state control. Instead, these rights reflect an understanding that parents
need affirmative support in carrying out their childrearing duties, and
that children, as independent persons, have a right to that state
support.156 The following Sections explain how our model construes
154. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66–67 (2000) (plurality opinion) (determining that
a Washington law which allowed any third party to petition a court for visitation rights without
deference to the parents was unconstitutional).
155. See Dailey & Rosenbury, supra note 3, at 1484–92, 1508–14 (discussing children’s web
of relationships within the authors’ model).
156. See Anne C. Dailey, Children’s Transitional Rights, 12 LAW, CULTURE & HUMANS. 178,
191 (2016); Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, The Relational Rights of Children, 48 CONN. L. REV. 741, 780–
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relational rights as encompassing broad structural reforms to support
families and children; Part III illustrates what these reforms might look
like.
Because of the importance of fostering children’s interests in these
three ways, the new model of parental rights establishes a two-tiered
approach to reviewing governmental action that restricts parental
authority. The two-tiered model of parental rights demands strict
scrutiny for government action that threatens to separate children and
parents, for example in the child custody or immigration arenas, based
on the importance of the parent–child relationship to children’s
welfare. If states seek to separate children from parents, then strict
scrutiny is appropriate, requiring states to provide a compelling
governmental purpose and means that are narrowly tailored.
In other cases, however, where the state does not seek family
separation, an intermediate standard of review should govern. By
emphasizing the importance of children’s diverse interests and the
ways states may affirmatively support those interests, our model rejects
the notion that state involvement in families should always be subject
to the highest scrutiny. When state involvement does not aim at family
separation but rather seeks to support the interests of children or
families, then courts and legislatures should allow more room for
fostering children’s independent interests. In these contexts, the state
should be required to show that its intervention substantially furthers
children’s interests. When evaluating parental rights claims under an
intermediate standard of review, the court should ensure that the
governmental action substantially furthers children’s own interests
without unduly disrupting or threatening the parent–child relationship.
The new model of parental rights thus calls for reconsideration of
the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Troxel v. Granville, which struck
down the state of Washington’s third-party visitation statute on the
ground that, as applied in this case, it violated the mother’s parental
rights.157 The state trial court had awarded visitation to the children’s
paternal grandparents based solely on the best interests of the child
and did not, according to the Court, give adequate weight to the
mother’s wishes.158 The case did not produce a majority opinion, and
the plurality’s opinion leaves unanswered many basic questions about

81 (2016) (“Relationship-based rights take seriously the nature of relationships and the state’s
affirmative obligation to support relationships that provide valuable care to children.”).
157. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 60, 72–73 (plurality opinion).
158. Id. at 61–62, 69.
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the scope and weight of parental rights. In particular, the plurality
describes the rights at stake as “fundamental,” but never clarifies
exactly what level of scrutiny should apply when these fundamental
rights have been burdened.159
Commentators do not offer much greater clarity. Few, if any,
openly take the position that parental rights deserve strict scrutiny
even though parental rights are deemed fundamental rights under the
Due Process Clause. An exception is Professors Clare Huntington and
Elizabeth Scott, who argue that parental rights should govern absent
harm to the child, a position that risks leaving children, as Justice John
Paul Stevens described it, as “so much chattel.”160 While some
commentators have argued in favor of intermediate scrutiny for laws
burdening parental rights, these proposals remain focused on the scope
of parental interests and the conflict between parents and state.161 Only
Justice Stevens in his dissenting opinion in Troxel has affirmed that, in
addition to balancing parents’ interests “against the [s]tate’s [] interests
as parens patriae,” the courts must also weigh “critically[] the child’s
own complementary interest,” in that case the child’s interests “in
preserving relationships that serve her welfare and protection.”162
While our model does not advocate for a straightforward balancing of
interests among parents, state, and children, it clarifies that children’s
interests must be identified and respected as an important
governmental end for purposes of intermediate scrutiny.
This two-tiered approach to parental rights confers the highest
protection on families when state action threatens to separate children
from their parents, thus addressing the important equality concerns of
commentators who argue that any weakening of parental rights runs
the risk of increased state removal of children from the homes of lowincome families, particularly families of color. Racism and white
supremacy in the child welfare system are a grave threat to children’s
wellbeing and families of color.163 State action that threatens to
separate parents and children, or that threatens to lead to the
separation of parents and children, should be treated as presumptively
159. Id. at 65. See Ryznar, supra note 13, at 134 (“The language of the Troxel plurality
established the importance of this parental right, but failed to articulate a level of scrutiny.”).
160. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 89 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
161. See Ryznar, supra note 13, at 153–54 (“[T]he state may have reasons to become involved
in the care and control of a child, and the courts would have to allow a lower level of scrutiny for
that intervention to occur.”); Meyer, supra note 13, at 570–79.
162. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 88 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
163. See infra notes 351–52 and accompanying text.
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unconstitutional and only sustained for the most compelling reasons,
generally limited to preventing serious physical or emotional harm to
children. But when state action seeks to support families or to further
children’s interests outside the home, a lesser level of scrutiny is
warranted. Intermediate scrutiny allows an important degree of
protection for parental rights while at the same time recognizing that
children have interests as independent persons separate and apart from
their parents that only grow over time.
The following three Sections elaborate in greater detail the
essential elements of our new model of parental rights: the need to
formulate parental rights in light of children’s independent interests
and agency; the importance of recognizing children’s affirmative rights
to necessities and families’ right to support from the state; and the gains
to pluralism and equality that follow from reconfiguring parental rights
in light of children’s independent interests.
B. Children’s Agency and Independent Interests
The law has long sought to support pluralism among families but
not diversity within families.164 The new parental rights aims to foster
both types of diversity by recognizing the ways in which children are
independent persons with interests separate and apart from their
parents at the same time that they are dependent on their parents for
caregiving and guidance. Children’s diverse interests may depart from
those of their parents in significant ways, and parents may not
recognize those departures or may actively work to suppress them.
Our new model of parental rights therefore recognizes children’s
agency within dependency, and the ways in which children’s agentic
capacities give rise to and shape their diverse interests. Children may
differ from their parents and have their own interests separate and
apart from parental interests.165 Indeed, developmental psychologists
have long confirmed the idea that child development is largely about
children distinguishing themselves from their parents and creating
their own sense of identity, both connected to but distinct from parents
and family.166

164. See Rosenbury, supra note 9, at 893 (emphasizing that “[p]luralism currently exists only
between families” and “rarely exists within families” (emphasis omitted)).
165. See, e.g., ANDREW SOLOMON, FAR FROM THE TREE: PARENTS, CHILDREN, AND THE
SEARCH FOR IDENTITY passim (2012).
166. See, e.g., ERIK H. ERIKSON, CHILDHOOD AND SOCIETY 247–69 (2d ed. rev. & enlarged
1963). Another reason for law’s blindness to children’s independent and evolving interests is the
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Our model uses “agency” to capture children’s affirmative power
to direct their own lives, including their power to form relationships,
shape and express their identities, seek out new experiences and
knowledge, and engage in the world. Agency does not mean autonomy
in the sense of persons having independent rational decision-making
capacity, although some older children do have the capacity for
autonomous decisionmaking in certain circumstances.167 Rather, the
concept of children’s agency as used here signifies children’s power to
affect the direction of their own lives even as persons still dependent
on others for physical, emotional, and intellectual care and guidance.
From an early age, these agentic powers are manifest in children’s
growing control over their own bodies and movements, their interest
in exploring the world, and their drive to develop relationships with
others. Children as young as six months will actively seek out attention
from other children, an early sign of children’s relationship-building
capacities.168 Agency is also reflected in children’s resistance to
parental authority, from the earliest struggles over feeding or sleeping
through adolescent forms of rebellion.
Identifying interests that are of special importance to children is
both a descriptive and normative question: what do courts,
professionals such as teachers and pediatricians, developmental
scientists, parents, and children themselves say about the interests that
are most important to life as a child in the United States? Child
psychology and developmental science say much about children’s
psychological and physical wellbeing, but children’s interests must also
draw from shared normative and political values such as diversity,
equality, and democracy.169 Moreover, children’s interests do not exist
separate and apart from culture, and they may differ based on race,
class, gender, ability, religion, and other identities.
Some advocates of expansive parental rights contend that
recognizing these divergent interests will result in more litigation, with

law’s focus on autonomy and the concomitant need to draw strict lines between childhood and
adulthood. See, e.g., Minow, supra note 1, at 3–5, 18–21.
167. See, e.g., A.L.I. Tentative Draft 1, supra note 5, § 19.01 (delineating mature minor
provision for health care).
168. See NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL & INST. OF MED., FROM NEURONS TO NEIGHBORHOODS:
THE SCIENCE OF EARLY CHILDHOOD DEVELOPMENT 166 (Jack P. Schonkoff & Deborah A.
Phillips eds., 2000).
169. For a description of the relationship between science and values in work advancing
children’s interests, see Alstott, Dailey & NeJaime, supra note 6 passim.
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judges standing in for parental decisionmakers.170 But the assumption
that furthering children’s agency and diverse interests always means
greater litigation is a product of the current all-or-nothing approach to
parental rights. Our model does not seek to empower children to run
to court every time their desires are impeded, for fulfilling children’s
every desire is obviously not in their interests. Yielding to children’s
every wish would reflect a false model of children’s autonomy at odds
with our conception of agency within dependency. Children absolutely
need the parent–child relationship and the love, guidance, and
discipline that only parental caregivers can provide.
Moreover, our model emphasizes supports for children outside of
the court system. For example, more robust support for children’s
interests may also be achieved through regulatory and administrative
protections, such as prohibitions on corporal punishment or stricter
standards for homeschooling; improved procedures, such as those
setting limits on parental power to commit children to psychiatric
hospitals; laws giving grandparents standing to seek visitation or
pediatricians standing to provide certain medical services without
parental consent; school policies that provide children with sex
counseling or contraceptives; regulations that ensure children’s access
to ideas and information on issues relevant to their lives; or laws giving
children more of a say in custody, foster care placement, or parental
rights termination proceedings. A somewhat expanded role for courts
may also be expected in certain contexts, such as judicial bypass
procedures that may allow some older children to obtain certain kinds
of medical treatment without parental consent.
Our model also urges the state to take children’s independent
interests into account when designing institutions, such as schools and
public spaces; when reforming foster care and other child welfare
systems; when assuming responsibility for supporting family
caregiving; when setting priorities for the distribution of social goods
such as food, housing, and internet service; when allocating funds for
ensuring children have access to health care; and when deciding
disputes over the placement of children who are already subject to
court jurisdiction. In recognizing children’s position in civil society, our
model goes beyond a focus on parents or state actors to support the
role of pediatricians, community mentors, coaches, teachers,
psychologists, peers, lawyers, and social workers in fostering children’s

170.

See, e.g., Guggenheim, supra note 4, at 949–50.
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interests. The new parental rights also calls for recognizing children’s
affirmative rights to basic necessities and services, rights that may be
vindicated through legislative or administrative means, as well as
sometimes by courts.
In earlier work, we laid out the contours of a preliminary template
for the range of children’s interests that the law should take into
account when defining and enforcing parental rights.171 These interests
include children’s interests in relationships with parents as well as with
children and other adults; exposure to new ideas; expressions of
identity; personal integrity and privacy; and participation in civic life.172
In addition to parents and caregivers, a range of persons with
knowledge of and connections to children can contribute to the work
of identifying and defining children’s independent interests, including
neighbors, coaches, counselors, clergy, pediatricians, psychologists,
developmental scientists, children’s lawyers, and social workers. The
hard work of articulating and protecting children’s interests should be
undertaken by courts and policymakers with the help of insights from
this much broader range of people invested in promoting children’s
welfare.
The Supreme Court has occasionally gestured in the direction of a
new model of parental rights, one that does not devolve to children
suing their parents. In Parham v. J.R.,173 the Court addressed whether
parents had unfettered authority to commit a child to a state psychiatric
hospital or whether a precommitment hearing was required.174 We
agree that parents should retain a role in such decisionmaking, and that
in many cases “the traditional presumption that the parents act in the
best interests of their child should apply.”175 But as the Parham court
emphasized, not in all cases: “[T]he child’s rights and the nature of the
commitment decision are such that parents cannot always have
absolute and unreviewable discretion to decide whether to have a child
institutionalized.”176 The Court crafted a review process for child
commitments that avoided an adversary hearing pitting child against
parent; instead, the Court required that the decision be reviewed by an

171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

See Dailey & Rosenbury, supra note 3, at 1448.
Id. at 1448, 1484–1506.
Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
Id. at 587, 601–02, 604.
Id. at 604.
Id.
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impartial medical expert to ascertain the necessity of the
commitment.177
Parham exemplifies one possibility for furthering children’s
independent interests in ways that narrow parental discretion without
resort to adversarial litigation. Children’s diverse interests may also be
fostered through school or other administrative avenues. Some worry
that the state or third parties will ask parents to carry out decisions with
which they disagree, creating conflict between parents and children, yet
existing law already creates such conflict by leaving children at the
mercy of parental decisionmaking. Our model seeks to ensure that this
already existing conflict inflicts less harm on children’s diverse
interests. Most parents will comply with good-faith policies regarding
their children, in the same way that almost all parents accept their
obligation to provide for their children’s education or to support their
children until the age of majority.178 Stress certainly may arise for
parents when their wishes are not respected, but the harm to children
is just as great—or greater—when parents neglect or invalidate
children’s agency and interests in the first place.
C. Broad Structural Supports for Parent–Child Relationships
Our model of parental rights reconceives the relationship between
parents and state by focusing on their shared responsibilities for
furthering children’s interests. Reframing the parent–child relationship
away from family privacy and toward children’s independent interests
opens up the possibility of seeing the parent–state relationship as a
partnership rather than an adversarial contest over children. Caring for
children would no longer be viewed as an all-or-nothing proposition,
with parents either left alone behind the shield of family privacy or
deprived of childrearing authority when the state intervenes. In the
same way that children belong to both families and broader
communities, families should be regarded “both as private associations
and as entities shaped by social policy and state action.”179
State support for parental care is therefore central to our model of
parental rights. States should further children’s interests in remaining
with their primary caregivers by providing parents with the support
they need to carry out their childrearing responsibilities. This is
177. Id. at 606–08.
178. But cf. Deadbeat Parents Punishment Act of 1998, 18 U.S.C. § 228 (attaching criminal
sanctions for failure to pay child support).
179. Minow & Shanley, supra note 21, at 6.
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particularly important for low-income families. As Professor Anne
Alstott argues, a legal regime committed to children’s equality “would
require supports for parental care, such as an enriched educational
program that would include extracurricular activities, as well as
institutions like paid family leave, parent counseling, substance-abuse
rehabilitation, and other support services.”180 Most importantly, states
should have the responsibility to provide services to families that
prevent the need to remove children from the home except in cases of
serious physical or emotional harm.
Under our model of parental rights, then, the state would be less
likely, not more likely, to use its police powers to remove children from
the care of parents. Our model seeks to replace discriminatory and
harmful state interventions with resources and support designed to
enable all parents, but particularly low-income and parents of color, to
meet their caretaking needs and further their children’s broad
interests.181 This restructuring of the family–state relationship might be
done through cash payments and supports for housing and daycare, as
well as through the education, training, and monitoring of child welfare
workers and systemic changes in child welfare policies designed to
address deep-rooted racial and cultural biases. A nondiscriminatory
state attuned to children’s interests would balance its responsibility to
provide resources and support to struggling families with careful
attention to children’s interests in remaining in the care of their
parents, however imperfect that care may be. The state would assume
its share of the joint responsibility for helping children thrive without
unnecessarily removing disadvantaged children from the home.
In doing so, our model seeks to remove barriers to recognizing
children’s affirmative rights to necessary goods and services, including
shelter, health care, food, clothing, education, disability services, and

180. Alstott, supra note 108, at 4.
181. Despite a divergence of views in the literature on child welfare, advocates on all sides
emphasize the importance of a radical reallocation of resources toward preventive measures to
support families as a way of reducing, if not eliminating, the need for removal. See, e.g., ROBERTS,
supra note 132, at 129; BARTHOLET, supra note 103, at 163–75; Michael S. Wald, Beyond CPS:
Developing an Effective System for Helping Children in “Neglectful” Families, 41 CHILD ABUSE
& NEGLECT 49, 59–60 (2015). For a broader argument to “establish the structures, policies, and
funding necessary to ensure the maximum development of every child,” see NANCY E. DOWD,
REIMAGINING EQUALITY: A NEW DEAL FOR CHILDREN OF COLOR 136 (2018); see also Anne L.
Alstott, What Does a Fair Society Owe Children—And Their Parents?, 72 FORDHAM L. REV.
1941, 1942 (2004) (arguing that society cannot demand of parents all the work that goes into
raising children without providing them with the baseline resources needed to parent effectively).
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protection from physical and emotional harm.182 Overturning the
holding in DeShaney that children have no affirmative rights to basic
necessities or goods is a crucial step in moving beyond protection for
the private family. The new model imposes shared duties on parents
and the state to provide children with basic necessities. When parents
do not have the resources to meet children’s needs, the state should
have the duty to provide support in ways that foster children’s interests,
including their interest in preserving their relationships with their
parents.
Such affirmative rights will require significant redistribution of
government resources to children,183 although research demonstrates
that investment in children saves government resources in the long
term.184 Indeed, state support is crucial to transform the relationship
between parents and state into a partnership rather than a contest over
control of children. This state support for families also ensures that our
model does not entail a one-to-one shift of decision-making authority
from parents to the state. Our model seeks to build supports for
children outside of the court system or existing foster care system in
order to more robustly protect and strengthen relationships between
parents and their children.
D. A More Robust Pluralism
In supporting diversity both within and among families, our model
of parental rights rejects the traditional view that expansive parental
rights are essential to safeguarding the value of pluralism in a liberal
society. Pursuant to this view, expansive parental rights allow parents
to shape children’s moral beliefs and pass on parental values, serving
as a bulwark against state standardization,185 particularly for families of

182. See Anne C. Dailey, Children’s Constitutional Rights, 95 MINN. L. REV. 2099, 2149
(2011). For skepticism about the possibility of children gaining affirmative rights, see Martha
Minow, Children’s Rights: Where We’ve Been, and Where We’re Going, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1573,
1580 (1995).
183. See Alstott, supra note 108, at 4 (recognizing the same difficulties).
184. JOSH BIVENS, EMMA GARCÍA, ELISE GOULD, ELAINE WEISS & VALERIE WILSON,
ECON. POL’Y INST., IT’S TIME FOR AN AMBITIOUS INVESTMENT IN AMERICA’S CHILDREN 31
(2016); Paolo C. Belli, Flavia Bustreo & Alexander Preker, Investing in Children’s Health: What
are the Economic Benefits?, 83 BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG. 777, 783 (2005); Art Rolnick & Rob
Grunewald, Early Childhood Development: Economic Development with a High Public Return,
REGION, Dec. 2003, at 6, 11.
185. Cf. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (“The child is not the mere creature
of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high
duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.”).
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color and families seeking to live outside of mainstream culture.186 We
certainly support liberal democracy’s commitment to social pluralism,
which, as the Supreme Court has emphasized, finds its origins in the
family.187 We also seek to better respect the autonomy of families who
have suffered undue state intervention, as discussed above.188 Yet in
our view, expansive parental rights are not the best tool for achieving
either.
First, like the doctrine of coverture from which it derives,
expansive parental rights mask the fact that there are, and should be,
diverse interests within the family—not simply between husband and
wife, but among all members of the family.189 For children who are
deprived of the opportunity to develop and express their own interests,
it is largely irrelevant if the state or a parent is responsible. Expansive
parental rights may shield children from one possible tyranny while
dispossessing them of legal tools to challenge another.190 Children who
feel different from their families experience difficulties even when
parents support that difference. In families where parents ignore or
punish such differences, children truly suffer.191 Advocates for
expansive parental rights fail to account for diversity within the family
and the harms children may experience when law ignores the myriad
ways in which children’s values, interests, and identities may differ
from those of their parents.
Second, expansive parental rights are not necessary for ensuring a
pluralistic society and may actually limit pluralism to the extent parents
suppress the development of children’s diverse identifies, beliefs, and
values. It is not obvious that social pluralism is best fostered by a system
that elevates parental rights and family privacy over children’s
independent interests or that expansive parental rights are the only

186. Peggy Cooper Davis, Contested Images of Family Values: The Role of the State, 107
HARV. L. REV. 1348, 1371 (1994); Huntington & Scott, supra note 5, at 1414.
187. See, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503–04 (1977).
188. See supra Part II.B.
189. Cf. Peggy Cooper Davis, Little Citizens and Their Families, 43 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1009,
1017–18 (2016) (“The principle of family announced in Meyer and followed in Pierce is admirable,
but Justice Douglas was right to caution that we owe respect both to the dignity of independent
families and to the dignity and the unknowable potential of a developing child.”).
190. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse has developed this argument with respect to child abuse.
Woodhouse, supra note 51, at 483–84. Other scholars make similar arguments regarding
children’s right to privacy. See, e.g., Benjamin Shmueli & Ayelet Blecher-Prigat, Privacy for
Children, 42 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 759, 763 (2011).
191. SOLOMON, supra note 165 passim.
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alternative to state standardization.192 Expansive parental rights run
counter to diversity values by inviting the assimilation of children into
their families while ignoring the diverse influences of the broader
communities in which children live.193 Expansive parental rights
arguably impede social pluralism by suppressing children’s ties to
communities outside the family, thereby inhibiting diversity within the
family and its potential carryover to the public sphere as children leave
the home.
Expansive parental rights are often justified as ensuring that the
state does not itself indoctrinate children into a state-mandated belief
system or identity.194 Yet the best defense against state overreaching is
not to cloister children behind parental rights but to confer on children
the right to have their interests recognized and protected by both
parents and the state. Moreover, by providing the strictest protection
for the parent–child relationship, our model ensures that the state
cannot completely displace parental guidance and control in a way that
would threaten a pluralistic society. Parents will still have primary
control over the development of their children’s value and belief
systems. But opening up room for children to develop their own
identities only fortifies the law’s commitment to social pluralism.
Most importantly, upholding the value of pluralism in a liberal
polity means respecting both the family’s role in inculcating values in
children and the family’s responsibility to guard children’s right to an
open future, meaning their right to develop their own identities and
moral commitments. The alternative to expansive parental rights is not
unencumbered state control but rather a legal system that recognizes
the importance of parental care and guidance at the same time that it
sets clear limits on parental rights in recognition of children’s distinct
identities and their ties to broader communities. Near absolute

192. Steven H. Shiffrin, The First Amendment and the Socialization of Children: Compulsory
Public Education and Vouchers, 11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 503, 509–11 (2002) (critiquing
the view that compulsory public education would lead to the standardization of children and
concluding that “[e]ven if public schools wanted to produce a standardized child, they would have
had no prospect of success”).
193. See Orly Rachmilovitz, Family Assimilation Demands and Sexual Minority Youth, 98
MINN. L. REV. 1374, 1382 (2014).
194. See A.L.I. Tentative Draft 1, supra note 5, at 2 (“Parental rights function to restrain [the
state’s] regulatory impulses and allow families to flourish according to their own values and
lifestyle choices, absent evidence of serious harm to the child.”).
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parental rights are not an inherent, necessary feature of a liberal
democratic state.195
Our model of parental rights thus seeks to better foster the public
interest in social pluralism by recognizing parental inculcation of values
while at the same time furthering children’s independent interests and
their broader engagement in the world outside the family. The
Supreme Court has already recognized the importance of this
engagement, but expansive parental rights have thwarted its potential
for fostering social pluralism. In Prince v. Massachusetts,196 the Court
famously proclaimed: “Parents may be free to become martyrs
themselves. But it does not follow they are free, in identical
circumstances, to make martyrs of their children before they have
reached the age of full and legal discretion when they can make that
choice for themselves.”197 Implicit in Prince is an acknowledgment of
the reality that children’s values and identities, whether religious or
not, may differ from those of their parents and legal guardians. The
Court’s holding may not have been motivated by a desire to promote
such differences—indeed, the Court was likely focused on upholding
child labor laws finally passed after the end of the Lochner era198—but
Prince stands for the proposition that our liberal democracy will
tolerate, and may even require, room for children to develop
viewpoints different from those of their parents. The right to an open
future articulated in Prince means respecting children’s independent
interests, beliefs, and values from an early age.199
To reiterate, parental rights should not be abolished; in fact,
parental rights remain crucial. In addition to their emotional needs for
close parenting, children benefit from being raised within a particular
family culture: children’s first sense of self and early identity are
formed from the values and commitments instilled in them from

195. The United States’ failure to ratify the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child,
which would expand legal protection for children’s interests, sets the United States apart as the
only country in the world not to have done so. See Status of Ratification Interactive Dashboard,
U.N. HUM. RTS. OFF. OF THE HIGH COMM’R, https://indicators.ohchr.org [https://perma.cc/3JZ8RPQQ].
196. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
197. Id. at 170.
198. See Guggenheim, supra note 4, at 945 n.18.
199. For an attempt to balance children’s interests in an open future with parents’ interests
in inculcating their child into their own ways of life, see Scott Altman, Taking Precautions When
Shaping a Child’s Values, 87 UMKC L. REV. 245 passim (2019).
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birth.200 Our model simply insists that parental control over children’s
identities should not be absolute. Instead, children should have space
to modify and even reject their families’ values. A liberal democracy
best advances the value of pluralism by supporting parental guidance
and the parent–child relationship while, at the same time, honoring
children’s individual interests and future selves.
The choice between fostering diversity among families and
fostering diversity within families is therefore a misleading one.
Challenges to expansive parental rights are assumed to involve a zerosum transfer of power from parents to the state. Yet the choice need
not be between expansive parental rights and state standardization.201
Instead, law may recognize both intra- and interfamily differences. By
acknowledging and promoting both forms of diversity, our model of
parental rights seeks to serve both children’s interests and the interests
of the broader liberal polity in fostering social pluralism.
III. THE NEW PARENTAL RIGHTS IN ACTION
This Part illustrates how our new model of parental rights is
designed to strengthen many families while simultaneously moving
children out from under the cover of parent–child unity. Our model
retains the presumption that parents act to further their children’s
interests and seeks to better protect parent–child relationships in
marginalized families, calling for strict scrutiny of any state action that
threatens the separation of parent and child. Yet our model calls for
lesser, intermediate scrutiny of all other laws affecting children in order
to permit the state to further children’s agency and other interests,
which become increasingly strong as children age. In order to better
support both children and families, the model also calls for access to
the resources and experiences necessary to vindicate children’s agency,
interests, and needs over time.
The topics below illustrating the new parental rights—
homeschooling, transgender youth medical decisionmaking, foster
care, children’s friendships, and forced separations in the immigration,
child welfare, and parental incarceration contexts—are not in any way
exhaustive. Rather, we have intentionally chosen a disparate range of
200. See, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503–04 (1977) (“It is through
the family that we inculcate and pass down many of our most cherished values, moral and
cultural.”).
201. Cf. Woodhouse, From Property to Personhood, supra note 3, at 319 (describing the “zero
sum game” of “the provision of rights” to parents or to children as a false dichotomy).
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hard issues in an effort to describe how a new model of parental rights
could transform the law and the lives of children and their families.
A. Acknowledging Intrafamily Diversity
The new parental rights seeks to recognize and foster children’s
diverse interests, interests that may well diverge from their parents’
own interests or wishes. This Section analyzes homeschooling and
transgender youth medical decisionmaking as prime examples of such
intrafamily diversity. Expansive parental rights are often justified as a
way to foster diversity among families, but their pursuit often fails to
take account of diversity within families and the harms suffered by
children growing up in families whose values and identities the children
do not share.
1. Homeschooling. The new parental rights calls on states to
adequately fund public schools and presumptively ban homeschooling,
departing from longstanding practice. Educating children in the home
was common prior to the mid-nineteenth century,202 with fathers
dictating their children’s education just as they dictated other aspects
of their children’s lives. Homeschooling began to decline with the
advent of compulsory education laws in the late nineteenth century,
and the legal status of homeschooling was in doubt in most states by
the mid-twentieth century.203 Yet educational progressives and leftleaning parents viewed homeschooling as an antidote to public schools’
rigidity and intellectual oppression,204 and they joined with Christian
fundamentalist parents to fuel the modern homeschooling movement
in the mid-1980s.205 Homeschooling ultimately became legal in every

202. Kimberly A. Yuracko, Education Off the Grid: Constitutional Constraints on
Homeschooling, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 123, 124 (2008).
203. Catherine J. Ross, Fundamentalist Challenges to Core Democratic Values: Exit and
Homeschooling, 18 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 991, 994 (2010); see also Milton Gaither,
Homeschooling in the USA: Past, Present, and Future, 7 THEORY & RSCH. EDUC. 331, 339 (2009)
(detailing the confused state of the law on homeschooling throughout the 1970s and 1980s).
204. Patricia M. Lines, Homeschooling Comes of Age, 140 PUB. INT. 74, 75–76 (2000);
Yuracko, supra note 202, at 125; see also MILTON GAITHER, HOMESCHOOL: AN AMERICAN
HISTORY 109 (rev. 2d ed. 2017) (noting “[t]he left-wing critique of public education and
preference for a freer, more natural childhood centered in the home”).
205. MITCHELL L. STEVENS, KINGDOM OF CHILDREN: CULTURE AND CONTROVERSY IN
THE HOMESCHOOLING MOVEMENT 144–45 (2001); see also Mitchell L. Stevens, The
Normalisation of Homeschooling in the USA, 17 EVALUATION & RSCH. EDUC. 90, 95 (2003)
(noting that “religious homeschool groups ultimately secured definitional control of home
education” in public discourse).
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state, and the rates of homeschooled children skyrocketed.206 Estimates
vary widely for how many children are homeschooled in the United
States today, but some researchers place the number near two
million.207 Most states impose minimal or no requirements on
homeschooling parents, and only eleven states require that parents
serving as homeschool teachers have a high school diploma or its
equivalent.208
In contrast, our approach seeks to ensure that parents do not have
absolute and unrestricted control over children’s education.209
Educating children within the privacy of the home may deprive
children of the opportunity to develop relationships with other adults
and, most importantly, with other children.210 Although some
homeschooled children may interact with other homeschooled
children in extracurricular activities,211 children’s interactions with
peers holding different values are central to the identity formation
process.212 Homeschooling may shelter children from exposure to ideas
different from those acquired in the home.213 In these ways,
homeschooling may stifle the development of a child’s sense of identity

206.
207.

Lines, supra note 204, at 77; Ross, supra note 203, at 994.
JAMES G. DWYER & SHAWN F. PETERS, HOMESCHOOLING: THE HISTORY AND
PHILOSOPHY OF A CONTROVERSIAL PRACTICE 1 (Randall Curren & Jonathan Zimmerman eds.,
2019); Vivian E. Hamilton, Home, Schooling, and State: Education in, and for, a Diverse
Democracy, 98 N.C. L. REV. 1347, 1350 (2020).
208. See
Parent
Qualifications,
COAL. FOR RESPONSIBLE HOME EDUC.,
https://responsiblehomeschooling.org/research/current-policy/parent-qualifications [https://perma.cc/A8J3Z4F2] (noting also that six of those eleven states “allow parents without a high school diploma or
GED [to] bypass” the requirements in certain situations).
209. For critiques of homeschooling consistent with our own, see Bartholet, supra note 3, at
72–76; Fineman & Shepherd, supra note 3, at 83–86; Hamilton, supra note 207, at 1390–92;
Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Speaking Truth to Power: Challenging “The Power of Parents to
Control the Education of Their Own,” 11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 481, 490 (2002).
210. As two scholars have described it, homeschooling is “radically separatist and
individualistic.” Fineman & Shepherd, supra note 3, at 64.
211. Robert Kunzman & Milton Gaither, Homeschooling: A Comprehensive Survey of the
Research, 2 OTHER EDUC. 4, 19–20 (2013).
212. Emily Buss, The Adolescent’s Stake in the Allocation of Educational Control Between
Parent and State, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1233, 1263–70 (2000); see also Martha Albertson
Fineman, Equality and Difference–the Restrained State, 66 ALA. L. REV. 609, 623 (2015)
(“[E]xposure to difference and expectations of tolerance for diversity is particularly significant
for children, whose experience with classmates from different backgrounds occurs at a time in
their life when they are most open to new ideas.”).
213. Judith G. McMullen, Behind Closed Doors: Should States Regulate Homeschooling?, 54
S.C. L. REV. 75, 85 (2002).
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separate and apart from parents.214 In addition, without the protection
afforded by adult oversight outside the home, homeschooled children
are more vulnerable to physical and emotional abuse within the
family.215 And when homeschooling keeps children isolated in the
private sphere of family life, it potentially deprives children of full
participation in economic and political affairs.216 Homeschooling
potentially compromises children’s interests by shielding them from
exposure to people with differing ideas and by weakening social
bonds.217
We therefore propose a presumption against homeschooling, with
limited exceptions where needed to serve children’s important
interests.218 Parents who wish to homeschool their children should be
required to show that they will further their children’s broad interests
in exposure to ideas and people outside the home in ways that will also
protect children against maltreatment.219 As the Supreme Court noted
in Board of Education v. Pico,220 “access [to ideas] prepares students
for active and effective participation in the pluralistic, often
contentious society in which they will soon be adult members.”221 In
evaluating parents’ claims for homeschooling, the state should take
into account the benefits of homeschooling for the particular child, who
may have special needs, be subject to bullying or harassment in school,
or experience racism or other forms of discrimination.222 Strict
214. For discussions of the importance of this development, see Dailey, supra note 138, at
484–85; Ross, supra note 203, at 1006–07; Jeffrey Shulman, Who Owns the Soul of the Child?: An
Essay on Religious Parenting Rights and the Enfranchisement of the Child, 6 CHARLESTON L.
REV. 385, 420–22 (2012).
215. Bartholet, supra note 3, at 14–20; Robin L. West, The Harms of Homeschooling, 29 PHIL.
& PUB. POL’Y Q. 7, 9 (2009).
216. See Fineman & Shepherd, supra note 3, at 72.
217. Rob Reich, The Civic Perils of Homeschooling, 59 EDUC. LEADERSHIP 56, 58–59 (2002).
218. Our approach therefore dovetails with that of Professor Elizabeth Bartholet. Bartholet,
supra note 3, at 72–73.
219. Presumptively banning homeschooling would likely require overturning the Supreme
Court’s decision in Wisconsin v. Yoder, which upheld Amish families’ desire to keep their highschool children out of school. 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972).
220. Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
221. Id. at 868.
222. Exceptions might also be appropriate for children who are engaged in the broader world
in ways that are incompatible with attending school, such as children whose parents wish to travel
for some period of time or religious parents wanting to take their children on a mission trip. These
children are generally exposed to different people and ideas even as they are homeschooled.
Some child athletes and child actors might similarly be exposed to a range of viewpoints even as
they are homeschooled, but that might not always be the case. Indeed, school attendance might
be crucial to expand these children’s experiences beyond the sport or studio in question.
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regulation of families granted homeschooling exceptions should also
be required.223
Those supporting unregulated homeschooling take the position
that parents have the fundamental right to educate their children at
home because homeschooling best serves the interests of children.224
Under our model, even if homeschooling might fall within parents’
fundamental rights, state bans on homeschooling must survive only
intermediate scrutiny. Furthering children’s interests in exposure to
ideas and people outside the home are important governmental ends,
and a ban on homeschooling, with exceptions for children where
“needed and appropriate,” would almost certainly meet the
intermediate scrutiny standard.225 We acknowledge that many
homeschooled children do well academically, going on to attend
college and generally reporting a high level of satisfaction with their
experience.226 But not all children have a positive experience with
homeschooling. Some children receive little to no education or, worse,
undergo abuse in an isolated family environment.227 Even those
children who do receive an adequate education may have other
important interests that go unfilled, including their interests in forming
relationships with other children and adults, in being exposed to new
ideas, in expressing their identities, and in participating in public life.228
Homeschooling may also have negative externalities that harm
children. It may impede racial and ethnic integration as homeschooled

223. Martha Albertson Fineman and George Shepherd are skeptical that such oversight is
possible and therefore would prohibit homeschooling altogether. Fineman & Shepherd, supra
note 3, at 99.
224. See Billy Gage Raley, Safe at Home: Establishing a Fundamental Right to
Homeschooling, 2017 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 59, 81–91.
225. Stephen Gilles notes:
States will normally have little difficulty showing that their laws intruding on parental
authority are intended to improve the welfare of children, and courts will presumably
agree that improving the welfare of children is an important governmental interest. The
focus will therefore be on whether that interest is substantially advanced by the
legislation in question.
Stephen G. Gilles, Parental (and Grandparental) Rights After Troxel v. Granville, 9 SUP. CT.
ECON. REV. 69, 126–27 (2001).
226. Tanya K. Dumas, Sean Gates & Deborah R. Schwarzer, Evidence for Homeschooling:
Constitutional Analysis in Light of Social Science Research, 16 WIDENER L. REV. 63, 73–78 (2010).
227. See TARA WESTOVER, EDUCATED: A MEMOIR passim (2018) (detailing personal
experiences of author, whose father prevented her from attending school).
228. For a more detailed discussion, see supra notes 210–217 and accompanying text.

DAILEY & ROSENBURY_PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

132

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

9/17/2021 12:07 PM

[Vol. 71:75

children, most of whom are white, withdraw from public schools.229
Some parents of color may choose to homeschool their children in
response to racism in public schools or the low quality of education
being offered there,230 but such choices are deeply constrained by
states’ failure to fulfill the mandate of Brown v. Board of Education.231
Similarly, parents of LGBTQ students may seek to protect their
children from bullying in public and private schools, but those choices
are also deeply constrained by failures to address discrimination in
schools.232 These concerns are serious, so the presumption against
homeschooling should be rebutted in cases where children’s
psychological or physical welfare is at risk. But, in the long run,
resources should be allocated so that schools can meet their
educational responsibilities to provide a nondiscriminatory and safe
educational environment for all children.
Indeed, the current system of homeschooling improperly assigns
sole responsibility for children’s education to parents,233 shifting the
burden for providing an adequate education from the state to
parents.234 In our view, the answer to failing schools is not
homeschooling; rather, the answer requires a systemic response on the
part of federal, state, and local authorities to adequately fund
education and eliminate the continuing racism in our public school
systems, a racism undergirded by residential segregation and school

229. Homeschool
Demographics,
Coal.
for
Responsible
Home
Educ.,
https://responsiblehomeschooling.org/research/summaries/homeschool-demographics [https://
perma.cc/R8WW-LAY3]. Some have compared homeschooling to white flight in the post-Brown
era. Indeed, some white supremacists endorse homeschooling as a way to enforce racial
segregation. Carmen Green, Educational Empowerment: A Child’s Right To Attend Public
School, 103 Geo. L.J. 1089, 1097 & n.44 (2015) (describing a website entitled “White Pride
Homeschool”).
230. Osamudia R. James, Valuing Identity, 102 MINN. L. REV. 127, 179–80 (2017).
231. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (holding that racially segregated
schools “deprived” Black children “of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment”). For an argument that homeschooling itself exacerbates this failure,
see Melinda D. Anderson, The Radical Self-Reliance of Black Homeschooling, ATLANTIC (May
17, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2018/05/black-homeschooling/560636
[https://perma.cc/4ND5-34TQ] (homeschooling “dilutes the landmark Supreme Court case’s
symbolic importance and threatens to reinforce the harm African American students experienced
when they were banned from attending white schools”).
232. See Craig Konnoth, The Protection of LGBT Youth, 81 U. PITT. L. REV. 263, 270 (2019).
233. Fineman & Shepherd, supra note 3, at 104.
234. Id. at 70.
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funding policies.235 Of course, in the meantime, some parents may need
to remove their children from public school to protect them from harm
or racist beliefs or actions. But the state should not be allowed to evade
its educational responsibilities to all children on the ground that
children who are discriminated against in school can be educated at
home.
Moreover, a presumptive ban on homeschooling would not
unduly limit religious childrearing. Conservative religious parents
retain authority over children even if they are required to send their
children to school, as parents are still free to counteract the effects of
schooling in the many hours children spend with their family outside of
school.236 Our model does not entirely dispossess parents of their
childrearing powers. Additionally, constitutional law has long ensured
that public schools do not become an engine of standardization,
beginning with West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette237 in
1943, which held that studentst cannot be forced to recite the Pledge of
Allegiance.238 Our entire public education system is structured in a way
that attenuates any governmental entity’s power to effectively
indoctrinate schoolchildren.239 There is no evidence that religious
communities are so fragile that schooling, which may include religious

235. In this way, we build upon the work of Professor Kimberly Robinson, who has argued
in favor of a positive federal right to education. See, e.g., Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, Fisher’s
Cautionary Tale and the Urgent Need for Equal Access to an Excellent Education, 130 HARV. L.
REV. 185, 226 (2016) (urging “that educational opportunity be distributed based on both student
needs and the common pursuit of excellence for all children in the United States, rather than
based on zip code, class, or race”); cf. Alstott, supra note 111, at 30 (critiquing the fact that, under
existing law, “parenthood, like other family activities, confers no positive rights to the resources
needed to rear children,” emphasizing that “[e]ven education is optional from a federal
constitutional perspective”). Our model would therefore require reconsideration of the Supreme
Court’s decision in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, in which the Court
upheld unequal funding for public schools tied to local property taxes. 411 U.S. 1, 9–10, 24 (1973).
236. Fineman & Shepherd, supra note 3, at 97–98.
237. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
238. Id. at 642. And the state makes space for more than religious beliefs; judicial
interventions and state laws regarding free expression and other constitutional rights generally
ensure that children enjoy protections against state standardization even when they are required
to attend school. JUSTIN DRIVER, THE SCHOOLHOUSE GATE: PUBLIC EDUCATION, THE
SUPREME COURT, AND THE BATTLE FOR THE AMERICAN MIND 62–88 (2018); Dailey, supra note
182, at 2116–20.
239. Shiffrin, supra note 192, at 509; see also Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, “He Drew a Circle That
Shut Me Out”: Assimilation, Indoctrination, and the Paradox of a Liberal Education, 106 HARV.
L. REV. 581, 589–93 (1993) (analyzing the Sixth Circuit’s rejection of religious parents’ objections
“to the very principles — tolerance and evenhandedness — traditionally used to justify liberal
education”).
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schools, will threaten these communities’ survival. In some cases,
children’s exposure to the broader world may strengthen, rather than
weaken, their religious bonds.240 Religious life will endure even under
a legal regime that protects children’s ability to flourish in ways that
differ from their parents.
Our proposed presumptive ban on homeschooling dovetails with
some scholars’ similar concerns with the adverse effects of
homeschooling on children, but their critiques remain constrained by
the status quo of expansive parental rights. Professor Emily Buss, for
example, has described how homeschooling interferes with children’s
interests in developing peer relationships crucial to the formation of
children’s sense of identity.241 In the end, however, Buss argues only for
a system where families are “encouraged” or “compelled” to expose
adolescents in their last two years of high school to “ideologically
unlike peers.”242 As she writes, “[U]ntil sixteen or seventeen, parents
would have the full level of educational control protected in Pierce and
Yoder, and even after this age parents would still have legal authority
over all other aspects of the child’s religious upbringing.”243 Even if the
state were to compel public education for these final two years, Buss
argues that “parents could have broad authority to exempt their
children from particular curricular content, so long as those
exemptions did not interfere with the state’s ability to facilitate the
profitable peer interactions.”244 Having made a persuasive case for the
importance of children’s peer relationships to children’s identity
formation, Buss pulls back to the familiar territory of expansive
parental rights.
Restrictions on homeschooling, standing alone, will not transform
the regime of expansive parental rights in the United States. But a
presumption against homeschooling might go a long way toward
protecting children’s independent interests by establishing the basic
framework designed to limit the scope of parental rights in light of
children’s agency and other interests. Such a mandate would
acknowledge that children’s interests may diverge from those of their
240. See, e.g., DONALD B. KRAYBILL, THE RIDDLE OF AMISH CULTURE 185–86 (rev. ed.
2001) (noting that over 90% of Amish youth remain in the faith even after they engage in
rumspringa, a period of time when they are “no longer under the control of their parents, yet still
free from the church”).
241. See Buss, supra note 212, at 1258–76.
242. Id. at 1233, 1284–87.
243. Id. at 1286.
244. Id. at 1286–87.
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parents. The law should recognize and promote this intrafamily
diversity instead of permitting parents to stifle it.
2. Transgender Youth Medical Decisionmaking. The new parental
rights also recalibrates parental authority in some situations where
children seek to obtain or refuse medical care over the objection of
their parents. We focus here on transgender youths’ ability to access
identity-affirming medical treatments, which might include mental
health counseling, hormone blockers, hormone replacement therapy,
trans-informed pediatric care, and, rarely, gender-confirming
surgery.245 Children’s interests in identity expression, bodily integrity,
and emotional wellbeing suggest that the law must pay closer attention
to the plight of transgender youth who often, for varying reasons,
cannot obtain parental consent to transition-related medical care or
insurance coverage for their treatments.246
Gender-affirming treatment for transgender youth is often
categorized along the following lines: reversible, such as counseling or
hormone blockers; semi-reversible, such as hormone replacement
therapy; and irreversible, such as surgery.247 The World Professional
Association for Transgender Health (“WPATH”) takes the position
that, with one exception, irreversible treatments should not be
available until a person reaches the age of legal majority in their
jurisdiction (generally eighteen in the United States248) and has “lived
continuously for at least 12 months in the gender role that is congruent

245. See Developments in the Law—Outlawing Trans Youth: State Legislatures and the Battle
over Gender-Affirming Healthcare for Minors, 134 HARV. L. REV. 2163, 2165–67 (2021)
[hereinafter Outlawing Trans Youth].
246. See Emily Ikuta, Overcoming the Parental Veto: How Transgender Adolescents Can
Access Puberty-Suppressing Hormone Treatment in the Absence of Parental Consent Under the
Mature Minor Doctrine, 25 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 179, 187–88 (2016); Daliah Silver,
Transforming America’s Perspective: How Recognizing the Rights of Transgender Youth Will
Empower the Next Generation, 39 CHILD.’S LEGAL RTS. J. 233, 245–49 (2019).
247. WORLD PRO. ASS’N FOR TRANSGENDER HEALTH, STANDARDS OF CARE FOR THE
HEALTH OF TRANSSEXUAL, TRANSGENDER, AND GENDER-NONCONFORMING PEOPLE 18 (7th
ed. 2012). We question whether any treatments, including hormone blockers, should be
characterized as truly “reversible,” since any treatment will alter the course of a child’s
development, however minimally. But with that caveat in mind, we accept the designation of
“reversible” and “irreversible” as indicating increasingly invasive levels of medical care.
248. Vivian E. Hamilton, Adulthood in Law and Culture, 91 TUL. L. REV. 55, 65 (2016)
(analyzing all fifty states and concluding that the age of 18 “has become firmly entrenched as the
presumptive age of majority” in the United States).
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with their gender identity.”249 For transgender youth, the primary
question is the availability of care short of surgery.
Should transgender children, both pre- and post-puberty, be able
to access certain gender-affirming treatments without parental consent
but with the guidance of adults other than their parents? Yes. The
availability of transition-related medical care for transgender youth
can have lifelong consequences for the individual child.250 Many
children experiment with gender identity through childhood and
adolescence,251 and it is likely for that reason that WPATH does not
recommend surgical medical interventions. But research shows that
“[u]ntreated [gender] dysphoria in trans youth is associated with . . .
depression, social anxiety, and suicidal thoughts and behavior.”252 The
availability of puberty blockers is considered an especially important
option, for once an individual enters puberty, many of the physical
changes, such as alterations in height and voice, can be permanent.253
Moreover, transgender children without access to identity-affirming
care may suffer serious psychological distress.254

249. WORLD PRO. ASS’N FOR TRANSGENDER HEALTH, supra note 247, at 21.
250. See Outlawing Trans Youth, supra note 245, at 2167–72.
251. See Brendan S. Abel, Hormone Treatment of Children and Adolescents with Gender
Dysphoria: An Ethical Analysis, 44 HASTINGS CTR. REP. S23, S24 (2014) (“[O]nly 10 to 20 percent
of these children [with gender dysphoria] will still have gender dysphoria by the time they reach
adulthood.”); Peggy T. Cohen-Kettenis, Gender Identity Disorder in DSM?, 40 J. AM. ACAD.
CHILD ADOLESCENCE PSYCHIATRY 391, 391 (2001) (finding that 6 to 23 percent of children who
were referred for gender-conforming treatment before puberty changed their gender identity in
adulthood). But see Julia Temple Newhook, Jake Pyne, Kelley Winters, Stephen Feder, Cindy
Holmes, Jemma Tosh, Mari-Lynne Sinnott, Ally Jamieson & Sarah Pickett, A Critical
Commentary on Follow-Up Studies and “Desistance” Theories About Transgender and GenderNonconforming Children, 19 INT’L J. TRANSGENDERISM 212, 212–13 (2018) (questioning the
methodology of similar studies).
252. Outlawing Trans Youth, supra note 245, at 2168; see id. (“Over half [of trans youth]
reported having thought about suicide, and a third reported at least one attempt.”).
253. Simone Mahfouda, Julia K Moore, Aris Siafarikas, Florian D. Zepf & Ashleigh Lin,
Puberty Suppression in Transgender Children and Adolescents, 5 LANCET DIABETES &
ENDOCRINOLOGY 816, 817–18 (2017). It remains unclear whether hormone blockers are in fact
reversible and noninvasive. See Sahar Sadjadi, The Vulnerable Child Protection Act and
Transgender Children’s Health, 7 TRANSGENDER STUD. Q. 508, 511 (2020) (discussing evidence
of long-term adverse effects of puberty blockers on fertility and future genital surgeries).
254. Tracy A. Becerra-Culqui, Yuan Liu, Rebecca Nash, Lee Cromwell, W. Dana Flanders,
Darios Getahun, Shawn V. Giammattei, Enid M. Hunkeler, Timothy L. Lash, Andrea Millman,
Virginia P. Quinn, Brandi Robinson, Douglas Roblin, David E. Sandberg, Michael J. Silverberg,
Vin Tangpricha & Michael Goodman, Mental Health of Transgender and Gender Nonconforming
Youth Compared With Their Peers, PEDIATRICS, May 2018, at 1, 4–8; Maureen Carroll,
Transgender Youth, Adolescent Decisionmaking, and Roper v. Simmons, 56 UCLA L. REV. 725,
734 (2009).
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Transgender youth also often experience emotional and physical
suffering as a result of harassment and violence by parents or others.
Although the literature on transgender youth generally assumes a
supportive family, “[p]arental abuse of transgender youth is
widespread.”255 Without parental support, transgender youth often
find themselves in foster care or unhoused.256 Even when parents are
not overtly hostile, they may lack acceptance.257 In such circumstances,
obtaining parental consent to transition-related medical care simply
may not be possible. And in a tragic feedback loop, the lack of
adequate medical care may magnify the trauma these youth
experience. Because the effects of puberty are physically pronounced
and difficult to reverse, delaying treatment may both amplify a child’s
near-term distress and undermine the chances of a successful
transition.258
By requiring parental consent for almost every type of medical
care provided to children,259 the current regime of expansive parental
rights harms transgender children lacking parental support. Although
there are some circumstances in which children may access medical
treatment without parental consent,260 these exceptions do not now
expressly encompass transition-related medical care. Indeed, the
nascent ALI Restatement on Children and the Law expressly states
that “[t]ransgender minors are not authorized to consent to treatment

255.
256.

Carroll, supra note 254, at 733.
NICHOLAS RAY, NAT’L GAY & LESBIAN TASK FORCE POL’Y INST., LESBIAN, GAY,
BISEXUAL AND TRANSGENDER YOUTH: AN EPIDEMIC OF HOMELESSNESS 4 (2006); Sonja
Shield, The Doctor Won’t See You Now: Rights of Transgender Adolescents to Sex Reassignment
Treatment, 31 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 361, 373–75 (2007).
257. SOLOMON, supra note 165, at 599–666.
258. Shield, supra note 256, at 378–84.
259. See, e.g., A.L.I. Tentative Draft 1, supra note 5, § 2.30.
260. For example, the Supreme Court has held that minors may obtain contraception without
parental consent, Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 693–702 (1977) (plurality
opinion), and many states make exceptions to parental consent requirements for treatments
relating to substance abuse, see, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.1264 (West 2021) (providing
that “[t]he consent to the provision of substance use disorder related medical or surgical care” by
a minor is valid); mental health care, see, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 577-29 (LexisNexis 2021)
(providing that minors “fourteen years of age” and above may “consent to mental health
treatment”); and sexually transmitted diseases, see, e.g., N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2305
(McKinney 2021) (allowing physicians to prescribe treatment without parental consent). Some
states also permit mature minors to obtain “routine, beneficial” medical care when they are
deemed mature enough to make the decision, see A.L.I. Tentative Draft 1, supra note 5, §19.01,
or when they reach a certain age, see, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-8-4 (2021) (waiving consent
requirements for minors at or above fourteen years of age).
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associated with gender confirmation.”261 Moreover, medical providers
open themselves to prosecution or civil damages if they provide
nonemergency care to children without parental consent.262 Children’s
ability to obtain transition-related health care absent parental consent
is therefore severely limited.263
Transgender children also are harmed when they are unable to
obtain needed guidance about transition options from their parents or
other adults. The decision to undertake transition-related medical care
is a difficult one with lifelong consequences. All children need guidance
in assessing their own wishes and feelings relating to gender
transitioning. Many children, particularly those who are prepubescent,
are not in a position to make this decision on their own, as they may
not appreciate the permanence or impermanence of their feelings or
the long-term consequences of the interventions.264
The new parental rights seeks to alleviate these harms by
providing avenues for children to obtain professional guidance even
when their parents object to their children’s exploration of their gender
identities.265 Schools might hire counselors who specialize in identity
formation, state public health boards might provide information
through publicly available websites, and states might allow children to
consult doctors without parental consent. Our model therefore does
not replace the current regime of expansive parental rights with an
approach that prioritizes children’s autonomy. Importantly, children
should not be given full autonomy rights with respect to these
decisions. Instead, children need guidance and support given the

261. A.L.I. Tentative Draft 1, supra note 5, §19.02 cmt. b.
262. Id. For an early case, see Zoski v. Gaines, 260 N.W. 99, 102–03 (Mich. 1935) (holding a
doctor liable for assault and battery for operating on a child without parental consent).
263. Carroll, supra note 254, at 736–39. One of the biggest hurdles for transgender youth in
obtaining medical care over parental objections is the cost of treatment and denials of insurance
coverage. SANDY E. JAMES, JODY L. HERMAN, SUSAN RANKIN, MARA KEISLING, LISA MOTTET
& MA’AYAN ANAFI, NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL., THE REPORT OF THE 2015 U.S.
TRANSGENDER SURVEY 93, 95, 98 (2016). Moreover, without parental support, children may not
have access to their insurance records or otherwise be able to avail themselves of coverage. These
hurdles could be addressed if the state had an affirmative duty to provide necessary medical care
to children.
264. See GABE MURCHISON, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN FOUND., SUPPORTING & CARING FOR
TRANSGENDER CHILDREN 4–10 (2016).
265. See id. at 11 (“Competent, compassionate medical and mental health providers are vital
resources for transgender and gender-expansive children and their families.”).
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complexity of the issues surrounding transition-related medical care
for transgender youth.266
By eschewing a simple choice between parental authority and
child autonomy, the new parental rights seeks to provide the guidance
children need while at the same time recognizing the reality of parent–
child differences and conflicts. In the abortion context, for example,
the Supreme Court has established an option for pregnant adolescents
who wish to obtain an abortion without parental notification or
consent. In Bellotti v. Baird,267 the Supreme Court observed that
pregnant minors may face parental objections or even violence if
forced to inform their parents of their wish to obtain an abortion.268
The Court therefore held that pregnant adolescents have the right to
go to court to seek permission to obtain an abortion free from parental
notification requirements.269 Yet while the Court has been willing to
recognize a pregnant adolescent’s right to seek court-ordered access to
treatment, no court has gone so far as to recognize a similar right on
the part of transgender youth. Outside of the reproductive care or
substance abuse contexts, legislators and courts have been less likely to
challenge the myth of parent–child unity.270
The Supreme Court’s decision in Bellotti provides a starting point
for reforms that better account for children’s interests in their evolving
gender identities. For example, a system might be created that allows
transgender children to seek medical consent from a court or other
neutral decisionmaker. This bypass option is superior to the mature
minor doctrine for it allows an “immature” minor—one who is likely
prepubescent—to receive permission from a neutral decisionmaker for

266. For an illuminating commentary on the complexity of identity-affirming care for
children, see Sadjadi, supra note 253, at 510–13, 514 n.2.
267. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
268. See id. at 647 (plurality opinion) (“[M]any parents hold strong views on the subject of
abortion, and young pregnant minors, especially those living at home, are particularly vulnerable
to their parents’ efforts to obstruct both an abortion and their access to court.”).
269. Id. at 651.
270. For example, courts have upheld parental decisions not to vaccinate a child when
justified on religious grounds. See, e.g., In re LePage, 18 P.3d 1177, 1181 (Wyo. 2001); Maier v.
Besser, 341 N.Y.S.2d 411, 413–14 (App. Div. 1972). In addition, on religious grounds, courts have
shielded from state override parental decisions to deny children medically recommended
procedures such as cancer treatment or blood transfusions, at least when there is no imminent
risk of death from failure to obtain the medical treatment. See Newmark v. Williams, 588 A.2d
1108, 1120–21 (Del. 1991); In re D.L.E., 614 P.2d 873, 874–75 (Colo. 1980); In re Green, 292 A.2d
387, 388, 392 (Pa. 1972).
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counseling or hormone blockers.271 The Supreme Court took a similar
approach in Parham v. J.R, where the Court acknowledged the
possibility of intrafamily conflict in the context of involuntary
commitment of a child to a psychiatric hospital, requiring that such
decisions be reviewed by a neutral decisionmaker such as a doctor or
judge.272 In the transgender youth context, enlisting pediatricians, child
psychologists, gender specialists, and other important adults in a child’s
life would be an important step toward designing and implementing a
neutral, supportive, and professionally guided system for helping
transgender
youth
through
this
complex
medical
decisionmakingdecision-making process.
Facilitating access to medically recommended treatment supports
children’s expression of gender identity, particularly as they enter
adolescence. The ability to express one’s felt gender identity can be a
prerequisite for developing a sense of social belonging at school,273
heavily influencing children’s capacity to develop strong peer-to-peer
relationships, to encounter new ideas, to acquire adult mentoring
relationships, and to obtain important academic skills.274 Further, given
the limitations of the current healthcare system, providing access to
gender-affirming care would help dispel the myth of the public–private
binary, moving away from relying on parents for the provision of public
goods toward legally recognizing children’s affirmative rights to health
care.
Providing avenues for children to access transition-related
medical care also opens the door to children’s engagement with adults
outside the family when parental support is lacking.275 Ideally, parents

271. The mature minor doctrine allows physicians to provide certain kinds of nonemergency
medical care to children without parental consent only when the child is mature enough to consent
on their own behalf. See A.L.I. Tentative Draft 2, supra note 78, § 19.01.
272. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602–04, 606–07, 610 (1979).
273. See Outlawing Trans Youth, supra note 245, at 2169–70.
274. Cf. Sacha M. Coupet, Valuing All Identities Beyond the Schoolhouse Gate: The Case for
Inclusivity as a Civic Virtue in K-12, 27 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1, 48–50 (2020) (describing the
ways transgender children are best supported socially to avoid negative outcomes).
275. See GABE MURCHISON, supra note 264, at 11 (“Competent, compassionate medical and
mental health providers are vital resources for transgender and gender-expansive children . . . .”).
Of course, adults outside the home, such as school officials, should be under a duty to keep
information about a child’s chosen gender confidential if a child does not want that information
to be shared with parents. See, e.g., Shmueli & Blecher-Prigat, supra note 190, at 784–85
(discussing guidelines from the American Library Association that recognize “a duty of librarians
not to disclose private information about children to their parents”); Stacey B. Steinberg,
Sharenting: Children’s Privacy in the Age of Social Media, 66 EMORY L.J. 839, 856–58 (2017)
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will further their children’s identity and other interests. But the law
must contend with the real world, where departures from gender
identity norms can enflame parental disappointment, indifference, or
anger. Nonparental provision of transition-related medical care to
transgender youth reinforces the crucial role that public, nonfamilial
sites play in fostering children’s access to the relationships,
experiences, and ideas that facilitate and underlie their independent
interests as children.
Allowing a child to obtain medical care over the objection of
parents may sometimes harm the parent–child relationship, and
assessments must be made on a case-by-case basis about what will best
serve the child’s gender identity interests as well as their interests in
maintaining family relationships. Yet simply deferring to parental
control over what might be essential medical care in the false name of
family unity risks harming these children even more. The invocation of
parent–child harmony is belied by the fact that conflict has already
erupted.276 If the family truly reflected a harmony of interests between
parents and children, then children would not need to bypass parental
consent in the first place. Of course, unlike terminating a pregnancy,
gender identity is difficult to conceal from parents. In most cases,
parents will know that their child is undergoing some kind of
treatment. Moreover, the treatment for transgender youth is ongoing,
rather than a onetime medical intervention, and complications might
arise if parents resist the treatment.277 One hopes that parents would
ultimately support their children’s gender-affirming treatments. The
new parental rights seeks to provide mechanisms for encouraging
parents to better understand their children’s interests and needs even
as it also provides a mechanism for transgender children to receive
guidance and treatment in the face of parental resistance.
With this nuanced approach, the new parental rights leaves room
for parents to retain substantial capacity to shape how their children
experience and express their identities through the everyday

(critiquing courts’ failures to respect children’s reasonable expectations that schools will not share
information with parents).
276. Cf. Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 75 (1976) (rejecting a
claim of parental authority over their children’s access to abortion “where the minor and the
nonconsenting parent are so fundamentally in conflict and the very existence of the pregnancy
already has fractured the family structure”).
277. See Silver, supra note 246, at 240–45 (describing various forms of parental resistance,
including interruptions to medical care, forcing children to undergo conversion therapy, and
cutting children off from financial resources and even the home).
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interactions that comprise family life. Parents do and should exercise
oversight over many day-to-day decisions in a preadolescent child’s
life, including younger children’s ability to express their identities
through clothing, hairstyle, and other avenues.278 Parents should not,
however, have absolute, life-altering control with respect to important
interests such as gender identity.279 Because children possess identities
independent of their parents, it is in children’s interest to have the
space and support they need to experience and express those identities
even as they are changing.
B. Building Relationships
Courts and scholars have long debated the extent to which
children’s relationships with adults and children outside the family
should be recognized and protected over parental objections.280 The
new parental rights clarifies that, when a child has a close emotional,
family-like bond with another adult or child, a presumption exists in
favor of the child maintaining that bond.281 When a conflict is raised in

278. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (“It is cardinal with us that the
custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents . . . .”).
279. We focus on gender identity here because it presents one of the most difficult examples
of potential parent–child conflict, but our analysis is by no means limited to gender identity.
Similar nuanced approaches will often be required for conflicts regarding children’s religion,
sexual orientation, and other expressions of identity. See, e.g., Rachmilovitz, supra note 193, at
1381, 1428–46 (proposing a “famil[ies] in need of services” framework).
280. See, e.g., Carter v. Brodrick, 644 P.2d 850, 855 (Alaska 1982) (recognizing possible
visitation rights of stepparents); In re Jennifer P., 553 A.2d 196, 197 (Conn. App. Ct. 1989) (per
curiam) (upholding the right of a former foster mother to petition a court for visitation); In re
Hood, 847 P.2d 1300, 1301–02 (Kan. 1993) (denying visitation rights to a child’s day care
provider); In re Custody of H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d 419, 437 (Wis. 1995) (permitting an adult with
“a parent-like relationship with the child” to petition a court for visitation if the child’s parent
“has interfered substantially with the child’s relationship with” that adult). For scholarship
considering third-party visitation rights, see Emily Buss, Adrift in the Middle: Parental Rights
After Troxel v. Granville, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 279, 280; Solangel Maldonado, When Father (or
Mother) Doesn’t Know Best: Quasi-Parents and Parental Deference After Troxel v. Granville, 88
IOWA L. REV. 865, 894 (2003); Murray, supra note 3, at 399–404, 448–49; Rebecca L. Scharf,
Psychological Parentage, Troxel, and the Best Interests of the Child, 13 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 615,
636 (2012).
281. In this way, our model builds on existing law. Although the Supreme Court, in Troxel v.
Granville, struck down a statute that had been interpreted as allowing third parties to obtain
visitation where it was in the best interests of the child, 530 U.S. 57, 60, 72–73 (2000) (plurality
opinion), every state provides some form of visitation rights to third-party relatives, and many
states continue to have third-party visitation statutes that allow anyone, whether related to the
child or not, to obtain visitation in some circumstances. See A.L.I. Tentative Draft 1, supra note
5, §1.80 cmt. a; Mark Strasser, Custody, Visitation, and Parental Rights Under Scrutiny, 28
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court, parties including the child should be heard on the question of
whether the relationship should be protected over parental objections.
Policymakers also should respect children’s interests in developing and
maintaining these relationships when designing schools, juvenile
justice centers, child welfare programs, and affirmative forms of family
support. This Subsection explores ways to do so by considering two
examples: relationships with former foster parents and with friends.
1. Foster Parents. The new parental rights seeks to protect
children’s diverse relationships with former foster parents, broadly
defined. There is no single type of foster care placement in the United
States; rather, foster care may take many different forms and involves
a range of relationships between children and the caregiving adults in
their lives.282 Although foster care arrangements are often facilitated
by the state, most nonparental caregiving is created informally by
parents or family members themselves.283 These “parents” might be kin
(an aunt or uncle, for example), or they might be unrelated to the
child.284 They might hope to eventually adopt the child, or they might
have no interest in formalizing their parental status.285 There is no one
model for what foster care is or should be.
Under the current regime of expansive parental rights, former
foster parents are generally not permitted to maintain relationships
with the children for whom they have cared unless they succeed in
obtaining termination of the legal parents’ rights and adopting the
child.286 This holds true even when the relationship between foster

CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 289, 316 (2018); Jeff Atkinson, Shifts in the Law Regarding the Rights
of Third Parties To Seek Visitation and Custody of Children, 47 FAM. L.Q. 1, 2–6 (2013).
282. See CHILD.’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., NO. 25, THE AFCARS
REPORT: PRELIMINARY FY 2017 ESTIMATES AS OF AUG. 10, 2018, at 1 (2018) (listing various
placement settings and case plan goals for children in foster care); Foster Care, CHILD TRENDS
(May 24, 2018), https://www.childtrends.org/?indicators=foster-care [https://perma.cc/GW4HP9DA].
283. Lauren E. Bartlett, Promoting Permanency and Human Rights, 23 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV.
L. & POL’Y 123, 139 (2019).
284. Coupet, supra note 117, at 606–07.
285. See id. at 609–10 (emphasizing that informal kinship caregivers often avoid the adoption
process because it “usually involves adversarial legal proceedings that pit kinship caregivers
against another relative, often their own adult child” and therefore is “emotionally difficult for
everyone involved”).
286. John Dewitt Gregory, Blood Ties: A Rationale for Child Visitation by Legal Strangers,
55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 351, 367–69 (1998); see also Smith v. Org. of Foster Fams. for Equal. &
Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 853–56 (1977) (declining to hold that foster parents have parent-like liberty
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parents and children rises to the level of a psychological parent
relationship, that is, a relationship defined by a close emotional bond
formed by parent-like caretaking over time.287 Psychological parents
may be the child’s biological parents, but they need not be. Children’s
deep attachments to their psychological parents are crucial to their
present wellbeing as well as their healthy development over time.288
The existence of a psychological parent bond between a foster
parent and child currently does not give rise to any special claim to a
continuing relationship once the foster care arrangement is over.
Indeed, overly close emotional bonds between foster parents and
children are generally discouraged because they are seen as potentially
disrupting children’s bond to their legal parents.289 The child–foster
parent relationship is understood to be governed by the foster care
contract between the state and the foster parents and to be timelimited.290 When the time is up, the relationship is over, and the child is
either returned to the parents, freed for adoption, or moved to another
foster care setting.291 Unless the foster parents become the adoptive
parents, neither foster parents nor children have any right to see each
other once the foster care arrangement has ended.
Legal recognition of children’s relationships with former foster
parents is complicated even if we focus exclusively on children’s
independent interests. Children’s interests are often furthered when
parents place their children voluntarily with foster parents, and parents
might hesitate to do so if they believe foster care will lead to a longerterm loss of custody or ongoing visitation obligations after they regain

interests under the Due Process Clause). If foster parents are able to adopt their foster children,
they then become the children’s legal parents with all the rights enjoyed by other legal parents.
287. For the initial use of the term “psychological parent,” see GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note
98, at 18, 80. For a modern adaptation of the psychological parent concept, see Alstott, Dailey &
NeJaime, supra note 6, at 8 (arguing for the extension of legal parenthood to “psychological
parents”). This term generally does not connote a legal status but rather may serve as a
justification for visitation rights or for granting de facto parent status. See Scharf, supra note 280,
at 631–36 (discussing attachment theory as a justification for third-party visitation rights). But see
Melissa Fried, Note, Reflecting the Best Interest of the Child: Middleton v. Johnson, 3
CHARLESTON L. REV. 635, 638–42 (2009) (discussing the development of psychological parent
doctrine in Alaska, South Carolina, West Virginia, and Wisconsin).
288. Alstott, Dailey & NeJaime, supra note 6, at 10–13.
289. Smith, 431 U.S. at 836–37 n. 40.
290. See id. at 835 (noting that foster parents “provide care under a contractual arrangement
with [the state or an authorized foster-care agency]” and acknowledging that the theory of the
foster care system contemplates temporary stays).
291. See Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, 42 U.S.C. § 675(5).
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custody.292 It is also impossible to evaluate the interests of former foster
parents without confronting the fact that Black children are
disproportionally removed from the home and placed in foster care.293
As discussed in greater detail below,294 the new parental rights posits
that children should be removed from the home only if meaningful
preventive or rehabilitative state support has failed or if a child’s safety
is in immediate peril. In other words, removal must be a last resort and
survive strict judicial review. Yet even with meaningful supports in
place, foster care likely will be necessary in limited circumstances, and
bonds of attachment may arise between foster parents and children.
The new parental rights therefore also posits that the prerogatives
of legal parents should not automatically hold sway when children have
developed a psychological parent relationship with former foster
parents. It is more important that the law recognize children’s close
emotional bonds with their caregivers than maintain an all-or-nothing
system of parental rights that requires terminating parental rights in
order for other relationships to be legally recognized. Relationships
with foster parents may continue past the end of the foster care
arrangement through custody and visitation arrangements, particularly
when foster parents are relatives. Options are varied: continuing
contact might involve permanent guardianship or open adoption
arrangements under which foster parents adopt the child but the
parents of origin maintain a relationship with the child, too.295
Although ties with a psychological parent may be severed in law, they
cannot easily, if ever, be severed in reality.296 In many cases, children

292. We acknowledge that such voluntary placements may not be freely chosen, as families
face financial constraints that may induce them to “choose” foster care. Smith, 431 U.S. at 826,
834 (noting that “middle- and upper-income families who need temporary care services for their
children have the resources to purchase private care,” whereas “[t]he poor have little choice but
to submit to state-supervised child care when family crises strike”). Parents may also be
threatened by child welfare agencies. Josh Gupta-Kagan, America’s Hidden Foster Care System,
72 STAN. L. REV. 841, 847–52 (2020).
293. In 2018, of the approximately 437,000 children in court-ordered foster care nationwide,
44 percent were white, 23 percent were Black, and 21 percent were Latino. CHILD.’S BUREAU,
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., FOSTER CARE STATISTICS 2018, at 9 (2020),
https://web.archive.org/web/20201102224811/https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/foster.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2QRN-C6YH]. We discuss this racial disproportionality in greater depth in Part
III.C.2, infra.
294. See infra Part III.C.2.
295. Josh Gupta-Kagan, The New Permanency, 19 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 1, 13–23
(2015); Bartlett, supra note 283, at 144–50.
296. GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 98, at 18, 80; see also V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 549,
555 (N.J. 2000) (acknowledging “the psychological parent cases in which a third party has stepped
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will have a strong interest in maintaining relationships with both their
legal parents and the parents who care for them when their legal
parents are unable to do so.297
In developing this approach, the new parental rights brings laws
governing foster care more closely in line with recent developments
acknowledging de facto parents as the legal parents of a child.298 What
constitutes a legally recognizable family has expanded to include samesex households, nonmarital families, and extended families.299 So far,
foster families have been left behind in this ongoing push to expand the
legal family.300 It is unlikely that any one legal rule will meet children’s
interests in maintaining ties with their psychological parents.301 The
legal system should be open, however, to ensuring that children’s
relationships with foster parents are protected when these
relationships have become a central part of a child’s life.
2. Children’s Friendships. The new parental rights also recognizes
the importance of peer relationships to children’s present welfare and
healthy development.302 Under current law, parents have a near-

in to assume the role of the legal parent who has been unable or unwilling to undertake the
obligations of parenthood” and finding that ongoing visitation was justified in the present case).
297. Marsha Garrison, Parents’ Rights vs. Children’s Interests: The Case of the Foster Child,
22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 371, 391–92 (1996); Gilbert A. Holmes, The Tie That Binds:
The Constitutional Right of Children To Maintain Relationships with Parent-Like Individuals, 53
MD. L. REV. 358, 388–90 (1994).
298. See supra notes 115–116 and accompanying text.
299. NeJaime, supra note 125, at 319–31.
300. Id. at 375–77.
301. Some scholars have argued that the expansion of family recognition developed in the
context of families headed by same-sex couples should be extended to other kinds of families. For
examples of those arguments, see Joanna L. Grossman, Parentage Without Gender, 17 CARDOZO
J. CONFLICT RESOL. 717, 718 (2016); Douglas NeJaime, Marriage Equality and the New
Parenthood, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1185, 1190 (2016). For concerns similar to ours, see Leslie Joan
Harris, Obergefell’s Ambiguous Impact on Legal Parentage, 92 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 55, 81–84
(2017).
302. For general examinations of the law’s relationship to friendship, see Monica C. Bell,
Safety, Friendship, and Dreams, 54 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 703, 722–31 (2019); Ethan J. Leib,
Friends as Fiduciaries, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 665 passim (2009); Ethan J. Leib, Friendship & the
Law, 54 UCLA L. REV. 631 passim (2007); Laura A. Rosenbury, Friends with Benefits?, 106
MICH. L. REV. 189 passim (2007). Most of that work has examined friendships between adults,
however, with children’s friendships considered only more recently. See Dailey & Rosenbury,
supra note 3, at 1488–90 (analyzing how law ignores children’s positive relationships with other
children); Bell, supra, at 725 (briefly analyzing how residential mobility affects the ability of
children to form friendships).
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absolute right to control their children’s access to friends.303 Indeed, the
power to choose whether or not their children associate with other
children may be the central component of parents’ right to raise
children free from governmental interference.304 Even in cases where
the state is already involved in the family, such as in child custody
disputes, courts generally defer to one or both parents’ decisions
regarding children’s social relationships.305 The only time the state
might contravene parental authority is when parents’ permissive
attitudes constitute neglect or lead their children to engage in
delinquency,306 as might occur if parents knowingly allow their
adolescent children to socialize with peers engaging in criminal
conduct.
Apart from a limited, but growing, attention given to siblings,307
the current regime of expansive parental rights takes little to no
account of children’s important interests in maintaining relationships
with other children.308 To the extent legal decisionmakers have focused
upon peers, it is almost always in the context of parents’ ability to
protect children from negative influence or harms that may flow from
these relationships.309 Attention to the damaging effects of children’s
relationships with other children is vital. Bullying and sexual

303. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 78 (2000) (Souter, J., concurring) (stating that parents
have an interest in choosing their child’s social companions and therefore have a right to be free
of “judicially compelled visitation” of grandparents over their objections). This right is bolstered
by parents’ rights to control children’s housing, schooling, and extracurricular activities, as
discussed supra Part III.A.1. See also Dailey & Rosenbury, supra note 3, at 1486 (“Because
children are always within the custody of parents or the state, their relationships are always
controlled by their custodians.”).
304. See James G. Dwyer, A Taxonomy of Children’s Existing Rights in State Decision
Making About Their Relationships, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 845, 970–71 (2003) (“It clearly
would be undesirable from a child welfare perspective for the state routinely to make decisions
directly about, for example, with whom a child will play.”); Rosenbury, supra note 9, at 866–67
(analyzing entity-based family privacy, which enables parents “to impart to their children
whatever values they please and to exclude anyone they choose from the family home”).
305. See generally Rosenbury & Dailey, supra note 3, at 1459–66 (describing children’s
autonomy rights in the current state of law and explaining why they are limited).
306. Cf. Naomi R. Cahn, Pragmatic Questions About Parental Liability Statutes, 1996 WIS. L.
REV. 399, 414–15 (emphasizing that parental liability is imposed for children’s misconduct when
parents fail to live up to duties owed to their children, including by providing inadequate
supervision); Dwyer, supra note 304, at 971 (“As with most other decisions parents make within
the family setting, most parental decisions about children’s relationships are legally constrained,
if at all, only by the general abuse and neglect provisions in state statutes.”).
307. Dailey & Rosenbury, supra note 3, at 1489–90, 1511.
308. Id. at 1489–91.
309. Id. at 1490–91.
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harassment are areas where important work has been done to
safeguard children’s wellbeing from the dangers of social interactions
with other children.310 Experts estimate that ten to fifteen percent of
children “experience serious and chronic peer difficulties, including
rejection, social exclusion, and victimization.”311
Yet overlooked in the legal literature on children’s relationships
is the way in which children’s peer relationships, and in particular their
friendships, play a vital role in enriching children’s present lives and
fostering their healthy development.312 Friendships in childhood may
lay the foundation for relationships lasting a lifetime.313 Friendship
“matters to the children themselves, creating a context in which they
evaluate their self-worth, competence, and view of the world as
pleasant or hostile.”314 Children also learn a wide range of skills
through friendships. Children’s cross-racial friendships in particular
help “teach[] children about the inaccuracy of stereotypes, the inequity
of race-based exclusion and the importance of inclusive racial
attitudes.”315 Identity formation is also profoundly affected by
friendships. Professor Emily Buss, one of the few legal scholars to
emphasize the value of peer relationships, observes that “it is largely
through these [peer] relationships that [children] pursue the difficult
and important task of identity formation—the sorting and selecting of
values, beliefs, and tastes that will define their adult selves.”316
Parents’ near-absolute right to control their children’s friendships
may negatively impact children’s interests not just with respect to

310. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-222d (2019) (providing that “[e]ach local and regional
board of education shall develop and implement a safe school climate plan to address the
existence of bullying . . . in its schools”); Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 643–
48 (1999) (interpreting Title IX to impose tort liability on schools that fail to protect students from
harassment by other students on school grounds).
311. DEBRA PEPLER & KAREN BIERMAN, ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND., WITH A
LITTLE HELP FROM MY FRIENDS: THE IMPORTANCE OF PEER RELATIONSHIPS FOR SOCIALEMOTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 2 (2018).
312. See generally JUDITH RICH HARRIS, THE NURTURE ASSUMPTION: WHY CHILDREN
TURN OUT THE WAY THEY DO 147–71 (1998) (analyzing how peer relationships often play a
larger role in children’s development than parental influence); BARRIE THORNE, GENDER PLAY:
GIRLS AND BOYS IN SCHOOL 11–27 (1993) (analyzing how children form rich social worlds with
other children at school).
313. Elian Fink & Claire Hughes, Children’s Friendships, 32 PSYCHOLOGIST 28, 29 (2019).
314. NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL & INST. OF MED., supra note 168, at 163.
315. Fink & Hughes, supra note 313, at 30.
316. Buss, supra note 212, at 1233. Yet in emphasizing only the importance of identity
development toward adulthood, Buss herself overlooks the importance of friendship to children
in the present.
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identity development but also with respect to their exposure to ideas,
their bodily integrity, and their participation in the broader world.
When we think about children’s exposure to ideas outside the home,
we tend to focus on formal education. But children learn from other
children.317 Friendships may also help safeguard children’s bodily
integrity to the extent children turn to friends to help with parental
abuse. Friendships may be particularly important for children
struggling with hardship, since friend relationships can serve as an
important source of emotional resiliency in the face of adversity.318
The new parental rights calls on courts, policymakers, and other
state actors to more fully recognize the role that children’s friendships
play in their present lives. Policymakers and courts could at least
acknowledge children’s friendships when crafting custody and
visitation orders, as well as when considering a custodial parent’s
request to relocate away from a child’s noncustodial parent.319 Child
welfare departments could also make arrangements for children to see
their friends when in foster care.320 At the same time, the state should
not become involved in day-to-day decisionmaking regarding
children’s interactions with peers. To the contrary, the presumption
that parents know what is best for their children on a daily basis
protects children from the disruptive effects of state involvement in
their everyday lives.321 In most cases, parents are best positioned to
know when children’s friendships may raise concerns about abuse or
exploitation and when they may enrich and strengthen children’s lives.
The new parental rights also calls on states and parents to work
together to facilitate children’s peer relationships outside of the home.
For example, states could adopt educational curricula that emphasize

317. HARRIS, supra note 312, at 147–71; THORNE, supra note 312, at 11–27; Roger Passman,
Experiences with Student-Centered Learning and Teaching in High Stakes Assessment
Environments, 122 EDUCATION 189, 196 (2001).
318. Conversely, as Professor Monica C. Bell explains, the stress of economic and racial
inequality may interfere with children’s ability to form friendships, further disadvantaging them.
Bell, supra note 302, at 722–24, 738.
319. This does not mean that, however, that children’s interests in maintaining their
friendships should trump parental desires to relocate in all or even most situations. See Ruth
Zafran, Children’s Rights as Relational Rights: The Case of Relocation, 18 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC.
POL’Y & L. 163, 204–12 (2010).
320. See Shanta Trivedi, The Harm of Child Removal, 43 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE
523, 533 (2019) (“Foster children complain not only about losing their immediate families but also
about losing contact with other relatives, friends, pets, and possessions.”).
321. Dwyer, supra note 304, at 970–71.
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the benefits of children learning from one another.322 Schools could
organize children’s interactions to promote positive peer dynamics and
disrupt negative ones.323 States could also require public schools to
open their doors for afterschool youth activities, including those run
largely by other children instead of adults. Juvenile detention and other
state-run facilities could be structured around fostering the
development of positive friendships. Finally, communities could create
more playgrounds and other recreational spaces for children, and
ensure their safety. Recognizing and supporting children’s friendships,
along with the social conditions that give rise to positive peer
relationships, are central features of the new parental rights.
C. Supporting Families
Our model also seeks to dramatically reduce state separations of
children from their parents. Current law leads to state-enforced
separations of children from their parents that inflict significant harm
on children. This Section discusses three areas in which forced
separations frequently take place: immigration detention, child welfare
removal, and parental incarceration. Our model would strengthen
parental rights in each of these areas. Both parents and children have
rights to maintain relationships with each other when state action aims
to separate them. Our model considers the effect of forced separations
on children’s independent interests in their present welfare and
development over time. We focus on creating the conditions under
which separations will become unnecessary while also better attending
to children’s independent interests when separations must occur.
1. Immigration Detention. The phenomenon of state-enforced
separations recently took a tragic turn at the border. Between July 2017
and October 2019, at least 5,400 children were separated from their
parents by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) as
families sought to enter the United States.324 In addition, ICE has

322. For a meta-analysis of 71 studies analyzing children’s peer learning and its positive
effects, see Harriet R. Tenenbaum, Naomi E. Winstone, Patrick J. Leman & Rachel E. Avery,
How Effective Is Peer Interaction in Facilitating Learning? A Meta-Analysis, 112 J. EDUC.
PSYCHOL. 1303, 1314–16 (2020).
323. See PEPLER & BIERMAN, supra note 311, at 3.
324. Chantal da Silva, More Than 5,400 Children Were Separated from Their Parents by the
Trump Administration, ‘Shocking’ New Tally Shows, NEWSWEEK (Oct. 25, 2019, 7:23 AM),
https://www.newsweek.com/trump-administration-family-separation-policy-aclu-1467715
[https://perma.cc/7ZBR-T6RH].
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deported tens of thousands of immigrant parents of children who are
U.S. citizens.325 In both contexts, the harms to children are rarely
addressed.
The justification for these forced separations is explicitly
punitive.326 Parents are viewed as exercising a choice to migrate into
the United States or to stay in the United States without valid
documentation and are consequently held accountable, including by
losing custody of their children.327 Moreover, the Board of Immigration
Affairs and many courts do not view the deportation of undocumented
parents with citizen children as a form of forced separation because
they believe parents will choose to bring their children with them.328
Deterrence is also invoked, as some policymakers believe separation
and deportation are effective tactics for eliminating family border
crossings or otherwise limiting the presence of undocumented parents
in the United States.329
Whether the rationale is punishment, deterrence, or both, the
separation policy focuses almost entirely on the behavior of parents, in
line with the current all-or-nothing regime of parental rights. Although
U.S. immigration law provides for “cancellation of removal” for some

325. Madeline Buiano, ICE Data: Tens of Thousands of Deported Parents Have U.S. Citizen
Kids, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Oct. 12, 2018), https://publicintegrity.org/inequality-povertyopportunity/immigration/ice-data-tens-of-thousands-of-deported-parents-have-u-s-citizen-kids
[https://perma.cc/C5CX-HAPJ]; see also RANDY CAPPS, MICHAEL FIX & JIE ZONG, MIGRATION
POL’Y INST., A PROFILE OF U.S. CHILDREN WITH UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANT PARENTS 3–4
(2016) (estimating that 79 percent of the 5.1 million children living “with at least one unauthorized
immigrant parent” are United States citizens).
326. Carrie F. Cordero, Heidi Li Feldman & Chimène I. Keitner, The Law Against Family
Separation, 51 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 430, 434 (2020); see Kathy Abrams, Family as a Vehicle
for Abjection, 2009 UTAH L. REV. 407, 408 (“[P]revious immigration raids and deportations use
family as an instrument of abjection” in order “to produce immigrants as somehow less than
human—the kind of beings whose deep connections with parents, children or spouses can be
disregarded, indeed flagrantly violated, at will.”).
327. For a recent expression of these views, see Michael D. Shear, Katie Benner & Michael
S. Schmidt, ‘We Need to Take Away Children,’ No Matter How Young, Justice Dept. Officials Said,
N.Y. TIMES (May 3, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/06/us/politics/family-separationborder-immigration-jeff-sessions-rod-rosenstein.html [https://perma.cc/JUP6-7RXC].
328. Marcia Yablon-Zug, Separation, Deportation, Termination, 32 B.C. J.L. & SOC. JUST. 63,
71–72 (2012).
329. William Cunnings, John Kelly Defends Separating Immigrant Families, Saying ‘Name of
the
Game
is
Deterrence,’
USA
TODAY
(May
11,
2018,
4:16
PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2018/05/11/john-kelly-splitting-migrant-familieslaws-trimip/602982002 [https://perma.cc/6EWP-2NWL]; see also Cordero, Feldman & Keitner,
supra note 326, at 434 (“[T]he U.S. government’s policies and practices beginning in 2018
represent the first time the United States deliberately separated arriving migrant and asylumseeking families as a tactic for deterring migration.”).
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undocumented immigrant parents if they are able to show that their
removal will cause “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to
their children,330 the hardship standard is an exceedingly difficult
threshold for immigrant parents to meet.331 Parents are the subjects of
the policy’s goals, and children are the objects used to punish or
influence parental behavior.332
In this way, a parent’s presence in the United States without valid
documentation may be viewed as a type of child forfeiture. Parents
who cross the border illegally are in no position, so this rationale would
go, to claim parental rights, even if they subsequently give birth to U.S.
citizens. They have waived their entitlement to custody over their
children in the United States by being in the country or attempting to
enter the country without documentation.333 Indeed, the United States
classifies children separated from their parents at the border as
“unaccompanied minors,” as if their parents had never traveled to the
border with them.334
This focus on parental behavior fails to take children’s
independent interests into account even as the state affirmatively
assumes custody over those children. Although a few states have
enacted legislation permitting parents to designate guardians for their
children in the event of deportation, children of deported parents are
often simply absorbed into the child welfare system.335 As migrant
children move from the private family into the custody of the state, the
state continues to view them as objects to be kept by parents or
forfeited. The United States has not to date adjusted its immigration

330. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b.
331. See Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 I. & N. Dec. 56, 62 (B.I.A. 2001); Jimenez v. INS, No. 9670169, 1997 WL 349051, at *4–5 (9th Cir. 1997) (unpublished table decision).
332. See David B. Thronson, Entering the Mainstream: Making Children Matter in
Immigration Law, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 393, 399 (2010).
333. For example, one discussion of Olowo v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 692 (7th Cir. 2004), notes
that the case upheld the deportation of a mother even though the court agreed that her citizen
children would be subject to female genital mutilation (“FGM”) if they also returned to the
mother’s home country, thereby confining consideration of the children’s interests to “FGM or
the loss of a parent” without considering whether the children’s interests could best be met by
allowing the mother to stay in the United States. Note, In the Best Interests of the Child AsylumSeeker: A Threat to Family Unity, 134 HARV. L. REV. 1456, 1472 (2021) [hereinafter In the Best
Interests of the Child Asylum-Seeker].
334. Shani M. King & Nicole Silvestri Hall, Unaccompanied Minors, Statutory Interpretation,
and Due Process, 108 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 4 (2020).
335. See Teresa Wiltz, If Parents Get Deported, Who Gets Their Children?, PEW TRUSTS (Oct.
25, 2018), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2018/10/25/ifparents-get-deported-who-gets-their-children [https://perma.cc/RJ8S-UW4B].
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policies to mitigate the traumatic harms suffered by children separated
from their parents.336 Immigrant or citizen children separated from
their undocumented parents are at increased risk of anxiety,
depression, and post-traumatic stress disorder.337 Young children kept
in shelters may also suffer irreversible changes to their brains, leading
to future deficits in executive function, memory, and thinking
processes.338
Many advocates, including the American Psychological
Association, share the view that lawmakers should adopt alternative
immigration policies that take these harms to children into account.339
In the absence of serious abuse and neglect on the part of their parents,
children’s broader interests are almost always furthered by ongoing
relationships with their parents.340 Here, the state is disrupting these
relationships for reasons completely unrelated to the quality of the
relationships. Simply stopping forced separations therefore seems to
be the obvious solution, yet the federal government is unlikely to
exempt families from immigration laws, leaving family immigration
detention as the only route to keeping families together under current
approaches. Family detention is likely to inflict other harms on
children,341 or at the very least is unlikely to foster their interests

336. See Jonathan Todres & Daniela Villamizar Fink, The Trauma of Trump’s Family
Separation and Child Detention Actions: A Children’s Rights Perspective, 95 WASH. L. REV. 377,
398–408 (2020).
337. Kalina M. Brabeck, M. Brinton Lykes & Cristina Hunter, The Psychosocial Impact of
Detention and Deportation on U.S. Migrant Children and Families, 84 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY
496, 498, 500 (2014); Carola Suárez-Orozco, Hee Jin Bang & Ha Yeon Kim, I Felt Like My Heart
Was Staying Behind: Psychological Implications of Family Separations & Reunifications for
Immigrant Youth, 26 J. ADOLESCENT RSCH. 222, 247–48 (2011); Lisseth Rojas-Flores, Mari L.
Clements, J. Hwang Koo & Judy London, Trauma and Psychological Distress in Latino Citizen
Children Following Parental Detention and Deportation, 9 PSYCH. TRAUMA 352, 353 (2017).
338. Amanda S. Hodel, Ruskin H. Hunt, Raquel A. Cowell, Sara E. Van Den Heuvel, Megan
R. Gunnar & Kathleen M. Thomas, Duration of Early Adversity and Structural Brain
Development in Post-Institutionalized Adolescents, 105 NEUROIMAGE 112, 117 (2015).
339. Letter from Jessica Henderson Daniel & Arthur C. Evans, Jr., Am. Psych. Ass’n, to
President Donald Trump (June 14, 2018), https://www.apa.org/advocacy/immigration/separatingfamilies-letter.pdf [https://perma.cc/LJ9G-8WLR]; AJAY CHAUDRY, RANDY CAPPS, JUAN
MANUEL PEDROZA, ROSA MARIA CASTAÑEDA, ROBERT SANTOS & MOLLY M. SCOTT, THE
URB. INST., FACING OUR FUTURE: CHILDREN IN THE AFTERMATH OF IMMIGRATION
ENFORCEMENT 74 (2010).
340. See Trivedi, The Harm of Child Removal, supra note 320, at 527–41; In the Best Interests
of the Child Asylum-Seeker, supra note 333, at 1473–74.
341. WENDY CERVANTES, FAMILY DETENTION: THE HARMFUL IMPACT ON CHILDREN 1
(2015).
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beyond the parent–child relationship. Current law therefore leaves
limited options, all of which fail to further children’s robust interests.
By challenging the framework of parental fault, the new parental
rights opens up alternatives to deportation, separation, or family
detention. Most promisingly, we resist the privatization of dependency
and insist that the state provide more support for children in need while
simultaneously fostering their relationships with their parents.342 This
could involve placements of immigrant families with relatives or in
other home settings, with parents subject to supervision
requirements.343 Although parents would be subject to restrictions,
those restrictions would not sever their relationships with their
children. Children could therefore maintain close relationships with
their parents while also attending school or otherwise pursuing
interests outside of the parent–child relationship.
The radical change here is in altering the relationship between
families and the state to eliminate the state’s punitive response to
undocumented parents, a response that directly harms children.
Children of undocumented parents should have basic rights to
maintain a relationship with their parents, a step not too far removed
from the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Plyler v. Doe,344 which held
that undocumented children may not be denied an education.345 The
new parental rights imposes shared duties on parents and the state to
care for children and recognizes that children have affirmative claims
to state support, including support that maintains rather than destroys
the parent–child relationship.
2. Child Welfare Removal. Although attention to children’s
interests ostensibly governs the law of child welfare, forced separations
in this context are also overwhelmingly defined by notions of parental
fault and forfeiture. Because current law protects family privacy and
parental authority unless a parent commits abuse or neglect that comes
to the attention of the state, child welfare law “depends on parental

342. See supra Part II.A.
343. See Julie Pittman, Released into Shackles: The Rise of Immigrant E-Carceration, 108
CALIF. L. REV. 587, 614–16 (2020).
344. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
345. See id. at 230 (“If the State is to deny a discrete group of innocent children the free public
education that it offers to other children residing within its borders, that denial must be justified
by a showing that it furthers some substantial state interest.”).
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fault as a predicate for state engagement in the life of the child.”346 This
state engagement often ends in removal of children from the home, an
event of traumatic significance even for those children suffering from
serious maltreatment.347 While in cases of severe maltreatment removal
may be the only course of action to keep a child safe, the law should
recognize the effect of removal for all children. Even maltreated
children develop attachment relationships to their parents; separation
may bring relief and safety (although not always), but separation may
also prompt acute trauma and feelings of loss and self-blame.348 It is
likely rare that maltreated children are not also attached to their
parents in emotionally complex ways.349 Ensuring that removal is
always an option of last resort is central to our model, and state steps
toward removal are subject to the highest scrutiny.
The current child welfare system350 privatizes caregiving and then
separates parents and children—sometimes permanently—as
punishment for perceived caregiving failures. Black children, in
particular, are separated from their parents or other primary caregivers

346. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Ecogenerism: An Environmentalist Approach to
Protecting Endangered Children, 12 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 409, 423 (2005); see also Gupta-Kagan,
supra note 132, at 903 (“The present system centers on legal findings of parental faults, not
children’s needs.”); Jean Koh Peters, The Roles and Content of Best Interests in Client-Directed
Lawyering for Children in Child Protective Proceedings, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1505, 1515 (1996)
(stating that parental fault is often the actual standard in child welfare proceedings even when
judges explicitly invoke the best interests of the child standard).
347. See CHILD.’S BUREAU, supra note 90, at xiv Exhibit S-2, 11 tbl.2.1, 90 tbl.6-4 (showing
that in 2019, out of 4,378,000 referrals, 656,000 children were found to be victims of maltreatment,
and 21.7 percent of those children were taken into foster care); Alan J. Dettlaff, The Evolving
Understanding of Disproportionality and Disparities in Child Welfare, in 2 HANDBOOK OF CHILD
MALTREATMENT 149, 152 (Jill E. Korbin & Richard D. Krugman eds., 2014) (“Multiple studies
have documented that children who are removed from their homes experience not only significant
trauma but also are more likely than other children to experience negative outcomes as adults . . .
.”).
348. See Trivedi, supra note 320, at 527–41 (explaining that the act of removing a child itself
creates trauma for children).
349. See id. at 528 (“[P]rofessionals seem to ignore that for the child, the maltreating parents
are the only parents he or she has, and that any separation, particularly if long and abrupt, will
evoke strong and painful emotional reactions.” (quoting Douglas F. Goldsmith, David
Oppenheim & Janine Wanlass, Separation and Reunification: Using Attachment Theory and
Research To Inform Decisions Affecting the Placement of Children in Foster Care, 55 JUV. & FAM.
CT. J. 1, 6 (2004))).
350. This system is now often referred to as the family regulation system or family policing
system to emphasize the destructive effects of widespread removal on Black families and
communities. See, e.g., Dorothy Roberts, Abolishing Policing Also Means Abolishing Family
Regulation, IMPRINT (June 16, 2020), https://imprintnews.org/child-welfare-2/abolishing-policingalso-means-abolishing-family-regulation/44480 [https://perma.cc/TU3L-GVWS].
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at alarming rates; studies from 2010 show Black children comprised 29
percent of children in foster care, despite representing only 14.5
percent of children living in the United States.351 Studies from 2018
show Black children comprised 23 percent of children in foster care.352
Although some number of children are necessarily removed from
parental caregivers for safety reasons,353 the system of privatized
caregiving has devastating consequences for a large number of
children, especially Black children living in low-income communities.
In a world of vast inequality, the system of privatized caregiving sets
the stage for caregiving difficulties and then views parents who falter
as having forfeited the right to raise their children.354
Taking a step back, this is not a system that serves children’s
interests in any meaningful way. We focus on two shortcomings here.
First, a system of privatized caregiving permits the state to elide its own
role in producing the conditions that lead to removals in the first place.
In 2017, 75 percent of all child welfare investigations involved parental
neglect,355 which “is frequently defined as the failure of a parent or
other person with responsibility for the child to provide needed food,
clothing, shelter, medical care, or supervision to the degree that the
child’s health, safety, and wellbeing are threatened with harm.”356 It is
true that child welfare officials can and often do offer in-home supports
to parents when they do not perceive an imminent risk of serious harm
to the child.357 But child welfare officials are extremely limited in their
capacity to provide what many parents actually need to fulfill their role
as parents: the financial resources necessary to reduce stress in the

351. Dettlaff, supra note 347, at 149.
352. CHILD.’S BUREAU, supra note 293, at 9.
353. See Gupta-Kagan, supra note 132, at 941 (generally advocating for the abolition of
mandatory reporting laws, but conceding such laws are still necessary for “cases involving severe
abuse or neglect”).
354. See ROBERTS, supra note 132, at 117 (critiquing rates of child removal as “reject[ing]
any national effort to address the systemic causes of children’s deprivation and [a decision] to
pursue instead the private remedies of marriage and adoption”).
355. Child
Maltreatment,
CHILD
TRENDS
(May
7,
2019),
https://www.childtrends.org/indicators/child-maltreatment [https://perma.cc/48YA-372S].
356. CHILD.’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., DEFINITIONS OF CHILD
ABUSE AND NEGLECT 2 (2019), https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubpdfs/define.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FU3S-KC2X]. Some instances of parental neglect involve serious maltreatment,
as the fatality rate for neglected children confirms. Of the 1,515 children who died of child
maltreatment in reporting states in 2019, 72.9 percent were neglected. Only 44.4 percent suffered
physical abuse. CHILD.’S BUREAU, supra note 90, at 56.
357. CHILD.’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., IN-HOME SERVICES IN CHILD
WELFARE 3 (2014).
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family and to “provide needed food, clothing, shelter, medical care, or
supervision.”358 Rather than providing robust preventative support for
families, the state erects a child welfare system that punishes many
parents struggling to raise their children in poverty.359 Many of the
problems currently plaguing the child welfare system are rooted in a
system that privatizes dependency and blames poor parents—
particularly Black parents—for their poverty.
The new parental rights acknowledges the state’s role in creating
the background conditions of inequality that lead to child welfare
involvement and shifts the law’s focus to preventing caregiving failures
from arising in the first place. Of course, some children do suffer severe
maltreatment in the home, but research suggests that this maltreatment
often results from the stresses of poverty, with adjacent hardships such
as substance abuse, unemployment, and homelessness.360 A
governmental system that privatizes caregiving can avoid responsibility
for addressing the economic inequality that, along with racial bias, fuels
the high rates of child removals in communities of color. Reform
requires systemic changes in the family–state relationship, including
jettisoning the myth of the private family in favor of preventive social
and economic policies aimed at keeping children and parents safely
together.361

358. Cf. CHILD.’S BUREAU, supra note 90, at 77–81 (describing the non-financial prevention
services and postresponse services offered to parents).
359. David Pimentel, Punishing Families for Being Poor: How Child Protection Interventions
Threaten the Right To Parent While Impoverished, 71 OKLA. L. REV. 885, 895 (2019); Candra
Bullock, Low-Income Parents Victimized by Child Protective Services, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC.
POL’Y & L. 1023, 1025 (2003). In many cases, the state cannot provide the very thing that parents
are lacking—for example, a safe and stable home. See, e.g., Matthew Stone, Maine is Removing
More Kids From Their Homes—Often To Stay in Hotels, BANGOR DAILY NEWS (July 29, 2018),
https://bangordailynews.com/2018/07/29/mainefocus/maine-is-removing-more-kids-from-theirhomes-often-to-stay-in-hotels [https://perma.cc/PQ2M-JZCD].
360. See ANDREA J. SEDLAK, JANE METTENBURG, MONICA BASENA, IAN PETTA, KARLA
MCPHERSON, ANGELA GREENE & SPENCER LI, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., NIS-4,
FOURTH NATIONAL INCIDENCE STUDY OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT: REPORT TO
CONGRESS 5–11 (2010) (explaining that household socioeconomic status is “significantly related
to incidence rates in all categories of Harm Standard maltreatment and levels of outcome
severity”).
361. Those who advocate for greater state intervention on behalf of children also recognize
the importance of radical reform to address the inequality and underlying racial subordination
that produces childrearing difficulties. See Elizabeth Bartholet, The Racial Disproportionality
Movement in Child Welfare: False Facts and Dangerous Directions, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 871, 923
(2009) (explaining that state-run maltreatment prevention programs “provide the best
opportunity to protect black children against maltreatment as well as the child welfare system
involvement that maltreatment triggers”).
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Second, child welfare removals risk reinforcing and sustaining a
child welfare system that disproportionately affects communities of
color and their children.362 The strong correlation between poverty and
maltreatment is not sufficient to explain the full extent of racial
disparities in the child welfare system. Recent studies that control for
family income indicate that “racial bias in decision-making remains an
important factor in contributing to racial disparities.”363 It seems clear
that racial disparities result in significant part from racialized
assumptions about parental fault and predictions of harm.364 Racial
bias in the reporting and investigating of child abuse and neglect
undoubtedly plays a role, as do racialized understandings of child
maltreatment. Neglect as a general category encompasses
discretionary decision points based on perceptions of risk, which opens
the door to cultural and racial biases in situations where removal may
not be warranted.365 The amorphous “best interests of the child”
standard confers significant discretion on child welfare officials,366 who
may lack familiarity with the communities in which they work or may

362. See CHILD.’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., RACIAL
DISPROPORTIONALITY AND DISPARITY IN CHILD WELFARE 2 (2016) (noting the breadth of
research documenting racial disparities present in the child welfare system).
363. Dettlaff, supra note 347, at 160.
364. See CHILD.’S BUREAU, supra note 362, at 6 (noting research suggesting racial disparities
in substantiation rates of child welfare cases); Sheila D. Ards, Samuel L. Myers Jr., Patricia Ray,
Hyeon-Eui Kim, Kevin Monroe & Irma Arteaga, Racialized Perceptions and Child Neglect, 34
CHILD. & YOUTH SERVS. REV. 1480, 1489 (2012) (concluding that racialized beliefs and
perceptions among caseworkers “are highly correlated with the overrepresentation of black
children among substantiated maltreatment cases”); Alan J. Dettlaff, Stephanie L. Rivaux,
Donald J. Baumann, John D. Fluke, Joan R. Rycraft & Joyce James, Disentangling Substantiation:
The Influence of Race, Income, and Risk on the Substantiation Decision in Child Welfare, 33
CHILD. & YOUTH SERVS. REV. 1630, 1635 (2011) (concluding that race is correlated with
caseworkers’ assessments of risk); see also ROBERTS, supra note 132, at 112 (suggesting that
unbiased decisions cannot be made regarding adoption placements); Jessica Dixon, The AfricanAmerican Child Welfare Act: A Legal Redress for African-American Disproportionality in Child
Protection Cases, 10 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 109, 110 (2008) (“Recent research shows
that race impacts professionals’ decision making at almost every stage of the process.”).
365. See Dettlaff, supra note 347, at 160 (“[T]he authors suggested that although income is a
factor that influences risk assessment, it is not a factor that influences the decision threshold.
Rather, the threshold is influenced by factors associated with the decision-maker, such as their
perceptions of race.”).
366. The “best interests of the child standard” is the dominant principle in family law, which
has long been criticized for the discretion it confers on judges. For a critique of the best interests
standard, see Alstott, Dailey & NeJaime, supra note 6, at 1.
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seek, either consciously or unconsciously, to impose their own
parenting values on other groups.367
Moreover, the current child welfare system, which prioritizes posthoc removals over ex-ante support for families, has created a regime of
family surveillance in low-income communities of color with
devastating consequences for all families living within the
communities.368 Calls to defund the child welfare system are motivated
in part by a recognition that, whatever good the system is doing for the
small number of children at risk of serious abuse, it is vastly outweighed
by the widespread harm to Black children and families living in
constant fear of removal.369 In addition to the harm done to individual
children, the threat of removal exerts a terrifying control over
communities of color, adversely affecting all children who live there.370
Our model illuminates the systemic conditions of economic
inequality and racial discrimination that undergird the current child
welfare system, conditions that amplify the harms from the
privatization of dependency and related parent–state binary. While
recognizing concerns about abandoning children to the private sphere
of parental control, we join calls for prohibiting removal except in cases
of serious and imminent psychological or physical maltreatment. As
described above, removals from imperfect but not seriously abusive or
neglectful home environments have detrimental developmental
consequences for children, and many children experience new forms of
abuse and neglect after they are removed from their parents and placed
into foster care.371 Children also often move between multiple foster
homes, compounding the destabilizing effects of removal, and
367. See, e.g., Amy Sinden, “Why Won’t Mom Cooperate?”: A Critique of Informality in Child
Welfare Proceedings, 11 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 339, 353–55 (1999) (explaining that the “best
interests of the child” standard is “extremely malleable and subjective”). To address this problem
in the judicial context, Sean Williams has proposed permitting family court judges to adopt rules
based on “local values” in order to cabin judicial discretion and limit the influence of unconscious
biases. See generally Sean Hannon Williams, Wild Flowers in the Swamp: Local Rules and Family
Law, 65 DRAKE L. REV. 781 (2017) (advocating for the use of judge-made local rules to guide
judges use of their “discretion in family law matters”).
368. See Roberts, supra note 132 passim.
369. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 350.
370. See Dorothy E. Roberts, Child Protection as Surveillance of African American Families,
36 J. SOC. WELFARE & FAM. L. 426, 429–34 (2014).
371. See Trivedi, supra note 320, at 528 (referencing studies suggesting that separation from
parents imposes adverse developmental and biological consequences); Sarah Katz, TraumaInformed Practice: The Future of Child Welfare?, 28 WIDENER COMMONWEALTH L. REV. 51, 80
(2019) (noting the lack of empirical evidence that creating a new family is better for children).
LGBTQ children are especially vulnerable. See Konnoth, supra note 232, at 274.
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frequently spend months, or even years, in the foster care system even
though parental reunification is ostensibly the ultimate goal.372 Due in
part to this instability, children in the foster care system are more likely
than other low-income children to drop out of high school, experience
homelessness, and suffer from mental and emotional health
conditions.373
Like other commentators, we aim to balance protecting children’s
interest in remaining with caring parents and their interest in emotional
and physical safety. Children’s interest in maintaining relationships
with their parents should not become an excuse for failing to help
children when circumstances warrant. We should be especially
concerned about a system of child welfare that does not value the lives
of racially and economically marginalized children sufficiently to
protect them against harm. This construction minimizes the
importance of background structural conditions like poverty and
homelessness in producing abuse or neglect, instead ascribing it to
parents’ “flawed character.”374 When based upon racial norms, child
welfare removals also perpetuate ongoing legacies of slavery and past
efforts to forcibly assimilate Native American tribes, undermining
communities’ cohesiveness and their ability to transmit cultural
practices from one generation to the next.375
In the long run, therefore, our model seeks to ameliorate the
background conditions of inequality and racial bias that lead to
removal. The need for removal could be vastly reduced if law focused
on all children’s interests in maintaining relationships with their
parents instead of focusing on parental fault, whether real or perceived.
Under our model, when serious harm to the child is threatened, the
372. See CASEY FAMILY PROGRAMS, STRONG FAMILIES 2 (2018), https://caseyfamilyprowpengine.netdna-ssl.com/media/SF_Placement-stability-impacts_2021.pdf [https://perma.cc/2Z658HPE] (showing that 67 percent of children over the age of two in foster care had more than two
foster care placements).
373. Moira A. Szilagyi, David S. Rosen, David Rubin & Sarah Zlotnik, Health Care Issues
for Children and Adolescents in Foster Care and Kinship Care, 136 PEDIATRICS 1131, 1132 (2015);
VANESSA X. BARRAT & BETHANN BERLINER, THE INVISIBLE ACHIEVEMENT GAP:
EDUCATION OUTCOMES OF STUDENTS IN FOSTER CARE IN CALIFORNIA’S PUBLIC SCHOOLS iii–
iv (2013) (discussing findings that children in the foster care system showed an achievement gap
compared to other students, in addition to experiencing higher drop-out rates).
374. Danielle Keats Citron, A Poor Mother’s Right to Privacy: A Review, 98 B.U. L. REV.
1139, 1145–46 (2018).
375. See Hari Kunzru, As American as Family Separation, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (July 1, 2021),
https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2021/07/01/as-american-as-family-separation [https://perma.cc/V6QDN8Y6] (reviewing LAURA BRIGGS, TAKING CHILDREN: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN TERROR
(2021)).
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state must consider the emotional trauma of removal when assessing
whether to separate parent and child.376 Although the state would still
be obligated to ensure children’s safety when they are clearly
endangered by their parents, the state would preemptively fulfill that
obligation by providing supports designed to bolster parenting, such as
visiting nurses, parenting guidance, and income supplements. If
parental failings nonetheless occur, careful case-by-case efforts should
be taken to keep children with their parents whenever possible through
the provision of state support and rehabilitative services. Training,
supervision, and community engagement should be directed to
reducing children’s removal from the home. Surveillance should be
replaced by alliance and trust.
Our model anticipates adequate state support for all families and
a child welfare system designed to keep parents and children together
to the extent possible without significantly harming children. Some
child advocates, rightly troubled by the system’s failings, seek to
radically reduce child protective services or do away with them
altogether.377 Yet because there will always be some parents who
cannot care for their children, we need a child welfare system that
protects their safety. Moreover, without the threat of permanent
separation, some parents might voluntarily seek state help with
childrearing during times of crisis. Perhaps, one day, adequate supports
will be in place, making child welfare intervention unnecessary. Yet
this day will not arrive until the state has fully assumed its responsibility
to support families.
In the meantime, our model calls for preventive state support for
struggling families and resources to ensure that children’s separation
from their parents happens only when absolutely necessary. This
initiative means committing federal and state resources to a badly
overburdened child welfare system, increasing the number of social
workers available, increasing high-quality training in child
development and implicit bias, providing at-home services, and
dramatically reducing child protection caseloads. The goal is to
reinforce parental caregiving to allow children to safely remain in their

376. See Trivedi, supra note 320, at 528 (noting the adverse psychological consequences
resulting from removal). Currently, there is no requirement that such emotional trauma be
considered.
377. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 350 (arguing that child protective services should be
defunded, echoing previous calls for police abolition).
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homes, moving away from a punitive regime of child removal toward a
regime of family support.
3. Parental Incarceration. Imprisonment for low-level drug and
other offenses has led to a well-documented crisis of mass incarceration
in this country.378 With mass incarceration has come shocking rates of
forced separations of children and parents. These separations are not
well-monitored and tracked, but, as of 2007, nearly 810,000 state and
federal prisoners reported being parents of minor children.379 Of these,
fathers comprised approximately 92 percent.380 A disproportionate
number of affected children are children of color. In 2007, for example,
Black children were 7.5 times more likely than white children to have
an incarcerated parent.381
Mass incarceration is not only a criminal justice issue; it is a
traumatizing assault on children and, because of racial disparities in the
criminal justice system, primarily on Black children.382 Separation may
weaken children’s attachment to their parents, “which has been linked
to poor child outcomes, including poor peer relationships and cognitive
abilities.”383 Additional adverse effects include “anxiety, withdrawal,
hypervigilance, depression, shame and guilt.”384 Anger, aggression, and
378. See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE
AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS passim (rev. ed. 2010) (documenting systematic mass incarceration in
the United States).
379. LAUREN E. GLAZE & LAURA M. MARUSCHAK, BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., PARENTS IN
PRISON AND THEIR MINOR CHILDREN 1 (2010).
380. Id. at 2. “[T]he number of incarcerated women has more than doubled in the last
decade.” Shani M. King, Hannah Ayasse, Alyssa Mikytuck, Rachel F. Barr, Jennifer F. Woolard
& Terry Harrak, The Intersection of Juvenile Justice and Early Childhood: How To Maximize
Family Engagement, 71 FLA. L. REV. F. 88, 88 (2019).
381. See Eric Martin, Hidden Consequences: The Impact of Incarceration on Dependent
Children, NAT’L INST. OF JUST. (Mar. 1, 2017), https://nij.ojp.gov/topics/articles/hiddenconsequences-impact-incarceration-dependent-children [https://perma.cc/X324-QYFJ].
382. See Chesa Boudin, Children of Incarcerated Parents: The Child’s Constitutional Right to
the Family Relationship, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 77, 77–78 (2011) (explaining that mass
incarceration victimizes the children of those incarcerated); Philip M. Genty, Damage to Family
Relationships as a Collateral Consequence of Parental Incarceration, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1671,
1671 (2003) (explaining how imprisonment damages family relationships); Anna R. Haskins,
Paternal Incarceration and Children’s Schooling Contexts: Intersecting Inequalities of Educational
Opportunity, 674 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 134, 35 (2017) (suggesting that mass
incarceration deepens disadvantages among students); Kristin Turney & Rebecca Goodsell,
Parental Incarceration and Children’s Wellbeing, 28 FUTURE CHILD. 147, 148 (2018) (stating that
parental incarceration is associated with negative outcomes for children, even when controlling
for other factors like poverty or family instability).
383. King et al., supra note 380, at 89.
384. Id.
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hostility can emerge toward caregivers and siblings and also affect
school performance.385 The effects of parental imprisonment on
children may last for generations.
Many scholars and commentators have addressed the effects of
mass incarceration, with some specifically focused on the effects on
families and children.386 But the collateral consequences of parental
imprisonment for children in this country largely have been ignored by
legislators, police departments, and prosecutors’ offices. Children’s
interests are rarely, if ever, taken into account as mandatory minimum
sentencing laws are passed and individuals are arrested, prosecuted,
and sentenced for often low-level crimes. Indeed, the U.S. Sentencing
Commission Guidelines Manual expressly instructs judges to overlook
children in the determination of their parents’ sentences.387
Under current law, the adult criminal justice system is too often
blind to children’s interests, particularly children’s interests in
maintaining close attachment relationships with their parents. In the
context of parental imprisonment, the prevailing all-or-nothing
approach to parental rights is especially pernicious. A parent sentenced
to prison will be viewed as having forfeited his or her rights to a
relationship with children, at least temporarily and sometimes for
good.388 Children are thus implicitly treated as a kind of property, as
they once were at common law. Their compelling interests in
maintaining an attachment relationship with their parents go
unrecognized. Moreover, because of this focus on parental forfeiture,
the system ultimately permits termination of parental rights as a
consequence of the crimes that led to imprisonment.
The harms to children from parental incarceration are enormous.
They face declines in physical, psychological, and educational
wellbeing and increases in the risks of future drug use, unemployment,

385. Id.; see also Amy B. Cyphert, Prisoners of Fate: The Challenges of Creating Change for
Children of Incarcerated Parents, 77 MD. L. REV. 385, 392 (2018) (noting that parental
incarceration is a strong risk factor for school failure).
386. See supra note 382 and accompanying text; see also Sarah Katz, Parental Criminal
Convictions and the Best Interest of the Child, 2019 PA. BAR ASS’N Q. 27, 28 (discussing what
consideration should be given to parental criminal convictions in custody determinations).
387. U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.6 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018); Cyphert,
supra note 385, at 387.
388. See Philip M. Genty, Damage to Family Relationships as a Collateral Consequence of
Parental Incarceration, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1671, 1678–79 (2003).
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and prison.389 Families lose income from the incarcerated parent, and
parental rights might eventually be terminated.390 Under the new
parental rights, incarceration should never be the sole basis for
terminating parental rights. Instead, the state should aim to maintain
the relationship between parent and child while at the same time
providing the child with custodial care. In some circumstances, that
means that individual children may have more than two parental
figures in their lives.
More broadly, attention must be paid to the racial inequality that
underlies the separation of parents and children of color in the criminal
justice system. A serious effort to protect children’s interests would
mean developing laws and policies that address racial injustices in
policing, prosecuting, and sentencing.
The new parental rights thus seeks to dramatically decrease the
level of parental imprisonment. In addition to reducing incarceration
levels overall, individual sentencing should take into account the
effects of prison on children with whom the defendant has a close
attachment relationship. Children should not be treated as collateral
damage in a war between parents and state. Neither should the parent
be viewed as having forfeited the relationship with his or her child,
thereby reducing the child to a mere property interest.
Incarceration, where necessary, would be accompanied by state
efforts to maintain an attachment relationship between parent and
child. Frequent and high-quality visits have been shown to benefit
children.391 Parents should be incarcerated near the child’s home; under
federal law, inmates must be housed in facilities within five hundred
miles of family,392 but even this distance is too far for many children.
Visiting times should be generous, and the state should guarantee that
children have the resources to get to prison. Prison facilities should

389. Cyphert, supra note 385, at 390–94 (describing emotional, financial, and social effects of
parental incarceration on children).
390. See id.; see, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-15-319 (2020) (providing for termination of parental
rights where parents are unable to care for the child, taking into consideration, inter alia,
“[c]onviction of and imprisonment for a felony.”).
391. See NANCY G. LA VIGNE, ELIZABETH DAVIES & DIANA BRAZZELL, URB. INST. JUST.
POL’Y CTR., BROKEN BONDS: UNDERSTANDING AND ADDRESSING THE NEEDS OF CHILDREN
WITH INCARCERATED PARENTS 10 (2008) (“[M]aintaining contact with one’s incarcerated parent
appears to be one of the most effective ways to improve a child’s emotional response to the
incarceration and reduce the incidence of problematic behavior.”).
392. First Step Act of 2018, 18 U.S.C. § 3621.
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make phones and computers more readily available for calls and
videoconferencing with children.
Moreover, increased connections between incarcerated parents
and their children could bolster rehabilitation as a stated goal of the
adult criminal justice system.393 Parenting programs could help develop
inmates’ parenting skills and otherwise encourage interactions
between parents and children. The aim would be to maintain
attachment relationships with children throughout incarceration and to
prepare inmates to resume an important place in children’s lives upon
release.
CONCLUSION
This Article presents a new model of parental rights that addresses
what the law now denies: the important ways in which children’s
interests may depart from those of their parents and the need for more
robust state support of children and their families. Support for
expansive parental rights in this country is undeniably strong but
tragically misguided. Although many believe that children and families
are better off when parents have full control over their children, the
reality is the opposite. The regime of expansive parental rights may
directly harm the many children who are different from their parents
or who do not live within families that conform to the traditional
nuclear form. Moreover, although many advocates for expansive
parental rights believe that parental rights are necessary to protect
economically and racially disadvantaged families from an overreaching
state, expansive parental rights fortify a regime of private support that
forces these families to fend for themselves alone.
The new parental rights set forth in this Article seeks to dispel the
overly romantic visions of parent–child unity and the public–private
divide that have captured the law’s imagination for at least the last
century. By calling for greater state support of both children and
families, our model challenges the privatization of dependency; fosters
diversity of family life; and respects the independent needs, values,
beliefs, and identities of all children.

393. See Cyphert, supra note 385, at 395 (noting that increased visits are associated with
reduced recidivism among incarcerated parents).

